Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory

Topoi 39 (2):439-457 (2020)
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Abstract

The paper presents a new theory of perceptual demonstrative thought, the property-dependent theory. It argues that the theory is superior to both the object-dependent theory (Evans, McDowell) and the object-independent theory (Burge).

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Sean Crawford
University of Manchester

Citations of this work

Is Perception Stimulus-Dependent?Sergio Cermeño-Aínsa - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):735-754.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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