On the 'standard' argument for fatalism

Philosophical Papers 24 (2):111-125 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What has sometimes been called the "standard" argument for fatalism never achieved the critical popularity of Richard Taylor's (1962) infamous argument. But it has enjoyed far greater longevity. In De Fato Cicero (1960) tells us it was known in ancient Greece as the "idle argument", for it purports to show the futility of attempting to control one's fate and, hence, those persuaded by it could be led to a life of inaction and idleness. Even with such antiquated credentials, however, the argument continues to exercise fine contemporary minds (e.g. Schlesinger 1993).

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,343

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
201 (#127,558)

6 months
3 (#1,061,821)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David J. Buller
Northern Illinois University

Citations of this work

Modus Ponens and the Logic of Decision.Nate Charlow - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (3):859-888.
Branching Time, Fatalism, and Possibilities.Giacomo Andreoletti - 2024 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 38 (3-4):139-155.
Looking for the Lazy Argument Candidates.Vladimir Marko - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (3 & 4):363-383; 447-474.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Philosophical Papers, Volume II.David Lewis - 1986 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1987 - New York: Blackwell. Edited by Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley.
A causal theory of counterfactuals.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):3 – 21.

View all 11 references / Add more references