Technological unemployment is what happens when automation eliminates jobs and not enough new jobs arrive to employ everyone, leaving part of the workforce permanently unemployed. Who owns the money that used to pay them? Business owners will argue that it’s theirs. I will argue that it’s not. I consider and refute several arguments for their claim, and then argue that this money is collective property. Because it’s collective property, we can use it to fund basic incomes for the (...) technologically unemployed without violating anyone’s property rights. Moreover, it is equal in amount to the total incomes lost to technological unemployment, and therefore big enough to fund a decent standard of living for the unemployed, no matter how numerous they are. This is a new kind of collective property, distinct and different from other collective properties, such as the natural world, employment rents, and social capital. (shrink)

This paper argues that even though massive technological unemployment will likely be one of the results of automation, we will not need to institute mass-scale redistribution of wealth to deal with its consequences. Instead, reasons are given for cautious optimism about the standards of living the newly unemployed workers may expect in the fully-automated future. It is not claimed that these predictions will certainly bear out. Rather, they are no less likely to come to fruition than the predictions of (...) those authors who predict that massive technological unemployment will lead to the suffering of the masses on such a scale that significant redistributive policies will have to be instituted to alleviate it. Additionally, the paper challenges the idea that the existence of a moral obligation to help the victims of massive unemployment justifies the coercive taking of anyone else’s property. (shrink)

In this article, we address the problem of the potential crisis in people’s life’s meaning due to massive automation-driven technological unemployment. Assuming that the problem of (re)distribution of economic resources to the whole of society in such a scenario will be solved (e.g. through provision of a Universal Basic Income), the question arises concerning the meaning of people’s lives in a world in which almost everyone does not have to (or even could not) work in order to (...) live. Here, we side with many current proposals that paid work is not the only possible source of meaning and hence, that a meaningful life could indeed be led in a post-work society. We especially focus on one of the most developed accounts, Danaher’s Virtual Utopia (Danaher, 2016, 2019, 2022). According to him, living immersed in playful virtual worlds where new, expanded and personalized possibilities of personal and collective experiences and actions, could not only be perfectly meaningful lives, but furthermore, “be the utopia we are looking for” (Danaher, 2019, p. 270). However, our analysis will suggest that although it is a very well thought and carefully articulated position, it suffers from various important problems. Our criticism will be based on an alternative framework to think about life’s meaning and the conditions for leading a good life in general. This alternative is based on the philosophy of buen vivir (“good living”). This notion has its roots in common aspects of various Latin American indigenous cultures regarding a community-centered way of life where humans, society and nature are taken to be deeply interconnected and interdependent, and where the notions of respect, harmony and balance are at the core of this interrelationship (Gudynas, 2011; Acosta, 2008; Beling et al., 2021). Buen vivir has many facets, but we will focus on three: the importance of healthy human communities, the human-nature relationship, and the intrinsic value of nature. Based on these, we argue that the Virtual Utopia is not a good candidate for human’s post-work utopia because i) it unnecessarily augments the environmental damage that is already involved in massive labor automation; ii) it entails an unnecessary and detrimental dependence on technology for human relationships; and iii) increases the severance of the link between humanity and nature. We conclude that the buen vivir approach is a promising candidate for an alternative utopian project, but one that needs further construction. (shrink)

A “post-work world” can mean a couple of things. First, it can mean a world where we attach less importance to work, restructure work so that tasks and authority are distributed more equitably, and otherwise decenter and reform the world of work. Second, it can mean a world where people are no longer working because robots, artificial intelligence, and other forms of automation have replaced humans and there are no longer enough jobs for everyone. This paper is about the second (...) kind of world, and how to support the workers it leaves behind. -/- Automation has always eliminated jobs, but in the past new jobs have appeared to replace them. This may be changing. Thanks to recent advances in automation, machines and software can now do an increasingly large percentage of the tasks that humans do. “Technological unemployment” is what happens when automation can do so many different tasks that new jobs do not appear in sufficient numbers to employ everyone (Keynes 1932). In short, automation may soon leave a very large part of the potential workforce permanently unemployed, leading to a social, political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. For ease of reference, I refer to the technologically unemployed as being displaced from the economy. -/- The displaced need incomes. One obvious source of funds is the money saved through technological unemployment. On the scale of an entire economy, technological unemployment increases the labor savings from automation, for in addition to the usual labor savings from automation, there is less of a need to pay new workers, for there are fewer new jobs. I call this money the displacement gain. This is money that becomes available precisely because technological unemployment has occurred. It is important to understand that the displacement gain is not the same thing as the profit that results from gains in productivity. Automation does not necessarily produce displacement but it does produce gains in productivity, and the profits from gains in productivity occur even when no one is displaced. A productivity gain does not become a displacement gain until technological unemployment occurs. -/- The core of this paper is a set of arguments that the displacement gain is not the private property of businesses or those who have ownership interests in businesses (I refer to both groups as “capitalists”), nor is it the private property of those lucky enough to still have jobs. For these and additional reasons, the displacement gain is collective property in which every person has an equal interest. Moreover, it is a kind of collective property that has been largely overlooked. (Better-known forms of collective property include the natural world and “social capital.” ) As far back as Thomas Paine (1796), many thinkers have argued that, because we all have equal interests in collective property, it should be distributed to everyone, working or not, rich or poor, as equal and unconditional basic incomes. The displacement gain is a new kind of collective property which can fund basic incomes, and those incomes can support the displaced. That’s how to pay for a post-work world. -/- However, I will argue, in order to distribute those funds equally we must pay unequal basic incomes, for those who are technologically unemployed bear a larger share of the burden involved in creating that collective property, and therefore deserve larger basic incomes to offset their larger burdens. My discussion of this leads to a possible solution to a problem that bedevils basic income proposals: how to prevent businesses from, in effect, appropriating basic incomes from their employees by simply paying them less, using basic incomes as a payroll subsidy . (shrink)

The paper rehearses arguments for and against the prediction of massive technological unemployment. The main argument in favor is that robots are entering a large number of industries; making more expensive human labor redundant. The main argument against the prediction is that for two hundred years we have seen a massive increase in productivity with no long term structural unemployment caused by automation. The paper attempts to move past this argumentative impasse by asking what humans contribute to the supply (...) side of the economy. Historically; humans have contributed muscle and brains to production but we are now being outcompeted by machinery; in both areas; in many jobs. It is argued that this supports the conjecture that massive unemployment is a likely result. It is also argued that a basic income guarantee is a minimal remedial measure to mitigate the worst effects of technological unemployment. (shrink)

Recently, economic studies on labor market developments have indicated that there is a potential threat of technological mass unemployment. Both smart robotics and information technology may perform a broad range of tasks that today are fulfilled by human labor. This development could lead to vast inequalities. Proponents of an unconditional basic income have, therefore, employed this scenario to argue for their cause. In this chapter, the author argues that, although a basic income might be a (...) valid answer to the challenge of technological unemployment, it fails to account for some ethical problems specific to future expectations of mass unemployment. The author introduces the proposal of an unconditional basic capital and shows how it can address these problems adequately and avoid objections against a basic income. However, the basic capital proposal cannot replace all redistributive social policies. It has to be interpreted as a supplement to either a basic income or more traditional redistributive policies. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic plunged economies into recessions and advancements in artificial intelligence create widespread automation of job tasks. A debate around how to address these challenges has moved the introduction of a universal basic income (UBI) center stage. However, existing UBI research mainly focuses on economic aspects and normative arguments but lacks an individual perspective that goes beyond examining the association between socio-demographic characteristics and UBI support. We add to this literature by investigating not only socio-demographic but also (...) psychological predictors of UBI acceptance in a multivariate analysis using a representative sample of the German working population collected in 2020 (N = 1986). Our results indicate that being more supportive of a UBI went along with being comparably younger, of East-German origin, and more in favor of equal living standards, as well as perceiving one’s economic situation to be worse and the threat of the corona-pandemic to be higher. (shrink)

Is sex work (specifically, prostitution) vulnerable to technological unemployment? Several authors have argued that it is. They claim that the advent of sophisticated sexual robots will lead to the displacement of human prostitutes, just as, say, the advent of sophisticated manufacturing robots have displaced many traditional forms of factory labour. But are they right? In this article, I critically assess the argument that has been made in favour of this displacement hypothesis. Although I grant the argument a degree of (...) credibility, I argue that the opposing hypothesis -- that prostitution will be resilient to technological unemployment -- is also worth considering. Indeed, I argue that increasing levels of technological unemployment in other fields may well drive more people into the sex work industry. Furthermore, I argue that no matter which hypothesis you prefer -- displacement or resilience -- you can make a good argument for the necessity of a basic income guarantee, either as an obvious way to correct for the precarity of sex work, or as a way to disincentivise those who may be drawn to prostitution. (shrink)

The debate about the impact and desirability of automizing labor is one that emerges alongside every major technological development. In recent years, attention for the potential ethical and social implications of automizing labor increased once again, in response to the successes and promises of artificial intelligence (AI) and other modern technologies. The aim of this article is, first and foremost, to introduce the reader to recent work on the desirability of automizing labor. The article distinguishes two philosophical debates about (...) replacing human jobs with AI systems or robots. The first debate has to do with questions of distributive justice, in light of the prospect of structural technological unemployment. The second debate has to do with questions about the relation between a job and a meaningful life. In addition to sketching these debates, the article highlights environmental concerns regarding automation as a possible future direction for research on the future of work. (shrink)

A recent wave of academic and popular publications say that utopia is within reach: Automation will progress to such an extent and include so many high-skill tasks that much human work will soon become superfluous. The gains from this highly automated economy, authors suggest, could be used to fund a universal basic income (UBI). Today's employees would live off the robots' products and spend their days on intrinsically valuable pursuits. I argue that this prediction is unlikely to come (...) true. Historical precedent speaks against it, but the main problem is that the prediction fundamentally misunderstands how capitalism works—its incentives to increase or decrease production, its principles of income allocation, and the underlying conception of merit. (shrink)

The present article aims to utilize some insights from behavioral and happiness economics to discuss the consequences that the introduction of an unconditional basic income to cope with technological unemployment may hold for well-being. The impact of 21st-century technological progress on employment has only just begun to make itself felt and it will take time to realize its full extent. However, the main innovation is already common knowledge: robots are finding their way into the production process. (...) According to several recent contributions, the phenomenon is radically different from past technological revolutions and could generate high levels of unemployment, calling for innovative redistributive public policies. The present article, building on Keynes’ short essay and referring to some of the principles and models of behavioral and happiness economics, focuses on the best-known of these policies, namely provision of an unconditional basic income. A series of factors – loss aversion and hedonic adaptation, the impossibility of escalating to higher-grade consumption behaviors, social interaction in the form of active and passive envy, loss of self-esteem and social stigma – are all likely to have a negative impact on well-being if an unconditional basic income that remains unchanging over time is implemented. A policy mix combining a rising basic income with other measures is therefore proposed. (shrink)

Technological advances in computerization and robotics threaten to eliminate countless jobs from the labor market in the near future. These advances have reignited the debate about universal basic income. The essays in this collection offer unique and compelling perspectives on the ever-changing nature of work and the plausibility of a universal basic income to address the elimination of jobs from the workforce. The essays address a number of topics related to these issues, including the prospects (...) of libertarian and anarchist justifications for a universal basic income, the positive impact of a basic income on intimate laborers such as sex workers and surrogates, the nature of "bad work" and who will do it if everyone receives a basic income, whether a universal basic income is objectionably paternalistic, and viable alternatives to a universal basic income. This book raises complex questions and avenues for future research about universal basic income and the future of work in our increasingly technological society. It will be of keen interest to graduate students and scholars in political philosophy, economics, political science, and public policy who are interested in these debates. (shrink)

A basic income might be able to correct for the income related losses of unemployment, but what about the meaning/purpose related losses? For better or worse, many people derive meaning and fulfillment from the jobs they do; if their jobs are taken away, they lose this source of meaning. If we are about the enter an era of rampant job loss as a result of advances in technology, is there a danger that it will also be an (...) era of rampant meaninglessness? In this chapter, I offer counsel against any such despair. I argue that we should encourage the withdrawal from the world of work into a more personal world of games.We should do this because (a) work is structurally bad and getting worse as a result of technology; and (b) a more ludic, game-like life would help us to attain a valuable form of human flourishing. I offer three arguments in support of this view, and respond to critics who argue that withdrawing from the demands of work would result in a more selfish and impoverished form of existence. (shrink)

As the world of technology increasingly intersects with humanity, one name stands out as a guide in this complex and ever-changing territory: James Hughes. In this interview, we had the opportunity not only to learn more about the author’s thinking and expertise, but also to explore the perspectives he brings on the technological future.

Recent technological developments in automation threaten to eliminate the jobs of millions of workers in the near future, raising worrisome questions about how to satisfy their welfare. One proposal for addressing this issue is to provide all citizens with a “universal basic income” (UBI) that ensures everyone with a social minimum. The aim is to give all individuals an unrestricted cash grant that provides them with an income that does not depend on status, wealth, or employment. (...) The question this paper explores is whether UBI can replace work in the age of automation. Work has financial and non-pecuniary benefits that provide individuals with an income, as well as self-realization, self-respect, and community. While the provision of UBI will supplement the financial benefits of work, the question remains whether such a grant can replace these non-pecuniary benefits. The first section outlines the benefits and burdens of work. The second section considers the effects of technology on work in the context of automation. The third section examines the arguments for UBI that make it a philosophically attractive alternative to traditional welfare policies. Finally, the last section evaluates whether the benefits of UBI can replace the loss of work in terms of its non-pecuniary benefits. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is rapidly entering our daily lives in the form of driverless cars, automated online assistants and virtual reality experiences. In so doing, AI has already substituted human employment in areas that were previously thought to be uncomputerizable. Based on current trends, the technological displacement of labor is predicted to be significant in the future – if left unchecked this will lead to catastrophic societal unemployment levels. This paper presents a means to mitigate future technological unemployment through (...) the introduction of a Basic Income scheme, accompanied by reforms in school curricula and retraining programs. Our proposal argues that such a scheme can be funded by a special tax on those industries that make use of robotic labour; it includes a practical roadmap that would see a government take this proposal from the conceptual phase and implement it nationwide in the span of one decade. (shrink)

Universal Basic Income (UBI) has been proposed as a potential way in which welfare states could be made more responsive to the ever-shifting evolutionary challenges of institutional adaptation in a dynamic environment. It has been proposed as a tool of “real freedom” (Van Parijs) and as a tool of making the welfare state more efficient. (Friedman) From the point of view of complexity theory and evolutionary economics, I argue that only a welfare state model that is “polycentrically” (Polanyi, (...) Hayek) organized as an evolving network of distributed decision-making can respond to the challenges of complexity in an adaptively efficient manner. UBI has the theoretical possibility to facilitate flexible, bottom-up innovation, since a) it embodies the “rule of law” principles of generality, nondiscrimination, simplicity, and transparency, and b) it grants people widespread freedom to experiment, innovate, and deviate from established practices and norms; but whether it can be made to work as intended depends on a number of variables in its design. I situate my research in the contemporary UBI debate around automation and technological development, which I interpret creatively through the lens of contemporary evolutionary political economy. I advance a syncretic model of institutional design based upon the shared insights of the Santa Fe, Neo-Hayekian, and Neo-Schumpeterian schools of evolutionary economics that, following Adam Thierer and Michael Munger, I call the framework of Permissionless Innovation (PI). Under the PI framework, which is a development of the tradition of evolutionary liberalism (Hume, Smith, Mandeville, Mill, Hayek, Polanyi, Schumpeter, Hodgson), individuals are granted the default right to innovate without having to ask for permission, and the right to basic income, which they can use to support their right to innovate, mutate, and experiment. This framework is a liberal framework to the extent it relies on widespread human freedom as a means of fostering innovation and social learning. And it is an evolutionary framework to the extent that it seeks to facilitate evolutionary socioeconomic processes for the sake of social progress and welfare advancement. I proceed to show, through an analysis of how innovation operates in both the economy and the cultural domain, that UBI can be used as an important cornerstone of an evolutionary liberal model of “ecostructural” governance that treats the socioeconomic order as an ecological garden of spontaneous growths, adaptations, and innovations. I call this the Permissionless Innovation Universal Basic Income (PIUBI) framework. In it, the right to innovate, deviate, and mutate is upheld as the “gold standard” of institutional design whereby individuals are granted widespread freedoms combined with the provision of UBI and other innovation-fostering (carefully bound) services and regulations. In the coming decades, UBI may even enable poor people to take better advantage of Human Enhancement Technologies (HETs) and other experimental innovations. Such a framework is compatible with a fast pace of evolutionary development, but the regulatory model accompanying such a framework must be capable of responding to evolutionary lock-ins, maladaptive innovations, self-destructive behaviour on the part of UBI recipients, and the management of catastrophic and existential risks. In the end, I will have shown that the PIUBI framework can be justified as a plausible default institutional mechanism for responding to radical uncertainty, but it needs to be experimentally adapted to changing circumstances with the help of various situation-specific, polycentric, multi-level, approaches. (shrink)

The article considers the problem of universal basic income. The author believes that this topic can become one of the most relevant for social-philosophical research. The author notes that although the problem has been of concern to philosophers and scientists for a long time, it has become especially relevant only recently – over the past ten years. The following reasons are given as an explanation: recent experiments on the introduction of a universal basic income in Western (...) countries, the trend toward automation and technologization, the transformation of the economy, which is becoming more and more precarious. The author notes that the topic of universal basic income has become relevant even in Russian science, however, not in social philosophy, as in the West, but mainly in economics. The author argues that, since the discussion about basic income in the economic dimension has already taken place, it should be expanded to the field of social philosophy. To do this, the author raises a number of questions that will shed light on the social-philosophical nature of the problem of universal basic income – freedom, justice, welfare state, etc. Special attention is paid to the curious ideological transformations that became possible by the emergence of topic of basic income. First of all, basic income contributes to the formation of new ideologies, such as post-capitalism. Secondly, basic income itself can be considered as a new ideology, which is a synthesis of other ideological trends – libertarianism, feminism, Marxism, etc. Thirdly, post-capitalism, which emphasizes basic income, opens up much more significant problems than replacing labor and turning all people into a precariat. The author hopes that this paper will serve as the beginning of the discussion of the issue of basic income in the context of social-philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

This article contributes to the debate on automation and justice by discussing two under-represented concerns: labour justice and equality. Since automation involves both winners and losers, and given that there is no ‘end of work’ on the horizon, it is argued that most normative views on the subject – i.e. the ‘allocative’ view of basic income, and the ‘desirability’ views of post-work and workist ethics – do not provide many resources with which to address unjustly unequal divisions of (...) labour involved in technological innovation. This article problematises these common responses reframing the problem from the perspective of labour justice. While the allocative view assumes that labour justice follows ‘spontaneously’ from income redistribution, the desirability views are chiefly interested in either defining or contesting the meanings of work for individuals, overlooking the interdependent nature of work and concerns of equality other than autonomy. Two conceptions of labour justice are thus applied to the problem: Paul Gomberg’s contributive justice, and Iris Young’s democratic division of labour. Instead of deciding between them, the normative core of ‘contributive parity’ is suggested as a critical standard for assessing unequal labour structures, and for envisaging a future in which technology can be an ally in making social cooperation fair. (shrink)

Many economists have argued convincingly that automated systems employing present-day artificial intelligence have already caused massive technological displacement, which has led to stagnant real wages, fewer middle- income jobs, and increased economic inequality in developed countries like Canada and the United States. To address this problem various individuals have proposed measures to increase workers’ living standards, including the adoption of a universal basic income, increased public investment in education, increased minimum wages, increased worker control of firms, (...) and investment in a Green New Deal that will provide substantial employment in transitioning to green energy, buildings, and agriculture. In this paper I argue that both left-wing and right-wing positions in political philosophy, such as John Rawls’s Justice as Fairness and Robert Nozick’s Entitlement Theory, are committed to the conclusion that we should take political action to counteract the effects of technological displacement by undertaking such measures to increase workers’ living standards. (shrink)

This research uses a normative approach to examine the relationship between basic income and migration. The decisive variable is the effect of labour automation, which increases economic insecurities globally, leaving some nation states in a position to cope with this and others not. The insecurities will increase migratory pressures on one hand but also justify the introduction of basic income on a nation state level on the other. The normative guideline is the republican conception of freedom (...) as non-domination. This is used to justify a basic income, analyse how labour automation creates dominating structures and how borders dominate migrants seeking to move to countries which introduce a basic income. The result is that nation states that introduce a basic income to counter internal domination through labour automation, also have to look outside of their nation state. The imposition of borders in order to keep a basic income sustainable as well as labour automation itself, establish a form of domination over less developed countries and thus demand international regulation. (shrink)

We offer a precautionary account of why business managers should proactively rethink about what kinds of automation firms ought to implement, by exploring two challenges that automation will potentially pose. We engage the current debate concerning whether life without work opportunities will incur a meaning crisis, offering an argument in favor of the position that if technological unemployment occurs, the machine age may be a structurally limited condition for many without work opportunities to have or add meaning to their (...) lives. We term this the axiological challenge. This challenge, if it turns out to be persuasive, leads to a second challenge, to which managers should pay special attention: the teleological challenge, a topic especially relevant to the broad literature about corporate purpose and governance. We argue that both the shareholder profit-maximization model and its major alternative, stakeholder theory, are insufficient to address the meaning crisis. Unless rebutted, the two challenges compel business leaders to proactively rethink the purpose of business for future society. Otherwise, businesses will be contributors to a major ethical crisis and societal externality in the coming society. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is predicted to have a deep impact on the future of work and employment. The paper outlines a normative framework to understand and protect human freedom and justice in this transition. The proposed framework is based on four main ideas: going beyond the idea of a Basic Income to compensate the losers in the transition towards AI-driven work, towards a Responsible Innovation approach, in which the development of AI technologies is governed by an inclusive and (...) deliberate societal judgment; going beyond a philosophical conceptualisation of social justice only focused on the distribution of ‘primary goods’, towards one focused on the different goals, values, and virtues of various social practices (Walzer’s ‘spheres of justice’) and the different individual capabilities of persons (Sen’s ‘capabilities’); going beyond a classical understanding of capital, towards one explicitly including mental capacities as a source of value for AI-driven activities. In an effort to promote an interdisciplinary approach, the paper combines political and economic theories of freedom, justice and capital with recent approaches in applied ethics of technology, and starts applying its normative framework to some concrete example of AI-based systems: healthcare robotics, ‘citizen science’, social media and platform economy. (shrink)

Suppose we are about to enter an era of increasing technological unemployment. What implications does this have for society? Two distinct ethical/social issues would seem to arise. The first is one of distributive justice: how will the efficiency gains from automated labour be distributed through society? The second is one of personal fulfillment and meaning: if people no longer have to work, what will they do with their lives? In this article, I set aside the first issue and focus (...) on the second. In doing so, I make three arguments. First, I argue that there are good reasons to embrace non-work and that these reasons become more compelling in an era of technological unemployment. Second, I argue that the technological advances that make widespread technological unemployment possible could still threaten or undermine human flourishing and meaning, especially if they do not remain confined to the economic sphere. And third, I argue that this threat could be contained if we adopt an integrative approach to our relationship with technology. In advancing these arguments, I draw on three distinct literatures: the literature on technological unemployment and workplace automation; the antiwork critique—which I argue gives reasons to embrace technological unemployment; and the philosophical debate about the conditions for meaning in life—which I argue gives reasons for concern. (shrink)

Radical changes of our cultural values in the near future are inevitable, since the current culture is ecologically unsustainable. The present proposal, radical as it may seem to some, is accordingly offered as worthy of consideration. The main section of this article is on a proposed scheme, named Asset and Income Limits, for instituting maxima to the legitimate incomes and assets of individuals. This scheme involves every individual being associated with two bank accounts, an asset account (their own property) (...) and a holding account (held in escrow). Other parts of the advocated change in economic landscape are a radically different understanding of the concept of work and the introduction of a basic income. The roles of technology and culture, in creating both the opportunities and the obstacles to a transformation of society, are discussed. Non-monetary, non-convertible rewards for exceptional contributions to society are described. The scheme enhances freedom, being neutral in relation to many other value systems, such as the secular/sacred spectrum. The qualitative versus quantitative dichotomy is addressed, and it is concluded that the most that can be said of a just and sustainable society that has yet to be created is that the maximum income should be no more than one order of magnitude greater than the basic income, that is ~10 times at the most. Incentives for profitable employment would still be sufficient, and paying the basic income out of taxes on sales and/or non-basic income would be feasible. (shrink)

This article explores the experiences of employed and unemployed Ontario Basic Income recipients in the Hamilton and Brantford pilot site. Integrating data from surveys and interviews, the self-reported outcomes of both groups are summarized. These outcomes pertain to employment, physical health, mental health, use of health services, food security, housing stability, financial well-being and social activities. The article highlights the difference in the degree of improvements between recipients who were working before and during the pilot versus those who (...) were not employed at both times. Its broad conclusion is that both groups reported significant benefits, but it was recipients who were continuously employed that reported the greatest improvements. This suggests that basic income could be an important policy tool to improve the lives of low-income and precarious workers in Ontario and perhaps elsewhere. (shrink)

This paper discusses the concept of “human disenhancement”, i.e. the worsening of human individual abilities and expectations through technology. The goal is provoking ethical reflection on technological innovation outside the biomedical realm, in particular the substitution of human work with computer-driven automation. According to some widely accepted economic theories, automatization and computerization are responsible for the disappearance of many middle-class jobs. I argue that, if that is the case, a technological innovation can be a cause of “human disenhancement”, (...) globally, and all things considered, even when the local and immediate effect of that technology is to increase the demand of more sophisticated human skills than the ones they substitute. The conclusion is that current innovations in the ICT sector are objectionable from a moral point of view, because they disenhance more people than they enhance. (shrink)

A basic income is an income paid by a political community to all its members on an individual basis, without means test or work requirement. This article surveys the various forms the basic income proposal has taken and how they relate to kin ideas; synthesizes the central case for basic income, as a strategy against both poverty and unemployment; examines the question of whether and in what sense a universal basic income (...) is affordable; and discusses the most promising next steps towards it, both in the North and in the South. (shrink)

This paper reports the results of an economic lab experiment designed to test the impact of Basic Income (BI) on wages and productivity. The experimental design is based on the classic gift exchange game. Participants assigned the role of employer were tasked with making wage offers, and those assigned as employees chose how hard they would work in return. In addition to a control without any social security net, BI was compared to unemployment benefits, and both types of (...) cash transfers were tested at two levels. The results are that wage offers were increased in both the BI and unemployment benefit treatments compared to the control. The higher-level BI treatment also significantly increased effort. Further experimentation could shed more light on how the potential extra value created in the labor market through increased productivity would be divided between employers and employees. (shrink)

Technological unemployment is a very real phenomenon that should be addressed by governments and businesses alike. This paper argues that current approaches to technological unemployment are short-sighted in that they focus predominantly and primarily on current generations. This kind of approach results in harm such as ignoring impending meaning-crises and propagating a potential form of human-quota-driven tokenism in the process of implementing automation in the workplace. Arguably, current generations can (and should) benefit from communal resources insofar as they (...) do not harm the least privileged of future generations. That is the threshold that is set in this paper and this threshold can serve as a guiding principle for leaders when making decisions about whether automation should be implemented, the degree and scope to which automation should be implemented, and the policies regarding the process of the implementation and the regulation of automation in the workplace. An intergenerational justice approach is a novel approach to the problem of technological unemployment and can inform decision-making and policy-setting alike. (shrink)

Since the Enlightenment, there have been advocates for the rationalizing efficiency of enlightened sovereigns, bureaucrats, and technocrats. Today these enthusiasms are joined by calls for replacing or augmenting government with algorithms and artificial intelligence, a process already substantially under way. Bureaucracies are in effect algorithms created by technocrats that systematize governance, and their automation simply removes bureaucrats and paper. The growth of algorithmic governance can already be seen in the automation of social services, regulatory oversight, policing, the justice system, and (...) the military. However, there have also always been justified democratic and economic criticisms of autocracy, bureaucracy, technocracy, and algorithmic governance. Bureaucrats, technocrats, and algorithms embody biases that tend to serve the interests of elites, and all require transparency and democratic accountability, oversight individual citizens are ill equipped to exercise. As state apparatuses are increasingly automated, mechanisms for collective action and democratic oversight also need to be automated. Algorithms and cyborg citizenry will enable a posthuman democracy. Democratically accountable algorithmic governance, enabled by artificial intelligence and human enhancement, can automate bottom-up citizen surveillance, inform debate, aggregate decision making, and ensure the efficient working of the gradually withering state. As paid work disappears and we transition to a postcapitalist economy with a universal basic income, market mechanisms can be replaced with democratic planning. Indeed, only algorithmic governance can secure our future against accelerating threats from technological innovation. (shrink)

A central task in efforts to identify pathways to ecologically and socially sustainable economies is to reduce inequality and poverty while reducing material consumption, which has recently inspired future post-growth scenarios. We build a model to explore the potential of a universal basic income (UBI) to serve these objectives. Starting from the observation that post-growth trajectories can take very different forms we analyze UBI in two scenarios advanced in the literature. Comparing UBI in a “local self-sufficiency” economy to (...) a UBI in an “automation” economy, we show that although both scenarios satisfy central sustainability criteria, the impact of a UBI would differ greatly between these contexts. Our analysis shows that a UBI is less compatible with a labor-intensive local self-sufficiency economy than a capital-intensive, high tech economy. We conclude that the feasibility and attractiveness of a UBI in a post-growth scenario depends greatly on the specific characteristics of the economy. (shrink)

The paper starts by exploring the negative contingencies that are associated with the core institution of capitalist societies, the labour contract: unemployment, poverty, and denial of autonomy. It argues that these are the three conditions that basic income schemes can help prevent. Next, the three major normative arguments are discussed that are raised by opponents of basic income proposals: the idle should not be rewarded, the prosperous don’t need it, and there are so many things waiting (...) to be done in the world. After demonstrating that proponents of basic income stand in no way empty-handed when facing these objections, a third part considers basic income in functional terms: would its introduction help to resolve problems of social and economic order that are unlikely to be resolved in more conventional ways? (shrink)

Basic income policies have recently enjoyed a great deal of discussion, but they are not a natural fit with views of distributive or social justice endorsed by many moral and political philosophers. This essay develops and defends a new view of social justice, called relational sufficientarianism, which is more compatible with a universal basic income. Relational sufficientarianism holds that persons in a just society must have sufficient social status, but not necessarily equal social status. It argues (...) that this view offers a more plausible account of just social relations than relational egalitarianism, a better account of the threshold for sufficiency than distributive sufficientarianism, and can serve as a more suitable theoretical backing for a universal basic income than either of these other views, or distributive egalitarianism. (shrink)

Automation can bring the risk of technological unemployment, as employees are replaced by machines that can carry out the same or similar work at a fraction of the cost. Some believe that the appropriate response is to tax automation. In this paper, I explore the justifiability of view, maintaining that we can embrace automation so long as we compensate those employees whose livelihoods are destroyed by this process by creating new opportunities for employment. My contribution in this paper is (...) important not only because I develop a theoretical framework that we can use to resolve this urgent policy dispute—a dispute that has been discussed extensively by labour economists, tax lawyers, and policymakers, but largely neglected by political philosophers—but also because my analysis sheds lights on a wider range of controversies relating to the moral and political importance of unemployment. (shrink)

This paper critically analyses the position that basic income schemes foster idleness and thereby create harm. The view is based on an alleged empirical link between idleness and violent crime and an equation of non-activity with the creation of burden for others. It will be argued that the empirical claim is weak because it relies on conjectures derived from studies on unemployment. In addition, opponents arguing that basic income leads to an unfair distribution of burden between (...) `lazy idlers'' and `honest taxpayers'' have to face three questions. Is the distribution of onerous or unpleasant work fair? Is the distribution of work burdens between paid and unpaid workers equitable? Is the distribution of work between the unemployed and the employed fair? None of these questions can be answered in the affirmative. Hence, it can be confirmed that the `idleness'' argument against basic income relies on unfounded premises. (shrink)

How should policymakers respond to the risk of technological unemployment that automation brings? First, I develop a procedure for answering this question that consults, rather than usurps, individuals’ own attitudes and ambitions towards that risk. I call this the insurance argument. A distinctive virtue of this view is that it dispenses with the need to appeal to a class of controversial reasons about the value of employment, and so is consistent with the demands of liberal political morality. Second, I (...) appeal to the insurance argument to show that governments ought not simply to provide those who are displaced by machines with unemployment benefits. Instead, it must offer re-training programmes, as well as enact more general macroeconomic policies that create new opportunities for employment. My contribution is important not only because it helps us to resolve a series of urgent policy disputes—disputes that have been discussed extensively by labour market economists and policymakers, but less so by political philosophers—but also because my analysis sheds light on more general philosophical controversies relating to risk. (shrink)

This article reviews the possible role of the universal basic income in the transformation of experience in gender and age perspectives. The universal basic income has been particularly hotly debated in recent decades. Regardless of the position, the common tone of the debates is the imperative “we must experiment.” Such a close interest in the universal basic income derives from the fact that it threatens to change the “generic” for humans situation of finiteness of (...) resources and the need to work. Thus, it is able to change the experience of what it means to be human. Since the universal basic income allows to separate labor from income, it is likely that its introduction will return value to the currently stigmatized or devalued types of labor, such as child care, elderly care or domestic work. It creates opportunities for experience redistribution in gender perspective: care and leaving, affective connection, and sensitivity could become the business of both parents, not just mothers. Another experience redistribution is possible in age perspective. Along with automation of labor, population ageing is a universal process that will sooner or later affect all the countries. Alarmist narratives that present this process as a threat and a problem now prevail. They are largely based on outdated ideas about old age and what it means to be old. However, in fact, ageing is the maturation of the population as a whole. With a proper re-evaluation of the meaning and significance of old age, the introduction of the universal basic income could create material conditions for the transfer of experience from the elderly to the younger – for the first time since traditional societies. (shrink)

Set aside fanciful doomsday speculations about AI. Even lower-level AIs, while otherwise friendly and providing us a universal basic income, would be able to do all our jobs. Also, we would over-rely upon AI assistants even in our personal lives. Thus, John Danaher argues that a human crisis of moral passivity would result However, I argue firstly that if AIs are posited to lack the potential to become unfriendly, they may not be intelligent enough to replace us in (...) all our jobs. If instead they are intelligent enough to replace us, the risk they become unfriendly increases, given that they would not need us and humans would just compete for valuable resources. Their hostility will not promote our moral passivity. Secondly, the use of AI assistants in our personal lives will become a problem only if we rely on them for almost all our decision-making and motivation. But such a (maximally) pervasive level of dependence raises the question of whether humans would accept it, and consequently whether the crisis of passivity will arise. (shrink)

This article considers the entanglements of neuroscience, economics and behaviourism in a two-year experiment (2017–18) with basic income in Finland. The participants in this mandatory, state-led experiment are unemployed individuals (25–58 years old) recruited by the National Social Insurance Institution. The experiment is a randomised controlled trial intended to provide useful information about the impacts of basic income on employment and well-being. Focusing on the epistemological foundations of the experiment, this analysis suggests that the Finnish trial (...) with basic income should be considered to be an example of the neuroliberal movement in policy-making as it uses behavioural economics and popularised neuroscience to optimise the cognitive abilities of the unemployed. The primary contribution of this paper is to raise concerns about how neuroliberalism reconfigures citizenship by obscuring the limits between freedom and control and how societies of control use neuroliberal models such as nudging to organise the disorganised and control the uncontrolled. (shrink)

Due to the innovative possibilities of digital technologies, the issue of increasing automation is once again on the agenda – and not only in the industry, but also in other branches and sectors of contemporary societies. Although public and scientific discussions about automation seem to raise relevant questions of the “old” debate, such as the replacement of human labor by introducing new technologies, the authors focus here on the new contextual quality of these questions. The debate should rethink the relationship (...) between technology and work with regard to quantitative and qualitative changes in work. In this article, our example will be the introduction of automation in industry, which has been reflected in the widely recognized study by Frey and Osborne in 2013. They estimated the expected impacts of future computerization on US labor market outcomes as very high, specifically regarding the number of jobs at risk. Surprisingly, this study was the starting point of an intensive international debate on the impact of technologies on the future of work and the role of technological change in working environments. Thus, according to the authors, “old” questions remain important, but they should be reinterpreted for “new” societal demands and expectations of future models of work. (shrink)

This article draws upon clinical experience of GPs working in a deprived area of the North East of England to examine the potential contribution of Universal Basic Income to health by mitigating ‘patient-side barriers’ among three cohorts experiencing distinct forms of ‘precariousness’: 1) long-term unemployed welfare recipients with low levels of education (lumpenprecariat); 2) workers on short-term/zero-hours contracts with low levels of education (‘lower’ precariat); 3) workers on short-term/zero-hours contracts with relatively high levels of education (‘upper’ precariat). We (...) argue that any benefits must be accompanied by robust institutions capable of promoting health. (shrink)

Today’s youth find it extremely difficult to look beyond the present, in large part due to the precariousness of the labour market. Unconditional basic income, meanwhile, is emerging as the economic and social policy that is attracting most interest as an alternative not only to the conditional minimum income programmes, but also to the increasing unemployment and precarious conditions of employment. This survey study, conducted among students at the University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU) in 2021 (n (...) = 709), explores the attitudes of young people towards basic income. Findings reveal strong support among Basque youth for basic income, citing its potential to enhance personal freedom and improve living conditions. While previous studies have already found that young people tend to be more supportive of basic income, this research fills a gap in the literature by analysing in depth young people’s attitudes and beliefs about this policy proposal. (shrink)

Argues that an anti-paternalist case for unconditional basic income (UBI) is more difficult to make than it appears. Those who support UBI on anti-paternalist grounds wrongly understand paternalism in terms of how having options affects liberty rather than, in terms of how others intercede in their rational agency in ways that reflect judgments of the recipients’ inferiority. Moreover, a basket of essential goods appears better equipped than UBI to prevent unequal social relations that paternalism can exploit or exacerbate.

Given the increasing potential of automation in the primary and industrial sectors of the economy, it is helpful to take a mesoeconomic, i. e. sectoral, look at the concept of a basic income. We present a thought experiment centred on societies in which labour takes place only in the service sector. We identify service sectors like prostitution in which it may be advantageous to shift away from the market and sectors like health services where public involvement is indispensable. (...) Introducing a basic income may also generate social capital, which usually accompanies service provision in the sphere of cooperation. (shrink)

The globalization of and technological challenge to the world's workers generate profound ethical problems. Suitable solutions will require governments and civil societies to move beyond the modern tendencies to divinize property rights and base people's income eligibility almost exclusively on their work. Some attention is being paid to the issues involved therein so as to achieve better work/life balance. In some places, in fact, resource-based wealth has been distributed to all citizens, even to those not directly involved in (...) generating the wealth. To maintain and grow such arrangements will be difficult so long as traditional capitalist values like property rights and the work ethic remain dominant. Until this worldview is modified, only the independently wealthy will be able to live decent lives without engaging in wage work. But wageworkers' ability to find such work indefinitely is not assured. (shrink)

A universal basic income (UBI) would be a guaranteed income floor for both the employed and the unemployed, from which economic theory predicts a gain in bargaining power and a disincentive to work. For high earners, the increase in taxes necessary to fund this program would decrease their motivation to earn. To assess these aspects, we conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment at a State Employment Service office in Spain. The unemployed participants received either an initial unconditional endowment, framed (...) under the logic of the solidarity condition of UBI (UBI treatment) – to examine the taxes’ effect – or as a participation fee (FEE) or no initial endowment (NONUBI). Subsequently, they faced one default randomized task from a set of four paid real-effort tasks. To study bargaining power, they could change the task up to three times and/or skip all tasks and conclude the experiment. In the FEE treatment, they yielded the highest earnings. While we did not find a statistically significant difference in earnings between the FEE and the NON-UBI treatments, the UBI differed from the NON-UBI and FEE. A likely reason could be a crowding-out of motivation by the pressure to reciprocate without believing in other participants’ deservingness of the UBI. In addition, the results reveal that females change tasks more frequently than males. (shrink)

Debates concerning digital automation are mostly focused on the question of the availability of jobs in the short and long term. To counteract the possible negative effects of automation, it is often suggested that those at risk of technological unemployment should have access to retraining and reskilling opportunities. What is often missing in these debates are implications that all of this may have for individual autonomy understood as the ability to make and develop long-term plans. In this paper, I (...) argue that if digital automation becomes rapid, it will significantly undermine the legitimate expectation of stability and consequently, the ability to make and pursue long-term plans in the sphere of work. I focus on what is often taken to be one of the main long-term plans, i.e. the choice of profession, and I argue that this choice may be undermined by the pressure to continuously acquire new skills while at the same time facing a diminishing range of professions that one can choose from. Given that the choice of profession is significant for not-work related spheres of life, its undermining can greatly affect individual autonomy in these other spheres too. I argue that such undermining of individual planning agency constitutes a distinctive form of harm that necessitates a proactive institutional response. (shrink)

Unemployment in Europe is currently a major challenge. Two models for solving the problem are frequently proposed: a work model, which in its radical version institutes a legally binding right to employment, and a basic income model, which in its radical form establishes a universal, unconditional right to income security. In practice, western democracies have experimented with mixed forms of both models, with a greater emphasis on guaranteeing work. This article examines the justifications of these two models (...) in their radical versions, with a special focus on the experience of self-respect. The conclusion is that the benefits that traditionally are associated with paid work function better in justifying a right to basic income than a right to work. (shrink)