In der Arbeit wird eine textimmanente Problemstellung der Transzendentalen Dialektik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft aufgegriffen, indem ausgehend vom Grundsatz der Vernunft nach der Möglichkeit eines regulativen Apriori im Rahmen der methodischen Vorgaben der Kritik der reinen Vernunft gefragt wird. Kants regulativer Vernunftgebrauch wird in drei Teilen untersucht: Der erste Teil – Problemfeld – entwickelt ausgehend von der Antinomie der reinen Vernunft immanente Kriterien, durch die das Lehrstück des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik dargestellt und geprüft werden kann. Der zweite Teil (...) – Analysen – entwickelt textimmanent die Herleitung der Vernunftbegriffe, das dadurch geleistete Systematische der Erkenntnis und ihre transzendentale Rechtfertigung. Der dritte Teil – Dimension und Reichweite – untersucht auf der Basis der textimmanenten Analyse die konkreten Beispiele, die Kant im Anhang zur Transzendentalen Dialektik anführt, um damit die begrifflich-abstrakten Gedankengänge an Fallbeispielen zu konkretisieren. Der Grundsatz der Vernunft wird dabei in seiner konstitutiven Form zurückgewiesen und in einer regulativen Interpretation als transzendentaler Grundsatz der Vernunft neu begründet. (shrink)

In The Philosophical Criticism, Alois Riehl developed a realistic interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism based on his theory of space and time. In doing so, more than 100 years ago, he formulated an interpretation of the relation between the thing in itself and appearances that is discussed in current research as the metaphysical „dual aspect“ interpretation, although it is rarely attributed to Riehl. To reconstruct Riehl’s position, the research results of comparative studies on Moritz Schlick are systematically extended and applied (...) to the current debate on Kant’s transcendental idealism. (shrink)

In the theoretical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the term object has an extensive and far-reaching significance, and it can therefore be understood as a theory of objects. This becomes particularly clear when it is observed that all of his guidelines can be traced to different concepts of objects and their combination. With his concept of the object of experience, he attempts to mediate incompatible aspects in this: in relation to the object of experience, we have apodictic claims but at the (...) same time our knowledge of the object develops and contains the possibility of historical progress. This theory of objects was elaborated by Kant with regard to natural science and the claim of its metaphysical foundation. For this reason, Kant’s concept of object is inherently linked with his concept of science. Astronomy is at the core of his investigation, because it represents a perfect example of a so-called proper and rational natural science. (shrink)

In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant formulates teleological principles, or rather ideas, and explicates them referring to concrete examples of natural science such as chemistry, astronomy, biology, empirical psychology, and physical geography. Despite the increasing interest in the systematic relevance of the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and its importance for Kant’s conception of natural science, the numerous historical sources for the regulative use of reason have not yet been investigated. One that is very central is Maupertuis’ principle (...) of least action. In 1781, Kant transformed teleology into heuristics and methodology, but in doing so, he partially develops a teleology which was disqualified by Maupertuis because its starting point lies in the construction of animals or plants, the structure of the earth, and the immensity of the celestial bodies. Based on Maupertuis’ principle of action, it can be shown that the Appendix forms a systematic interface between Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens and Critique of Judgement which allows the reconstruction of Kant’s regulative use of reason and its specific status in the context of natural science and his critical appraisal of Maupertuis. (shrink)

With the first edition of the Philosophical Criticism, published in the 1870s and 1880s, Alois Riehl became the founder and most important representative of Realistic Criticism, and emerged as one of the leading figures in German-speaking philosophy at the turn of the century. In 1901, he applied for a chair at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Vienna. In the appointment procedure for the succession to Ernst Mach, he was chosen by the committee with the recommendation unico loco, (...) and also confirmed by the faculty. Nevertheless, the Minister of Education, Wilhelm von Hartel, rejected the recommendation for political and ideological reasons. Using previously unpublished archival sources, the present study reconstructs Riehl’s academic career, the conditions of the appointment procedure, the internal decision-making processes, and the reasons that ultimately led to his rejection. The aim of the article is to develop a case study that, first, makes educational policy in Austria visible and, second, critically evaluates the term Austrian Philosophy that dates back to this time. (shrink)

Im ersten Teil des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik entwickelt Kant einen Übergang zwischen dem logischen Gebrauch der Vernunft und den transzendentalen Prinzipien der Vernunft. Basierend auf methodologischen Überlegungen zur Chemie, zur physiologischen Anthropologie und zur Entwicklungsgeschichte astronomischer Grundannahmen versucht Kant, diese Prinzipien in ihrem transzendentalen Status zu rechtfertigen und ihre Kompatibilität mit anderen Teilen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft nachzuweisen. Ausgehend von diesen wissenschaftstheoretischen Beispielen wird für eine heuristisch- pragmatische Rechtfertigung der transzendentalen Prinzipien der Vernunft und eine ideelle Funktion der (...) durch diese Prinzipien gewonnenen Ideen argumentiert. Dabei lässt sich die enge Verbindung zwischen den transzendentalen Prinzipien des ersten Teils des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik und Kants Konzept der rationalen Naturwissenschaft in den Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft nachweisen. (shrink)

In a crucial paragraph (KrV, A 663-664 / B 691-692) of the first part of the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic”, Kant discusses the specific status of the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity. In doing so, he refers to an already proven argument and thus to other passages of the Critique of Pure Reason. In search of this argument the “Transcendental Analytic” but in particular the “first book” of the “Transcendental Dialectic” turn out to be possible reference points. Although (...) this contextualisation demands further systematic and editorial reflections, it also allows the clarification of the status of the principles and their justification in relation to a subjective deduction. Kant offers with the subjective deduction, as introduced in the “Preface” (of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason) and again in the “first book” of the “Transcendental Dialectic”, a first argumentative strategy, which differs from the objective one but provides “some objective validity” (KrV, A 664 / B 692; Kant, 1998, p. 602) and therefore has systematic importance for the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity. My aim is to offer immanent strategies for a justification of the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity in the framework of the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

In her 1921 book, The Space-Time Problem in Kant and Einstein, Ilse Schneider examines the foundations and consequences of the theory of relativity from an epistemological perspective. Beyond addressing detailed questions of early 1920s physics, it is a programmatic attempt to reconcile Kant’s transcendental idealism with Albert Einstein’s physics. The Kantian background puts the book in direct competition with Ernst Cassirer’s book Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, published in the same year. Schneider’s approach was largely ignored in the research compared with (...) Cassirer’s. What has not been considered so far is that Schneider and Cassirer represent two different interpretations of Kant, which they apply to Einstein’s physics. Recent Kant scholarship has differentiated these interpretations into the “metaphysical” and “epistemological dual-aspect” views. The former view can be found in the work of Schneider’s academic supervisor, Alois Riehl, and clearly distinguishes Schneider’s realist-inspired approach from Cassirer’s idealism. Given these differing views, it is necessary to be more precise when speaking of “immunization strategies” in the context of neo-Kantianism in order to make the differences between Schneider and Cassirer clear. Cassirer immunizes philosophy from the results of physics. In contrast, Schneider exposes philosophy much more strongly to physics. (shrink)

Der Band versammelt Studien zu philosophische, wissenschaftlichen und künstlerischen Reflexionen auf das Vermögen der Einbildungskraft, das in der Erkenntnistheorie und Psychologie des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts in bedeutenden Entwürfen und erbitterten Kontroversen europaweit diskutiert wurde. Zwischen produktivem und reproduktivem Status, d.h. zwischen Phantasie und Gedächtnis changierend wurde die Leistungsfähigkeit für Erkenntnis und Wissenschaft von den Gefahren der Täuschungen des Geistes durch die Einbildungskraft korreliert. Der Band leistet eine breit gefächerte Sichtung der unterschiedlichen Konzepte der Einbildungskraft und ein Tableau der Begründungsleistungen (...) erstellen, das historische und systematische Perspektiven produktiv vermittelt. (shrink)

Alois Riehl’s View of Friedrich Nietzsche and His Relationship with Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. Alois Riehl and Friedrich Nietzsche were contemporaries – both were born in the same year, 1844. But the philosophical paths they followed could hardly be more different. Nevertheless, Riehl recognized Nietzsche as one of the most important thinkers of his time. He was one of the first academic philosophers to devote a detailed analysis to Nietzsche’s writings. And Riehl saw in Nietzsche’s work a complementary counterpart to the scientific (...) philosophy that he developed in his Philosophical Criticism. At the heart of the present paper is a speech given by Riehl on October 15, 1903, on the occasion of the reopening of the Villa Silberblick and the unveiling of Max Klinger’s bust of Nietzsche. The argument is divided into three parts. First, it reconstructs the background to these events historically in light of the friendly relationship between Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and Riehl, as well as Riehl’s hesitation to give a speech. Second, Riehl’s ambivalent attitude in his reception of Nietzsche is analyzed through a close reading of his text. Third, the paper concludes with a final look at the specific event of October 15, 1903, based on historical material. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, the controversy between conceptualists and nonconceptualists has provided important insights into Kant’s critical project and especially the transcendental deduction. At the same time, the differentiation of the various positions has led to a seemingly unsolvable paradox in interpretation. However, if the intensifications of the debate are withdrawn and the current positions are placed in the context of historical interpretations, it becomes apparent that a nonconceptualism can indeed be developed without coming into (irresolvable) conflict with Kant’s (...) conceptualism. In this sense, Alois Riehl proposes in his Philosophical Criticism (vol. 1) a so-called state nonconceptualism. Even if he does not have the terminology in use today, he can defend this on par with the current debate especially with regard to A 89–90 / B 122–123. In doing so, Riehl’s realistic interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism offers strategies that again question a hasty skepticism towards nonconceptualist interpretations. (shrink)

In dem Band entwickeln renommierte Autorinnen und Autoren in 22 Beiträgen Antworten auf eine Reihe von Fragen zu Immanuel Kant und der Rezeption seiner Philosophie in Österreich, die bis heute noch nicht ausreichend diskutiert wurden: Gab es überhaupt einen österreichischen Neukantianismus? Wie prägend ist die Philosophie von Kant für die Entwicklung der Philosophie in Österreich? Oder anders formuliert: Inwiefern haben österreichische Denkerinnen und Denker des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts einen Beitrag zu einem spezifischen Verständnis der kantischen Philosophie geleistet? Dabei zeigt (...) sich, dass neben den zwei Hauptformen des Neukantianismus in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts – d.h. der Marburger und der Südwestdeutschen Schule – ein spezifisch österreichischer Zugang zu Kant historisch wie systematisch von besonderer Bedeutung ist und weitreichende Folgen hatte. Unter Absehung der üblichen geografischen Zuordnungen der verschiedenen Schulen lässt sich dieser als realistischer Kritizismus beschreiben und hat neben Richard Hönigswald und Robert Reininger seinen wichtigsten Vertreter in Alois Riehl. (shrink)

In the epistemology and psychology of the 17th and 18th centuries, various conceptions of the faculty of imagination were the subject of heated debate. This volume brings together a number of studies on these philosophical, scientific, and artistic notions of imagination, which offer a fruitful range of historical and systematic approaches to the topic.