Abstract

In exploring the morality of deception, I focus on three kinds of deception: lying, insincerity about oneself , and self-deception. The basic questions addressed are: What characterizes each kind of deception? Are each of these kinds of deception wrong or undesirable? Do the same sorts of considerations that bear on the morality of one form of deception bear on the morality of the other forms? ;Lying, the topic of Chapter One, is clearly wrong; but it is less obvious why. I consider what light the Utilitarian and Kantian traditions shed on the morality of lying and argue that lying is a breach of faith--a position within the Kantian tradition. ;Insincerity and self-deception are importantly different from lying. Unlike lying, insincerity is not generally wrong. We do not have a prima facie obligation to present ourselves as we are and we have not usually wronged another by putting on a false facade. In Chapter Two I give an account of insincerity and explore the grounds on which this form of deception is objectionable. Insincerity is objectionable because the insincere person falls short of an ideal of character. ;Chapter Three confronts the puzzles associated with self-deception and sets forth an account of this phenomenon. An individual deceives himself when he purposefully brings it about that he acquires a belief which is at odds with what he has judged to be the case. There are special difficulties with arguing either that self-deception is wrong or that it is bad. In many cases the self-deceiver could not have successfully chosen to avoid deceiving himself. Very often the only person harmed, or even affected, by the self-deception is the deceiver. Finally, self-deception in some cases appears to be beneficial because it helps persons cope with difficult circumstances. These and other points are examined in Chapter Four where I explore the morality of self-deception. As in the case of insincerity, I argue that an appeal to the value or disvalue of certain character traits best explains why self-deception is objectionable