Responsibility Between Persons

Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada) (2004)
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Abstract

How are we to understand one person's responsibility to another when one person wrongs another? Within legal and philosophical literature, we can identify a prevailing paradigmatic approach to answering this question. The key distinguishing feature of this paradigmatic approach is the assumption that there is a division between what defines a person's wrongdoing on one hand, and the significance of losses suffered by another person on the other hand. Throughout this thesis, I argue against this approach and the theories that participate in it, including theories presented by Judith Jarvis Thomson, Stephen Perry, Jules Coleman, and Ernest Weinrib. ;As an alternative to theories that take up this paradigmatic approach, I present the duty/right based theory of responsibility. I build this theory of responsibility from the bottom up, starting with the structure and content of the wrong a person is responsible to another for. I argue that the wrong one person does to another is defined in terms of the freedom one person rightfully holds in relation to another. Since duties and rights set out the limits of each person's freedom in relation to the freedom of others, the formal and substantive content of those duties and correlative rights explain not only the nature of the wrong one person does to another, but also what one person must do in relation to another to appropriately address such a wrong. To appropriately address a relational wrong, an actor must give back the measure of the freedom she illicitly takes from another person when she commits a relational wrong against that person. One means of doing this is for the wrongdoer to compensate a person for the illicit harm he suffers as part of a relational wrong. The coherent explanation this theory provides as to the role compensation plays in appropriately addressing a wrong one person does to another explains some of our basic intuitions and practices surrounding the issue of responsibility between persons, including those that concern the extent to which the use of damages in tort law enforces the kind of responsibility in question

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