On Valence: Imperative or Representation of Value?

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (3):533-553 (2023)
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Abstract

Affective valence is increasingly thought to be the common currency underlying all forms of intuitive, non-discursive decision making, in both humans and other animals. And it is thought to constitute the good or bad (pleasant or unpleasant) aspects of all desires, emotions, and moods. This article contrasts two theories of valence. According to one, valence is an experience-directed imperative (‘more of this!’ or ‘less of this!’); according to the other, valence is a representation of adaptive value or disvalue. The latter is shown to provide the better account.

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What the body commands: the imperative theory of pain.Colin Klein - 2015 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (6):281-97.
What makes pains unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.

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