Abstract

A “post-work world” can mean a couple of things. First, it can mean a world where we attach less importance to work, restructure work so that tasks and authority are distributed more equitably, and otherwise decenter and reform the world of work. Second, it can mean a world where people are no longer working because robots, artificial intelligence, and other forms of automation have replaced humans and there are no longer enough jobs for everyone. This paper is about the second kind of world, and how to support the workers it leaves behind. Automation has always eliminated jobs, but in the past new jobs have appeared to replace them. This may be changing. Thanks to recent advances in automation, machines and software can now do an increasingly large percentage of the tasks that humans do. “Technological unemployment” is what happens when automation can do so many different tasks that new jobs do not appear in sufficient numbers to employ everyone (Keynes 1932). In short, automation may soon leave a very large part of the potential workforce permanently unemployed, leading to a social, political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. For ease of reference, I refer to the technologically unemployed as being displaced from the economy. The displaced need incomes. One obvious source of funds is the money saved through technological unemployment. On the scale of an entire economy, technological unemployment increases the labor savings from automation, for in addition to the usual labor savings from automation, there is less of a need to pay new workers, for there are fewer new jobs. I call this money the displacement gain. This is money that becomes available precisely because technological unemployment has occurred. It is important to understand that the displacement gain is not the same thing as the profit that results from gains in productivity. Automation does not necessarily produce displacement but it does produce gains in productivity, and the profits from gains in productivity occur even when no one is displaced. A productivity gain does not become a displacement gain until technological unemployment occurs. The core of this paper is a set of arguments that the displacement gain is not the private property of businesses or those who have ownership interests in businesses (I refer to both groups as “capitalists”), nor is it the private property of those lucky enough to still have jobs. For these and additional reasons, the displacement gain is collective property in which every person has an equal interest. Moreover, it is a kind of collective property that has been largely overlooked. (Better-known forms of collective property include the natural world and “social capital.” ) As far back as Thomas Paine (1796), many thinkers have argued that, because we all have equal interests in collective property, it should be distributed to everyone, working or not, rich or poor, as equal and unconditional basic incomes. The displacement gain is a new kind of collective property which can fund basic incomes, and those incomes can support the displaced. That’s how to pay for a post-work world. However, I will argue, in order to distribute those funds equally we must pay unequal basic incomes, for those who are technologically unemployed bear a larger share of the burden involved in creating that collective property, and therefore deserve larger basic incomes to offset their larger burdens. My discussion of this leads to a possible solution to a problem that bedevils basic income proposals: how to prevent businesses from, in effect, appropriating basic incomes from their employees by simply paying them less, using basic incomes as a payroll subsidy