Abstract

The problem of interpersonal utility comparisons has remained a thorn in the side of utilitarian theorizing for over a century. The present work argues that the problem rests on a metaphysical assumption: namely, that preferences bear their intensities as monadic properties, so that it makes sense to attempt to directly compare the strength of some of an individual's preferences with those of someone else, without regard for the strengths of their remaining preferences. The failure of behavioural and physiological proposals for performing such "direct"comparisons is carefully examined, and further considerations are adduced to support the view that preference intensities are relational rather than monadic properties. A proportionate interpretation of individual welfare is then sketched which forms the basis for "indirect" interpersonal comparisons, on which preference strengths are compared via their proportionate contribution to each person's total possible welfare. The final chapters argue that the usual distributive objections to utilitarianism cannot be sustained against a version based on indirect comparisons; and that recent complaints centered around the notion that utilitarianism is too demanding as a moral theory depend on misconstruing it as a theory of obligation rather than as a theory of the moral worth of actions