Epistemologia, sofrimento humano e psicoterapia

Prometeica - Revista De Filosofía Y Ciencias 30:92-110 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Human suffering is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon of special interest for psychotherapy. Psychotherapists deploy various epistemological processes that act as mediators when understanding the human suffering afflicts their clients. However, these issues are scarcely considered by psychotherapists and are rarely addressed in specialized literature. In this sense, and seeking to respond to this problem, this theoretical article aims to analyze the epistemic mediators of the psychotherapist that affect the process of knowledge of the client's human suffering. Three mediators will be analyzed: 1) the general epistemic framework (psychotherapeutic approach of ascription), 2) the specific epistemic framework (personal epistemology of the therapist), and 3) the hegemonic epistemology (positivism) together with its role in the psychopathologization of life, the objectification of suffering and mental health. It is concluded that human suffering is a constant construction phenomenon dependent on the psychotherapist's epistemic mediators, impacting various areas of praxis. Finally, the limitations, implications, and contributions of the issues discussed in the discipline are presented.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 104,706

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-07-09

Downloads
20 (#1,135,094)

6 months
15 (#212,208)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references