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Innocuous Infallibility
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):406-408 (2002)
Abstract
Alan Sidelle has offered an argument to show that internalism about justification implies us to have a certain sort of infallibility concerning some internal facts. This is true but harmless to internalism.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Three Forms of Internalism and the New Evil Demon Problem.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):345-360.
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