X—Ethics and the First-Person Perspective

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 123 (3):253-274 (2023)
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Abstract

It is sometimes claimed that each of us has a special ‘first-person perspective’ on our own mind. It is also sometimes claimed that each of us confronts questions about what to do from a distinctively ‘agent-centred’ standpoint. This essay argues that the analogies between these claims are not just superficial, but point to the importance, in both cases, of a representational structure that sets ‘first-person’ awareness apart from external or ‘third-person’ awareness. I describe this structure and show its importance in clarifying some well-known claims about the importance of the agent’s standpoint in ethics.

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Matthew Boyle
University of Chicago

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References found in this work

Famine, affluence, and morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Ought, Agents, and Actions.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):1-41.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Ethics 98 (1):137-157.
Should the numbers count?John Taurek - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):293-316.

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