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Intrinsic Value
Edited by Miles Tucker (Virginia Commonwealth University)
About this topic
| Summary | The intrinsic value of a thing is the value it has in itself or for its own sake. First-order questions about intrinsic value focus on its bearers. Are the only basic intrinsic goods pleasures or satisfied desires? Or might more ‘objective’ goods, such as virtue, beauty, and understanding be valuable as well? Second-order questions about intrinsic value focus on (i) the intelligibility of the concept (ii) the possibility that the intrinsic value of a thing may depend on its extrinsic features and (iii) the relation between intrinsic value and other moral concepts such as instrumental value, welfare, fittingness, virtue, and moral obligation. |
| Key works | Moore 1903 advances and defends the now classical conception of intrinsic value. Chisholm 1986 develops a fitting attitude analysis of intrinsic value grounded in the work of Franz Brentano and proposes influential answers to a range of axiological puzzles. Thomson 1997 introduces widely-discussed arguments against the coherence of non-relational value in general and intrinsic value in particular. Korsgaard 1983 provides a Kantian approach to axiology and suggests that the concept of intrinsic value is subordinate to the concept of final value. Kagan 1998 advances a battery of arguments which aim to show that the intrinsic value of a thing may depend upon its extrinsic features. Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004 introduces the now widely discussed 'wrong kind of reason' objection to fitting attitude analyses of value. Lemos 1994 and Zimmerman 2001 are broad and important works that defend a generally Moorean approach to the nature and significance of intrinsic goodness. |
| Introductions | Zimmerman 2019 Bradley 2013 |
Show all references
Related
Siblings
- Aesthetic Value (1,313 | 349)
- Epistemic Value (517)
- Environmental Value (941 | 611)
- Moral Value (1,570 | 195)
- Well-Being (1,681 | 12)
- Varieties of Value, Misc (209)
Contents
463 found
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| 1 — 50 / 463 |
- (1 other version)Mapping Human Values: Enhancing Social Marketing through Obituary Data-Mining.Mark Alfano, Andrew Higgins & Jacob Levernier - forthcoming - In Lynn Kahle & Eda Atay, Social and Cultural Values in a Global and Digital Age.
- On the intrinsic value of diversity.Seth D. Baum & Andrea Owe - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.Diversity is an important ethical concept, but it is almost exclusively studied within two domains: biodiversity and diversity of sociological attributes such as race and gender. We provide a general study of the intrinsic value of diversity. We survey prior literature on the intrinsic value of biodiversity and sociological diversity in search of insights relevant to the intrinsic value of all types of diversity. We then present three thought experiments designed to clarify intuitions about the intrinsic value of small amounts (...)
- Why we Must Change the Bioethical Terminology around So-Called “Lives Not Worth Living,” and “Worthwhile” and “Unworthwhile” Lives.Rebecca Bennett - forthcoming - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics:1-11.The terminology of “lives not worth living,” “worthwhile lives,” and “unworthwhile lives,” used by John Harris and many others, has become an accepted linguistic convention in bioethical discussions. These terms are used to distinguish lives of overwhelming negative experience from lives that are or are expected to be of overall positive value. As such, this terminology seems helpful in discussions around resource allocation, end-of-life decision making and questions of when it might be acceptable (and unacceptable) to reproduce. This paper argues (...)
- Failure.Gwen Bradford - forthcoming - In Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet, Ill-Being: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.In Achievement, I suggest that failures can be just as good as achievements. Achievements are valuable because of their effort and competence, and some failures have these features too, and are therefore valuable for the same reasons. While that may be true, surely it’s also true that failures are, or can be, genuinely bad – not merely a privation of the good of achievement, but themselves intrinsically bad. As is the case for many bads, it is surprisingly difficult to give (...)$115.00 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation
Bookmark - Positional conditional egalitarianism.Susumu Cato & Ken Oshitani - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.Conditional egalitarianism is a form of egalitarianism that responds to the levelling-down objection by asserting that equality is intrinsically valuable only when it benefits some individuals. Andrew Mason’s original formulation of conditional egalitarianism faces criticism from Nils Holtug, who proposes a refined formulation that introduces a clause regarding the effects of additional benefits on equality. However, Holtug’s own formulation encounters internal inconsistencies. This paper proposes a positional refinement of Holtug’s conditional egalitarianism, emphasizing the importance of impartiality in evaluating distributions. This (...)No categories
- Knowledge, Tennis, and Objective List Accounts of Well-Being.Alan H. Goldman - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-20.This paper argues that objective list accounts of well-being cannot account for the fact that not all knowledge, an item typically on such lists, is good for people independently of their attitudes toward it. The most obvious way to distinguish that knowledge that is intrinsically valuable is precisely in terms of subjective attitudes and aims. Tennis is a source of well-being for me. It is not simply instrumentally valuable to me as a means to any usual member of objective lists. (...)No categories
- Sortal Quality: Pleasure, Desire, and Moral Worth.David Hunter - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.(DRAFT: I'll update when the book is published.) This started as a book about desire. I was hoping to complement what I had said about belief in my (2022). To believe something, I argued, is to be positioned to do, think and feel things in light of a possibility whose obtaining would make one right. I argued that believing is not representational, that belief states are not causes or causal powers, and that the objects of belief are ways the world (...)
- The Axiology of Pain and Pleasure.Alycia LaGuardia-LoBianco & Paul Bloomfield - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-24.There is little more common in ethics than to think pain is intrinsically bad and pleasure is intrinsically good. A Humean-style error theory of the axiology of pain and pleasure is developed against these commonsense claims. We defend the thesis that the value of pain and pleasure is always contingent and only instrumental. We survey prominent theories of both intrinsic value and pain/pleasure, all of which assume that pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable. We base our error theory on counterexamples (...)
- Toward a Consensus on the Intrinsic Value of Biodiversity.Katie H. Morrow - forthcoming - Environmental Values.This paper addresses the stalemate on the question whether biodiversity has intrinsic value. I distinguish between a “weak” conception and two “strong” conceptions of intrinsic value in the environmental ethics literature. The strong conceptions of intrinsic value are connected, respectively, to moral standing and to a strongly objectivist account of value. Neither of these forms of value likely applies to biodiversity. However, the weak conception of intrinsic value is neutral about both moral standing and the nature of value and plausibly (...)
- All Play and No Work? AI and Existential Unemployment.Gary David O’Brien - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-25.Recent developments in large language models and image generation software raise the possibility that AI systems might one day replace humans in some of the intrinsically valuable work through which humans find meaning in their lives – work like scientific and philosophical research and the creation of art. If AIs can do this work more efficiently than humans, this might make human performance of these activities pointless. This represents a threat to human wellbeing which is distinct from, and harder to (...)
- Towards an account of basic final value.Timothy Perrine - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.Ordinary and philosophical thought suggests recognizing a distinction between two ways something can be of final value. Something can be of final value in virtue of its connection to other things of value (“non-basic final value”) or something can be of final value regardless of its connection to other things of value (“basic final value”). The primary aim of this paper is to provide an account of this distinction. I argue that we have reason to draw this distinction as it (...)
- Intrinsically Good, God Created Them.Daniel Rubio - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.Erik Wielenberg [2014] and Mark Murphy [2017], [2018] have defended a series of arguments for the conclusion that creatures are not good intrinsically. In response, I take two steps. First, I introduce a conception of intrinsic value that makes created intrinsic value unproblematic. Second, I respond to their arguments in turn. The first argument is from the sovereignty-aseity intuition and an analysis of intrinsicality that makes derivative good extrinsic. I challenge the analysis. The second comes from a conception of perfection (...)
- Against the Fundamentality of GOOD.Nandi Theunissen & L. Nandi Theunissen - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.The argument that is in question in this article concerns the would-be dependence of one form of value on another. When something is intrinsically good for someone, which is to say, directly beneficial for them, it is so because it is good simpliciter. Proponents of the argument have so-called ‘perfectionist’ values chiefly in mind: worthwhile artworks, striking natural formations, intellectual and scientific achievements. They contend that the fact that engaging with perfectionist goods is non-instrumentally good for people depends on the (...)
- Can Virtue Grow out of Vicious Human Nature? Xunzi’s Genealogy Reconstructed.Tang Yun - forthcoming - Philosophy East and West.Xunzi’s pessimistic understanding of human nature and his endorsement of the intrinsically valuable virtue of yi (義) put him in a vulnerable position. To defend this position, Xunzi needs to conquer what the essay calls “the compatibility problems,” the first of which concerns the compatibility between bad human nature and virtue, while the second is between Xunzi’s functional understanding of virtue and his understanding of virtue as possessing intrinsic value. If Xunzi’s moral philosophy were to fail to solve these two (...)
- Ross on Virtue and Vice.Thomas Hurka & Bowen Chan - 2025 - In Robert Audi & David Phillips, The Moral Philosophy of W. D. Ross: Metaethics, Normative Ethics, Virtue, and Value. Oxford University Press. pp. 169-188.This chapter examines Ross’s account of moral virtue as one of his four intrinsic goods and argues that in key respects it’s superior to the better-known accounts of Aristotle and Kant. Among the topics covered are: (1) Ross’s treatment of virtue as a secondary or derivative good, one that consists in fitting attitudes to other, independently given values or duties—this in contrast with many virtue-ethical views; (2) his sharp separation between the right and the morally good, so a wrong act (...)
- Digital Duplicates and Collective Scarcity.Benjamin Lange - 2025 - Philosophy and Technology 38 (1):1-5..Digital duplicates reduce the scarcity of individuals and thus may impact their instrumental and intrinsic value. I here expand upon this idea by introducing the notion of collective scarcity, which pertains to the limitations faced by social groups in maintaining their size, cohesion, and function.No categories
- The Argument from Addition for No Best World.Daniel Rubio - 2025 - In Justin J. Daeley, Optimism and The Best Possible World. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.This chapter will amount to a detailed exposition and exploration of one of the most prominent arguments against the existence of an unsurpassable world: the argument from addition. Endorsed by a variety of thinkers such as St. Thomas Aquinas, Alvin Plantinga, and William Rowe, the argument from addition uses the possibility of adding good things to a candidate unsurpassable world to argue that every world is surpassable. While widely endorsed, the argument has come under recent criticism. By carefully working through (...)
- Symbolic value and the limits of good-for theory.Aaron Abma - 2024 - Noûs.Good-for theorists claim that to be valuable is to be good for someone, in the sense of being beneficial for them. Their opponents deny this, arguing that some things are good-simpliciter: good independently of being good for anyone. In this article I argue in favor of good-simpliciter. I appeal to the category of symbolically valuable acts, acts which seem valuable even when they do not benefit anyone and even when they are costly to the agent. I explore various strategies a (...)
- Irreplaceable Value.Gwen Bradford - 2024 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies of Metaethics 19. Oxford University Press USA.If the Mona Lisa, the Sistine Chapel, the sarcophagus of Tutankhamun, or the Sword of Goujian were destroyed, nothing could replace them. New works of art that are even more impressive may be created, which may replenish the value in the world in quantity, but they would not fully replace the loss. Works of art and historical artifacts have irreplaceable value. But just what is irreplaceable value? This paper presents perhaps the first analysis. Irreplaceable value is a matter of intrinsic (...)(collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct download (2 more)Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
- Direct acquaintance with intrinsic value.Martin Dimitrov - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 75 (2):428-449.Upon introspection, we judge that suffering feels bad. I argue there is no appearance-reality gap when it comes to introspective judgments about simple, intrinsic, nonrepresentational phenomenal states like itches, tingling, and suffering's feeling bad. On constitutivism about phenomenal introspection, there is no appearance-reality gap here because these judgments are literally constituted by the phenomenal states they are about. As a result, we are directly acquainted with the intrinsic properties of experience in having these judgments. Reflecting on our direct acquaintance with (...)
- On fellowship.Dale Dorsey - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):133-152.This paper explores a form of communion between persons that the philosophy of value has a tendency to ignore. In discussions of interpersonal relationships and experiences, focus is almost always directed to the phenomenon of friendship and family: two or more individuals that share a history, have longstanding relationships of mutual care. Friendship is said, among other things, to be of intrinsic value, to directly benefit the friend, to generate special obligations, and to yield advances in a person’s virtue. But (...)
- It’s Not the Slope that Matters: Well-Being and Shapes of Lives.Gil Hersch & Daniel Weltman - 2024 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 22 (1-2):97-124.Many believe that an upward-sloping life is better than a downward-sloping life because of its shape. This is a common way of formulating the shape of a life hypothesis. We argue that the hypothesis is mistaken. We need not assume that there is something intrinsically valuable in the shape of one’s life to justify the tendency to judge an upward-sloping life as better than a downward sloping one. Instead, we can appeal to more fundamental and less controversial claims to justify (...)
- It’s Not the Slope that Matters: Well-Being and Shapes of Lives.Gil Hersch & Daniel Weltman - 2024 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 22 (1-2).Many believe that an upward-sloping life is better than a downward-sloping life because of its shape. This is a common way of formulating the shape of a life hypothesis. We argue that the hypothesis is mistaken. We need not assume that there is something intrinsically valuable in the shape of one’s life to justify the tendency to judge an upward-sloping life as better than a downward sloping one. Instead, we can appeal to more fundamental and less controversial claims to justify (...)
- Monotheism and Value Monism.Martin Jakobsen - 2024 - Philosophia Christi 26 (1):75-89.This article addresses the following metaethical questions: how many intrinsic values are there? Robert Adams holds the view that there is only one intrinsic value, a view called “intrinsic value monism,” but does not present any arguments in favor of this view. This paper makes the case that there are good reasons for upholding value monism. I argue that our ability to weigh different values against each other supports value monism and that monotheistic worship also supports monism.
- Better Life Stories Make Better Lives: A Reply to Berg.Antti Kauppinen - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (6):1507-1521.Is it good for us if the different parts of our lives are connected to each other like the parts of a good story? Some philosophers have thought so, while others have firmly rejected it. In this paper, I focus on the state-of-the-art anti-narrativist arguments Amy Berg has recently presented in this journal. I argue that while she makes a good case that the best kind of lives for us do not revolve around a single project or theme, the best (...)
- Liveliness as a Theory of Meaning in Life: Problems and Prospects.Kirk Lougheed - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (4):797-813.I aim to more fully develop a theory of meaning in life based on the concept of life force that is important to a substantial number of Africans in the sub-Sahara region. While life force implies a large invisible ontology, Thaddeus Metz has recently developed an entirely naturalistic version of it known as liveliness. However, he also offers two objections that hinge on the idea that life force cannot accommodate intuitions that certain types of knowledge and progress are valuable for (...)No categories
- The good life as the life in touch with the good.Adam Lovett & Stefan Riedener - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5):1141-1165.What makes your life go well for you? In this paper, we give an account of welfare. Our core idea is simple. There are impersonally good and bad things out there: things that are good or bad period, not (or not only) good or bad for someone. The life that is good for you is the life in contact with the good. We’ll understand the relevant notion of ‘contact’ here in terms of manifestation: you’re in contact with a value when (...)
- Commonsense Morality and Contact with Value.Adam Lovett & Stefan Riedener - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (1):1-21.There seem to be many kinds of moral duties. We should keep our promises; we should pay our debts of gratitude; we should compensate those we’ve wronged; we should avoid doing or intending harm; we should help those in need. These constitute, some worry, an unconnected heap of duties: the realm of commonsense morality is a disorganized mess. In this paper, we outline a strategy for unifying commonsense moral duties. We argue that they can be understood in terms of contact (...)
- Ethical Extensionism Defended.Joel MacClellan - 2024 - Between the Species 27 (1):140-178.Ethical extensionism is a common argument pattern in environmental and animal ethics, which takes a morally valuable trait already recognized in us and argues that we should recognize that value in other entities such as nonhuman animals. I exposit ethical extensionism’s core argument, argue for its validity and soundness, and trace its history to 18th century progressivist calls to expand the moral community and legal franchise. However, ethical extensionism has its critics. The bulk of the paper responds to recent criticisms, (...)
- The Imperialism of Desert.Ofer Malcai & Re'em Segev - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11:861-889.What is the relation between desert and other values such as equality, priority for the worse off, and utility? According to the common (pluralist) view, desert and these other values reflect distinct concerns: some are about distributive justice, some about retributive justice, and some (most clearly, utility) are not concerned with justice at all. However, another (monistic) view holds that while desert is a basic value, other values are merely derived from it. This controversy is relevant, for instance, to allocative (...)
- The Basic Obligation to Not Destroy Heritage.Quince Pan - 2024 - Dissertation, King's College LondonWhy is destroying heritage pro tanto wrong? Why does heritage destruction require justification, unlike the destruction of rubbish? The property rights view answers: heritage belongs to people, communities and cultures. The reverence view answers: we are obliged to respect things with non-instrumental value. The moral rights view answers: our predecessors, contemporaries and successors have rights to have their cherishings respected and cultural and epistemic goods protected. The moral harm view answers: destroying heritage causes morally significant harm. I argue that these (...)
- Defending Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering.Matthieu Queloz - 2024 - Analysis 84 (2):385-400.In this paper, I respond to three critical notices of The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering, written by Cheryl Misak, Alexander Prescott-Couch, and Paul Roth, respectively. After contrasting genealogical conceptual reverse-engineering with conceptual reverse-engineering, I discuss pragmatic genealogy’s relation to history. I argue that it would be a mistake to understand pragmatic genealogy as a fiction (or a model, or an idealization) as opposed to a form of historical explanation. That would be to rely on precisely the (...)
- Conservatism and justified attachment.Travis Quigley - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):1304-1316.Value conservatism is the thesis that there is a distinctive reason to preserve valuable things even when a (somewhat) more valuable thing might be created by their destruction. I offer an account that improves on the current literature in response to Cohen's “Rescuing Conservatism.” In short, we become psychologically attached to valuable things that make up part of our lives; the same holds true, interestingly, with things of relatively neutral value. Severing attachments is painful. This yields a reason to favor (...)No categories
- A forgotten distinction in value theory.Facundo Rodriguez - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (10).The debate on final value has been so far understood as a debate over what sort of properties final value depends on. The debate’s reliance on mere dependence has, I argue, made it very difficult for conditionalists to put forward a coherent positive alternative to intrinsicalism. Talk of dependence is too coarse-grained and fails to distinguish between different ways in which value can metaphysically depend on other properties of the value bearer. To remedy this, I propose that we bring back (...)
- (3 other versions)Nature's Intrinsic Value.Benjamin Steyn - 2024 - Environmental Ethics 46 (2):107-130.Environmental ethicists often make claims about the intrinsic value of nature or parts thereof. Advances in intrinsic value theory, most notably Ben Bradley’s ‘Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value,’ successfully cleave the concept of intrinsic value into two: a Moorean and Kantian variety. This paper seeks to classify and organize different environmental theorists within a Bradley-inspired framework, helping to bring clarity and charity to the claims of older and newer environmental ethicists. These two types of intrinsic value help explain why different (...)
- States of affairs and our connection with the good.Miles Tucker - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (2):694-714.Abstractionists claim that the only bearers of intrinsic value are abstract, necessarily existing states of affairs. I argue that abstractionism cannot succeed. Though we can model concrete goods such as lives, projects, and outcomes with abstract states, conflating models of goods with the goods themselves has surprising and unattractive consequences. I suggest that concrete states of affairs or facts are the only bearers of intrinsic value. I show how this proposal can overcome the concerns lodged against abstractionism and, in the (...)
- A Possibility for Environmentalists to Deny Intrinsic Value in Nature.Rut Vinterkvist - 2024 - Environmental Ethics 46 (1):91-93.
- The co-evolution of virtue and desert: debunking intuitions about intrinsic value.Isaac Wiegman & Michael T. Dale - 2024 - Synthese 204 (4):1-18.Thomas Hurka’s recursive account of value appeals to certain intuitions to expand the class of intrinsic values, placing concepts of virtue and desert within the realm of second and third order intrinsic goods, respectively. This is a formalization of a tradition of thought extending back to Aristotle and Kant via the British moralists, G. E. Moore, and W. D. Ross. However, the evidential status of such intuitions vis a vis the real, intrinsic value of virtue and desert is hostage to (...)
- Realism and the Value of Explanation.Samuel John Andrews - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1305–1314.Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu quoque. Dasgupta (...)
- Uniqueness, Intrinsic Value, and Reasons.Gwen Bradford - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (8):421-440.Uniqueness appears to enhance intrinsic value. A unique stamp sells for millions of dollars; Stradivarius violins are all the more precious because they are unlike any others. This observation has not gone overlooked in the value theory literature: uniqueness plays a starring role recalibrating the dominant Moorean understanding of the nature of intrinsic value. But the thesis that uniqueness enhances intrinsic value is in tension with another deeply plausible and widely held thesis, namely the thesis that there is a pro (...)
- Glasgow on Death's Badness and Radiant Value.Ben Bradley - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Research 48:293-300.In The Solace, Joshua Glasgow’s main claim is that life has “radiant value” and that death inherits some of that value; this provides us with a source of solace. He also argues that death is bad not only in virtue of depriving us of good things, but also in virtue of depriving us of opportunities for good things. I raise difficulties for these claims.No categories
- When is Equality Basic?Ian Carter & Olof Page - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):983-997.In this paper we steer a course between two views of the value of equality that are usually understood as diametrically opposed to one another: on the one hand, the view that equality has intrinsic value; on the other, the view that equality is a normatively redundant notion. We proceed by analysing the different ways in which the equal possession of certain relevant properties justifies distributive equality. We then present an account of ‘basic equality’ that serves to single out where (...)
- Testing for intrinsic value, for us as we are.Daniel Coren - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):773-798.Philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Brentano, Moore, and Chisholm suggest marks of intrinsic value. Contemporary philosophers such as Christine Korsgaard have insightful discussions of intrinsic value. But how do we verify that some specific thing really is intrinsically valuable? I propose a natural way to test for intrinsic value: first, strip the candidate bare of all considerations of good consequences; and, second, see if what remains is still a good thing. I argue that we, as ordinary human beings, have (...)
- Suffering is bad.Louis Gularte - 2023 - Synthese 202 (6):1-28.Subtitle: "Experiential understanding and the impossibility of intrinsically valuing suffering." Suffering, I argue, is bad. This paper supports that claim by defending a somewhat bolder-sounding one: namely that if anyone—even a sadistic ‘amoralist’—fully understands the fact that someone else is suffering, then the only evaluative attitude they can possibly form towards the person’s suffering as such is that of being _intrinsically against_ it. I first argue that, necessarily, everyone is disposed to be intrinsically against their _own_ suffering experiences, holding fixed (...)
- The Intrinsic Value of Public Deliberation in the Governance of Human Genome Editing.Kalina Kamenova - 2023 - American Journal of Bioethics 23 (7):63-65.Public deliberation has increasingly become the gold standard for citizens’ participation in the governance of science and technology, with a growing body of research suggesting that deliberative p...
- Egalitarian Justice as a Challenge for the Value-Based Theory of Practical Reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2023 - In Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster, Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 239-249.In this essay, I argue that the objections that have been raised against the view that equality is intrinsically valuable also provide objections to the view that all practical reasons can be explained in terms of value. Plausible egalitarian principles entail that under certain conditions people have claims to an equal share. These claims entail reasons to distribute goods equally that cannot be explained by value if equality has no intrinsic value.
- Conditionalism, intrinsicalism, and pleasure in the bad.Noah Lemos - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):692-705.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
- Self-Determination and the Value of Nationality.Ruairi Maguire - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (4):315-335.In this article, I argue that because co-nationals have an intrinsically valuable relationship, they have a presumptive claim against interference in their collective affairs. My argument from the claim that co-nationals have an intrinsically valuable relationship to the presumptive claim against interference is threefold, and I set it out in section “From Intrinsic Value to Self-Determination”: firstly, parties to an intrinsically valuable relationship have a respect-based claim to autonomy. Secondly, the relationship between co-nationals realizes some important goods, and collective autonomy (...)
- Happy Egrets Strike Back?Francesco Orsi - 2023 - In Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster, Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 297-307.In this paper I articulate and respond to Kent Hurtig's objection to the fitting attitude account of value (FA). According to the objection, when a good or bad state of affairs is indexed to the actual world, but is such that the actual world does not contain anyone for whom it is fitting to (dis)favor it, it cannot be fitting for anyone in a non-actual world to (dis)favor it. So there are good or bad states of affairs that it is (...)
- Is It Fitting to Divide Value? A Review of The Value Gap. [REVIEW]Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (5-6):533-544.Rønnow-Rasmussen’s The Value Gap is an extended argument for Value Dualism, the view that both goodness and goodness for are coherent value concepts that are not fully understandable in terms of each other. In the first part of the book, he criticizes attempts to fully understand one type of value in terms of the other. In the second part of the book, he argues that both concepts are value concepts by appealing to a “Fitting Attitude” analysis of value concepts. This (...)
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