Where are nature's joints? Finding the mechanisms underlying categorization

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):220-221 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Machery argues that concepts are too heterogeneous to be a natural kind. I argue that the book does not go far enough. Theories of concepts assume that the task of categorizing warrants a unique set of cognitive constructs. Instead, cognitive science must look across tasks to find a fundamental set of cognitive mechanisms

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,809

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-10-27

Downloads
27 (#821,816)

6 months
7 (#698,214)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?