Abstract

This chapter examines Ross’s account of moral virtue as one of his four intrinsic goods and argues that in key respects it’s superior to the better-known accounts of Aristotle and Kant. Among the topics covered are: (1) Ross’s treatment of virtue as a secondary or derivative good, one that consists in fitting attitudes to other, independently given values or duties—this in contrast with many virtue-ethical views; (2) his sharp separation between the right and the morally good, so a wrong act can be virtuous and good; (3) his recognizing both de dicto and de re forms of virtue; (4) his making the primary locus of moral value occurrent attitudes rather than, as in Aristotle, dispositions; (5) his (unpersuasive) arguments that virtue is the greatest intrinsic good and the motive of duty the best motive; and (6) his interesting accounts of the moral worth of actions done from multiple motives or not done from a good motive that should be present and effective but isn’t.