Disunity of personal taste

Mind and Language (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The article argues that, linguistically speaking, there is no uniform class of personal taste predicate. There is an F(un)‐type PPT that takes infinitive complements expressing events. In effect, these PPTs are predicates of events involving participants. There is also a T(asty)‐type that cannot take an infinitive complement and does not enter into the alternation pattern of the F‐type predicates. These predicates express dispositions of objects to generate experiences or responses. Some experiencer/judge is involved in the truth of the respective kinds of claims, but for different reasons, and in neither case is such a role encoded linguistically as an index for the predicate.

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References found in this work

Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by John Hawthorne.
Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.François Recanati - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Minimal semantics.Emma Borg - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Conversational Impliciture.Kent Bach - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):124-162.

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