- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Moods, Colored Lenses, and Emotional Disconnection: a Comment on Gallegos
Philosophia 46 (3):625-632 (2018)
Abstract
In “Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods” Francisco Gallegos presents a challenge to a popular view about the phenomenology of being in a mood that he calls “perceptualism”. In this essay, I offer a partial defense of perceptualism about moods and argue that perceptualism and Gallegos’s preferred Heideggerian alternative need not be viewed as in opposition to one another.Author's Profile
Other Versions
No versions found
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods.Francisco Gallegos - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1497-1513.
Toward a Phenomenology of Mood.Lauren Freeman - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):445-476.
The Ethics of Moods.François Raffoul - 2019 - In Christos Hadjioannou (ed.), Heidegger on Affect. Palgrave. pp. 245-263.
In the Mood for Knowledge : How We Get Knowledge from Moods Expressed in Art.Viktor Emanuelsson - unknown
Reflections on the Possibility of Perceptualism.Andres Ayala - 2019 - The Incarnate Word 6 (1):33-50.
How is a phenomenology of fundamental moods possible?Tanja Staehler - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):415 – 433.
The Embodied and Situated Nature of Moods.Giovanna Colombetti - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1437-1451.
Latent Moods in Heidegger and Sartre: from Being Assailed by Moods to Not Conceding to (some) Moods that Assail Us.Simone Neuber - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1563-1574.
Analytics
Added to PP
2017-10-13
Downloads
89 (#236,018)
6 months
9 (#488,506)
2017-10-13
Downloads
89 (#236,018)
6 months
9 (#488,506)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Why moods change: their appropriateness and connection to beliefs.Tatyana A. Kostochka - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11399-11420.
References found in this work
Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value.Bennett W. Helm - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
The nature and plausibility of cognitivism.John Haugeland - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):215-26.
Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties?Berit Brogaard - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):35 - 42.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-667477cd97-7qg25 dc2