Carving nature at its joints using a knife called concepts

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):207 - 208 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

That humans can categorize in different ways does not imply that there are qualitatively distinct underlying natural kinds or that the field of concepts splinters. Rather, it implies that the unitary goal of forming concepts is important enough that it receives redundant expression in cognition. Categorization science focuses on commonalities involved in concept learning. Eliminating makes this more difficult

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 106,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Not different kinds, just special cases.David Danks - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):208-209.
Concept talk cannot be avoided.James A. Hampton - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):212-213.
2 Induction, Samples, and Kinds.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2011 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Matthew H. Slater, Carving nature at its joints: natural kinds in metaphysics and science. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 33.
Whatever happened to meaning?Jean M. Mandler - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):79-80.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-10-27

Downloads
59 (#398,686)

6 months
17 (#181,383)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?