States of affairs and our connection with the good

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (2):694-714 (2024)
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Abstract

Abstractionists claim that the only bearers of intrinsic value are abstract, necessarily existing states of affairs. I argue that abstractionism cannot succeed. Though we can model concrete goods such as lives, projects, and outcomes with abstract states, conflating models of goods with the goods themselves has surprising and unattractive consequences. I suggest that concrete states of affairs or facts are the only bearers of intrinsic value. I show how this proposal can overcome the concerns lodged against abstractionism and, in the process, reconnect us with the good.

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Miles Tucker
Virginia Commonwealth University

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References found in this work

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Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - International Journal of Ethics 14 (3):377-382.
Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Synthese 79 (1):171-189.

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