In the Groundwork, we find three distinct conceptions of freedom: (i) A negative conception of freedom, understood as a capacity for spontaneous action independent of alien causes; (ii) a positive conception of freedom, understood as the capacity of giving law to oneself; and (iii) a second positive conception, understood as the capacity to give laws that bind others as well as oneself. The dominant interpretation of Kant ignores this third conception of freedom and interprets the second conception as a capacity (...) for self-determination or self-governance, which is seen as the most basic and important Kantian conception of autonomy. In this paper, we will focus mainly on explaining the distinction between the second and third conceptions of autonomy and will defend the claim that the third conception is morally the most basic. We will also explain briefly why Kant thinks that having the capacity for citizenship is necessary for having the capacity for self-governance. (shrink)

The bundle theory is a theory about the internal constitution of individuals. It asserts that individuals are entirely composed of universals. Typically, bundle theorists augment their theory with a constitutional approach to individuation entailing the thesis ‘identity of constituents is a sufficient ground for numerical identity’ (CIT). But then the bundle theory runs afoul of Black’s duplication case—a world containing two indiscernible spheres. Here I propose and defend a new version of the bundle theory that denies ‘CIT’, and which instead (...) conjoins it with a structural diversity thesis , according to which being separated by distance is a sufficient ground for numerical diversity. This version accommodates Black’s world as well as the three-spheres world —a world containing three indiscernible spheres, arranged as the vertices of an equilateral triangle. In this paper, I also criticize Rodriguez-Pereyra’s alternative attempt to defend the bundle theory against Black’s case and the case of the three-spheres world. (shrink)

The bundle theory, supposed as a theory concerning the internal constitution of individuals, is often conjoined with a constitutional approach to individuation entailing the thesis ‘no two individuals can share all their constituents’ (CIT). But then it runs afoul of Black’s duplication case. Here a new bundle theory, takingdistance relations between bundles to be a sufficient ground for their diversity, will be proposed. This version accommodates Black’s world. Nonetheless, there is a possible objection. Consider the ‘triplication case’—a world containing three (...) indistinguishable spheres, each 5-meters from each other. Since distance relations are dyadic, this version must fail to distinguish the threespheres world from Black’s world. In response to this objection, I maintain that we must construe distance relations as irreducibly multigrade and n-ary. Then these two worlds will be distinguished by appealing to a triadic relation—R3—that three things enter mutually. Aren’t all polyadic relations in principle reducible to dyadic relations? I won’t deny that. But I will aim lower and argue that R3 cannot be reduced to dyadic relations that obliterate the distinction between the three-spheres world and Black’s world. (shrink)

Hume begins his discussion of causation with the promise that he will explain fully the relation of cause and effect, and argues strenuously that there is no impression from which the idea of necessary connection is derived. At the end of his discussion, he summarizes his views by offering his "two definitions of cause" where he asserts that the causal relation can be nothing but the regular succession of cause and effect. This is traditionally thought to be evidence for the (...) view that Hume reduces causation to regular succession and that he denies causal realism which asserts that there are necessary connections in nature to be taken into consideration. ;There is no evidence for the claim that Hume distinguishes between what we know of causation and what causation in itself is. On the contrary, he denies the existence of an external physical world and limits reality to our ideas. It seems to be a mistake, therefore, to claim that he believes that there are necessary connections that we can never know. ;Just as there are analytical elements, there are both naturalistic and sceptical elements in his philosophy. However, the way in which these three elements are interrelated is quite different. His natural theory of belief does not concern causal realism but our causal beliefs. He never claims that we have a natural belief that there are necessary connections in nature. What he claims is that after the observation of a regular succession of cause and effect, the experience of the cause not only brings the idea of the effect into our mind but brings this idea together with an "impression of necessity". When we examine the way in which Hume characterizes this impression, we see that it plays an important role in Hume's theory of natural beliefs. It is the irresistible way in which the idea of the effect enters into our mind. It is what, Hume calls the "vivacity" or "violence" which turns a simple conception of the idea of the effect into a causal belief about the occurrence of this effect. And this is the context in which Hume introduces his scepticism. It does not consist of his belief that we lack knowledge of causation but consists of his criticism of our nature in forming such causal beliefs. (shrink)