Intrinsic Value, Organic Unity and Environmental Philosophy: Grounding Our Values
Dissertation, University of Minnesota (
1993)
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Abstract
By arguing that current theories of ontology and intrinsic value in environmental ethics are inadequate in informing a truly ecological ethic, I show that new theories need to be developed if environmental philosophers are going to be able to address environmental policy issues. I offer an ecologically-informed ontology that fulfills the need for an adequate ontology by identifying the various beings that should be considered by an environmental ethic. This ontology includes various ecological entities, e.g., ecosystems, bioregions and populations, as well as genealogical entities, e.g., demes, lineages, families and species. Then, I develop a basis for intrinsic value of non-human nature--intrinsic value as degree of organic unity. The aesthetic notion of organic unity, I argue, provides an adequate grounds for intrinsic value in environmental ethic. When this ontology and theory of value are combined, they provide direction for public policy issues concerning the environment