Moods, Colored Lenses, and Emotional Disconnection: a Comment on Gallegos

Philosophia 46 (3):625-632 (2018)
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Abstract

In “Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods” Francisco Gallegos presents a challenge to a popular view about the phenomenology of being in a mood that he calls “perceptualism”. In this essay, I offer a partial defense of perceptualism about moods and argue that perceptualism and Gallegos’s preferred Heideggerian alternative need not be viewed as in opposition to one another.

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10.1007/s11406-017-9917-x

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Bartek Chomanski
Adam Mickiewicz University

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References found in this work

The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
The nature and plausibility of cognitivism.John Haugeland - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):215-26.
Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties?Berit Brogaard - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):35 - 42.

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