Abstract

David Hume argues in the Treatise of Human Nature that we should, in doing philosophy, limit ourselves to ideas that can be traced to prior sense impressions. Hume advocates an empirical methodology that eradicates metaphysically constructed ideas. Once he adopts his methodology, however, he finds tracing our idea of a continued and distinct body to prior sense impressions difficult. ;I examine Hume's attempt of giving a natural history of our belief in external body. I suggest that we understand how we come to have our belief in external body in a more complex way than Hume allows. What we "see" in particular instances depends upon previous experience as well as training and attention. We could be determined to believe that a perception indicated an object that was continued and distinct because of the way perceptions have worked previously. Once we do so, we can trace our idea of external body to complex experiences as well as a feeling of determination that arises from multiple experiences. ;During this part of Hume's exposition of our idea of external body, we are trying only to provide a natural history. Not until the end of Book I do we come to concerns about legitimacy or adequacy, and do we see Hume question the truth or reliability of our beliefs. Only at the end of Book I does Hume turn to justification of the deliverance of the senses, reason, and imagination. ;Once Hume examines fully his system of beliefs, he sees that he cannot ensure their truth , and he despairs of using our cognitive faculties to justify themselves. The implications for philosophy are important: we are natural beings who have the ability to reason and think about things that are not immediately known or present to us, and hence different from the animals. But we cannot justify our beliefs: instead, we have the capacity to reflect and examine our beliefs and to limit our knowledge to its proper sphere without relying on superstition or metaphysics