Abstract

In this article, I propose an investigation of Ernst Cassirer’s conception of truth, as set out in his inaugural address as rector of Hamburg University, in light of two key concepts of his philosophy, i.e., function and symbolic form. My aim is neither to give an exhaustive exposition of the subject, nor to attempt to elaborate a complete Cassirerian theory of truth. Rather, I want to focus on how the Cassirerian conception of truth can be useful in countering certain contemporary anti-scientific tendencies, particularly those born from the fear that modern science could destroy other cultural forms (especially religion). Specifically, I believe that Cassirer’s conception enables us to identify criteria by which to distinguish science from non-scientific endeavours and to preserve the primacy of science in the cognitive enterprise, without calling social consensus into question (avoiding the risks of relativization), but also without resorting to positivistic dogmatisms that condemn everything that is not science to falsity or nonsense. By tracing back any kind of truth to its own contest of meaning and by identifying this context of meaning on transcendental and semiotic bases, Cassirer’s conception opens to a pluralistic and pragmatic approach that leaves space for the possibility of non-scientific truths, which, while not being entitled to interfere with the scientific work, can still be considered legitimate and valuable.