Towards a Theory of Theoretical Objects

PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986 (1):384-393 (1986)
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Abstract

Science is made possible by the introduction of theoretical objects. Why this should be so has never been made clear. Indeed, it has never been made clear how theoretical objects are rightly to be understood, or in what ways they differ from more ordinary sorts of physical objects. What follows is a sketch of a new theory. In my view, this theory becomes explicit on the so-called “Copenhagen interpretation” of quantum mechanics. But it has implicitly characterized scientific development since the revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries.How are theoretical objects rightly to be understood? I say that they are objects whose existence is postulated by a theory is alright as far as it goes, but it doesn’t go far enough. We also need to know what theories are.

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reprint Brittan Jr, Gordon G. (1986) "Towards a Theory of Theoretical Objects". PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986():384 - 393

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