Knowledge and Subjunctive Conditionals

Philosophy Compass 2 (6):781-791 (2007)
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Abstract

What relation must hold between a fact p and the corresponding belief that p for the belief to amount to knowledge? Many authors have recently proposed that the relation can be captured by subjunctive conditionals. In this paper I critically evaluate the main proposals along those lines

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Juan Comesaña
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem.Sven Bernecker - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.
Two Notions Of Safety.Julien Dutant - 2010 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
Knowledge and Belief in Placebo Effect.Daniele Chiffi & Renzo Zanotti - 2017 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (1):70-85.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher, Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.

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