On analyzing the standards of forensic evidence: A reply to Schoeman

Philosophy of Science 54 (1):92-97 (1987)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Ferdinand Schoeman (1986) attempts to refute six arguments that I gave in The Probable and the Provable (1977, pp. 49-120) for not analyzing the standards of forensic proof in terms of any concept of probability that conforms to the familiar principles of the mathematical calculus of chance. But he evidently does not appreciate the strength of the case for rejecting the validity of any such analysis. In the course of discussing his criticisms, I shall add a seventh argument to fortify my position, though I concede that the second of my original arguments has to be discarded.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,676

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
66 (#318,633)

6 months
16 (#183,409)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Justification, excuse, and proof beyond reasonable doubt.Hock Lai Ho - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):146-166.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The implications of induction.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1970 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 160:486-487.
Twelve questions about Keynes's concept of weight.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (3):263-278.

Add more references