Imagination after neurological losses of movement and sensation: The experience of spinal cord injury [Book Review]

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2):183-195 (2005)
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Abstract

To what extent is imagination dependent on embodied experience? In attempting to answer such questions I consider the experiences of those who have to come to terms with altered neurological function, namely those with spinal cord injury at the neck. These people have each lost all sensation and movement below the neck. How might these new ways of living affect their imagination?

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Conscious machines: Memory, melody and muscular imagination. [REVIEW]Susan A. J. Stuart - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):37-51.

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