On Schupbach and Sprenger’s Measures of Explanatory Power

Philosophy of Science 82 (1):97-109 (2015)
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Abstract

Jonah N. Schupbach and Jan Sprenger have proposed conditions of adequacy for measures of explanatory power. They derive and defend a measure of explanatory power satisfying their conditions of adequacy. This article furthers the development of their measure. The requirement that the measure be multidimensional analytic is avoided. Several proofs are simplified, and gaps in proofs are filled

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Author's Profile

Michael P. Cohen
University of California, Los Angeles (PhD)

Citations of this work

Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

The Logic of Explanatory Power.Jonah N. Schupbach & Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (1):105-127.
Degree of factual support.John G. Kemeny & Paul Oppenheim - 1952 - Philosophy of Science 19 (4):307-324.

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