Intencionalidad sin conciencia: Brentano, Searle y las ciencias cognitivas

Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 7 (2):99-118 (1992)
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Abstract

In this paper, I shall argue that both cognitivism and liberal contractualism defend a pre-moral conception of human desire that has its origin in the Hobbesian and Humean tradition that both theories share. Moreover, the computational and syntactic themes in cognitive science support the notion, which Gauthier evidently shares, that the human mind – or, in Gauthier’s case, the mind of “economic man” – is a purely formal mechanism, characterized by logical and mathematical operations. I shall conclude that a single conception of human behaviour runs through the various dominant psychological, moral and political theories of analytic inspiration

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