Gut-wrenching Choices and Blameworthiness

Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (4):577-585 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

While there is no shortage of disagreement about what is required for blameworthiness, it has traditionally been assumed that freely doing what you know to be wrong all things considered, despite being aware that it is within your power to do the right thing instead, suffices. Let us refer to this traditional assumption as the sufficiency thesis. The sufficiency thesis is plausible, but it is not beyond dispute. Reflection on certain situations in which a person can do the right thing but only at great personal sacrifice highlights some particularly pressing difficulties for it. My principal aim in this article is to show that those difficulties are not insuperable. Along the way, I also make some observations about the sorts of considerations that can limit the amount of blame of which a person is worthy without rendering the person entirely blameless.The Challenge OutlinedThe following story will serve as the backdrop for much of the subsequent discussion.The story is an augmented ve ..

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,809

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A puzzle about excuses.Martin Montminy - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Moral Worth and Moral Belief.James Grant - 2022 - Ethics 133 (2):216-230.
Blameworthiness without wrongdoing.Justin Capes - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):417-437.
Blameworthiness is Terminable.Benjamin Matheson - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-10-05

Downloads
56 (#382,832)

6 months
7 (#698,214)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Justin A. Capes
Flagler College

Citations of this work

Moral Blameworthiness, Quality of Will, and Akratic Action.E. J. Coffman - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):365-370.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Blameworthiness and obligation.R. B. Brandt - 1958 - In Abraham Irving Melden (ed.), Essays in moral philosophy. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Add more references