Collateral conflicts and epistemic norms

In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain, Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge (2020)
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J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Epistemic normativity is not independent of our goals.J. Adam Carter - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
The Norm of Belief.John Gibbons - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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