Abstract

Is selling sex a service like any other? Philosophers have given a range of answers to this question: (a) sex has a specific value that is debased by commercial markets in sex; (b) sex work is a service like any other; (c) markets in sex perpetuate structural systems of inequality. This article takes seriously the suggestion that there is something special about sex itself which raises a specific set of concerns when traded for money. The challenge is to explain this without drawing on contentious essentialist claims about the value of sex. It proceeds by analysing a parallel between sexual promises and selling sexual consent. On an expectational theory of promising, commercial agreements to sex generate obligations in a way that is normatively analogous to sexual promises. Understanding the normative release conditions for such assurance‐providing agreements provides a way of analysing the justifiability of various ways of enforcing such agreements. I argue that the release conditions for agreements involving sex are not conducive to being codified under typical forms of service contract. As such, regulation aimed at legitimising sex work must provide adequate protections to workers without codifying it under typical forms of service contract.