Species of Goodness

Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. I contend that the distinction has never been properly drawn. My main task is to formulate the distinction in a way that avoids the problems of the traditional formulations. ;After defending the traditional Moorean conception of intrinsic value against John Mackie's arguments from relativity and "queerness," and against recent attacks by Elizabeth Anderson and Shelly Kagan, I attempt to define two important types of extrinsic value in terms of intrinsic value. First, I define instrumental value. The main problem with traditional definitions of instrumental value is that they fail to account for the fact that preventing something intrinsically evil from occurring seems to be just as worthwhile as bringing about something intrinsically good. I attempt to account for this fact by introducing a "contextualist" analysis of instrumental value. Next, I present and defend an analysis of contributory value. I compare contributory value with conditional intrinsic value, and present an argument to show that the notion of conditional intrinsic value faces problems that can be avoided by admitting the existence of contributory value. I then expand on the contextualist analysis of instrumental value, and provide an analysis of extrinsic value that explains what is common to instrumental and contributory value. I contend that my analysis can also account for other types of extrinsic value---for example, signatory value---and I defend my analysis against recent objections by Alastair Norcross involving the extrinsic values of actions. ;Finally, I argue that contributory value can help to solve a current problem in environmental ethics. The problem is this: how can it be that the last member of a species is more valuable than a similar member of a flourishing species ? I argue that diversity of goods increases the value of a whole; therefore, the last member of an endangered species has contributory value in virtue of its contribution to the world's biological diversity

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,516

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Can instrumental value be intrinsic?Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):137-157.
The Goodness of Means: Instrumental and Relational Values, Causation, and Environmental Policies.Patrik Baard - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (1):183-199.
“Intrinsically” or just “Instrumentally” Valuable? On Structural Types of Values of Scientific Knowledge.Peter P. Kirschenmann - 2001 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 32 (2):237-256.
An Interest-Satisfaction Theory of Value.Warren Neill - 1998 - Ethics and the Environment 3 (1):55 - 80.
Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23-43.
Sentimental value.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):373–379.
Two Distinctions in Environmental Goodness.Karen Green - 1996 - Environmental Values 5 (1):31 - 46.
Moral Status, Final Value, and Extrinsic Properties.Nicolas Delon - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):371-379.
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-05

Downloads
32 (#699,889)

6 months
11 (#329,096)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Principia ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. Edited by Thomas Baldwin.
Utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill - 1861 - Cleveland: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Roger Crisp.
“How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on moral realism. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 13 (3):7-9.
Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.

View all 46 references / Add more references