Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, Miscellaneous

Is it possible to articulate a conception of consciousness that is compatible with the exotic characteristics of contemporary, disembodied AI systems, and that can stand up to philosophical scrutiny? How would subjective time and selfhood show up for an entity that conformed to such a conception? Trying to answer these questions, even metaphorically, stretches the language of consciousness to breaking point. Ultimately, the attempt yields something like emptiness, in the Buddhist sense, and helps to undermine our dualistic inclinations towards subjectivity (...) and selfhood. (shrink)

We suggest that the influence of biology in ‘biologically inspired robotics’ can be embraced at a deeper level than is typical, if we adopt an enactive approach that moves the focus of interest from how problems are solved to how problems emerge in the first place. In addition to being inspired by mechanisms found in natural systems or by evolutionary design principles directed at solving problems posited by the environment, we can take inspiration from the precarious, self-maintaining organization of living (...) systems to investigate forms of cognition that are also precarious and self-maintaining and that thus also, like life, have their own problems that must be be addressed if they are to persist. In this vein, we use a simulation to explore precarious, self-reinforcing sensorimotor habits as a building block for a robot's behavior. Our simulations of simple robots controlled by an Iterative Deformable Sensorimotor Medium demonstrate the spontaneous emergence of different habits, their re-enactment and the organization of an ecology of habits within each agent. The form of the emergent habits is constrained by the sensory modality of the robot such that habits formed under one modality (vision) are more similar to each other than they are to habits formed under another (audition). We discuss these results in the wider context of: (a) enactive approaches to life and mind, (b) sensorimotor contingency theory, (c) adaptationist vs. structuralist explanations in biology, and (d) the limits of functionalist problem-solving approaches to (artificial) intelligence. (shrink)

The past few years have witnessed a growth of interest in the historical and philosophical dimensions of bioinformatics as a discipline. Despite the importance of bioinformatics in addressing the issues raised by the growing amount of biological data, data management is often seen as all it has to offer to biology. However, the emphasis on data management may come at the expense of understanding how bioinformatics generates genuine biological knowledge beyond its instrumental value for bench biologists. Some authors have taken (...) the first steps beyond data management, and towards the characterization of bioinformatics as a unique epistemic endeavor by stressing how its experimental practices can be conducive to biological knowledge. In this article, we build upon these attempts, and by using a detailed case study from the field of single cell transcriptomics (i.e., RNA velocity), we provide a fully-fledged characterization of bioinformatics as an experimental discipline. (shrink)

Often in romantic relationships, people want partners whose moral, political, and religious values align with their own. This article connects this point to the project of value alignment in AI research, in which researchers aim to design artificial intelligence systems that behave in ways that are in accordance with human values. There are good reasons to pursue the project of value alignment in connection with romantic chatbots—artificial intelligence systems designed to allow human users to simulate or replicate elements of romantic (...) relationships that ordinarily exist only between human beings. However, this paper argues that certain types of value alignment in such systems would preclude them from entering into authentic loving relationships. Some important features of authentic love require a capacity for value misalignment between romantic partners. A romantic chatbot whose values were locked in to match those of its human user only allows for a kind of inauthentic love that does not treat the artificial partner as a person in their own right but at most makes them into a kind of tool. The arguments presented draw on the existentialist feminist views of Simone de Beauvoir and her understanding of authentic romantic love. De Beauvoir held that inauthentic loving relationships entail that certain interactions between partners lack the significance or meaning they would have in cases of authentic love, that authentic love promotes self-knowledge and reflection, and that authentic love allows individuals to accomplish projects they could not accomplish on their own, including projects of self-transformation. The article explores ways in which the project of value alignment involving romantic chatbots interferes with such things. (shrink)

Abstract -/- We present a preliminary application of the Coherent Oscillation Detection and Encoding System (CODES), a novel method for detecting gravitational waves using prime-based encoding and phase-locking, to the GW190521 event detected by LIGO. CODES encodes strain data into a complex function C(x,t)=∑p=2,3,5,71pei(2πlog⁡(p)t+χpx) C(x,t) = \sum_{p=2,3,5,7} \frac{1}{p} e^{i(2\pi \log(p) t + \chi_p x)} C(x,t)=∑p=2,3,5,7​p1​ei(2πlog(p)t+χp​x), enhancing coherence through phase alignment to compute a Coherence Score (CCS). Using H1 detector data from GPS 1242442965.779297 to 1242442968.220459, CODES identified a peak CCS of (...) 1.945987e-38 at GPS 1242442967.256348, closely aligning with the known merger time of 1242442967. This suggests CODES’s potential as an alternative detection technique. However, this is a single-event analysis with unoptimized parameters. Ongoing work includes testing CODES on additional events (e.g., GW150914, GW170817), optimizing phase shifts, and conducting statistical significance tests to prepare for a journal submission. This preprint timestamps the method’s initial success. (shrink)

This research is aimed at the critical analysis of Searle's critique of cognitive science. The focus of Searle's critique is on computationalism, which holds that mind is to brain as software is to hardware—all mental states are explained in terms of computational processes...

The article examines potential scenarios of how cyborg technologies might influence social relations and the structure of future society. The authors forecast several scenarios for social development in the context of cyborgization - the mass implementation of technological modifications to human physicality and cognitive systems. They analyze possible ways new social hierarchies might emerge in the context of human technological enhancement. The work pays special attention to the problem of social fragmentation and potential conflicts resulting from uneven distribution of technologies. (...) Addressing "future shock" - the possible social reaction to radical technological transformations - the authors propose developing ethical principles and technological empathy as strategic directions for helping society adapt to new conditions and maintain consensus in the future. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is now capable of generating sophisticated and compelling images from simple text prompts. In this paper, I focus specifically on how artists might make use of AI to create art. Most existing discourse analogizes AI to a tool or collaborator; this focuses our attention on AI’s contribution to the production of an artistically significant output. I propose an alternative approach, the exploration paradigm, which suggests that artists instead relate to AI as a participant: artists create a space for (...) interaction with the AI algorithm by way of their prompts, thereby allowing them to explore the way that the algorithm “sees” and “represents.” AI art practiced in this fashion bears a striking resemblance to contemporary conceptual and participatory art. Viewing AI art in this way has implications for the appreciation of style in AI art; concerns about novelty and originality; and the assignment of artistic credit and copyright. (shrink)

The value of testimony as a source of knowledge has been a subject of epistemological debates. The "trust theory of testimony" suggests that human testimony is based on an affective relationship supported by social norms. However, the advent of generative artificial intelligence challenges our understanding of genuine testimony. The concept of "quasi-testimony" seeks to characterize utterances produced by non-human entities that mimic testimony but lack certain fundamental attributes. This article analyzes these issues in depth, exploring philosophical perspectives on testimony and (...) the implications of conversational AI technologies on our epistemic practices. (shrink)

Artificial intelligent technologies are utilized to provide online personalized recommendations, suggestions, or prompts that can influence people's decision-making processes. We call this AI-enhanced nudging (or AI-nudging for short). Contrary to the received wisdom we claim that AI-enhanced nudging is not necessarily morally problematic. To start assessing the risks and moral import of AI-nudging we believe that we should adopt a risk-factor analysis: we show that both the level of risk and possibly the moral value of adopting AI-nudging ultimately depend on (...) the complexity of the “moral situation” in which various risk-factors play a causal role in determining levels of uncertainty. (shrink)

The rapid integration of these artificial intelligence (AI) tools into our daily lives is reshaping how we think and make decisions. We propose that data-driven AI systems, by transcending individual artefacts and interfacing with a dynamic, multiartefact ecosystem, constitute a distinct psychological system. We call this ‘system 0’, and position it alongside Kahneman’s system 1 (fast, intuitive thinking) and system 2 (slow, analytical thinking).System 0 represents the outsourcing of certain cognitive tasks to AI, which can process vast amounts of data (...) and perform complex computations beyond human capabilities. It emerges from the interaction between users and AI systems, which creates a dynamic, personalized interface. Authors: Massimo Chiriatti, Marianna Ganapini, Enrico Panai, Mario Ubiali & Giuseppe Riva. (shrink)

Can AI systems such as ChatGPT think? We present an argument from rationality for the negative answer to this question. The argument is founded on two central ideas. The first is that if ChatGPT thinks, it is not rational, in the sense that it does not respond correctly to its evidence. The second idea, which appears in several different forms in philosophical literature, is that thinkers are by their nature rational. Putting the two ideas together yields the result that ChatGPT (...) is not a thinker. The paper sets out the argument in detail and shows how it can withstand numerous objections. We end the paper by contrasting the argument from rationality with a more well-known argument often taken to show that ChatGPT doesn’t think, due to Bender and Koller. (shrink)

Revista IT & C este o publicație trimestrială din domeniile tehnologiei informației și comunicații, și domenii conexe de studiu și practică. -/- Cuprins: -/- EDITORIAL / EDITORIAL -/- Levering Data Science in the Detection of Advanced Persistent Threats Utilizarea științei datelor în detectarea amenințărilor persistente avansate -/- TEHNOLOGIA INFORMAȚIEI / INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY -/- Detecting Advanced Persistent Threats in Cyber Warfare – Academic Studies Detectarea amenințărilor persistente avansate în războiul cibernetic – Studii academice -/- TELECOMUNICAȚII / TELECOMMUNICATIONS -/- Artificial Intelligence in (...) Communications in Electronic Warfare Inteligența artificială în comunicații în războiul electronic -/- PROGRAMARE / PROGRAMMING -/- Artificial Intelligence Algorithms in Electronic Warfare Algoritmi de inteligența artificială utilizați în războiul electronic -/- SECURITATE CIBERNETICĂ / CYBER SECURITY -/- Cyber Attack Case Studies – Advanced Persistent Threats Studii de caz privind atacurile cibernetice – Amenințările persistente avansate -/- ISSN 2821-8469 ISSN-L 2821-8469, DOI: 10.58679/IT78551 . (shrink)

Această carte explorează utilizarea inteligenței artificiale de către serviciile de informații din întreaga lume și rolul său critic în domeniul analizei intelligence, în apărare și securitatea națională. Serviciile de informații joacă un rol crucial în securitatea națională, iar adoptarea tehnologiilor inteligenței artificiale a avut un impact semnificativ asupra operațiunilor lor. De asemenea, examinează diferitele aplicații ale inteligenței artificiale în serviciile de informații, implicațiile, provocările și considerațiile etice asociate cu utilizarea acesteia. Cartea subliniază necesitatea cercetării și dezvoltării continue în domeniul inteligenței (...) artificiale pentru a se asigura că serviciile de informații. și în general apărarea și securitatea națională se pot adapta în mod eficient la amenințările emergente. (shrink)

Background: Microbiome biomarker discovery for patient diagnosis, prognosis, and risk evaluation is attracting broad interest. Selected groups of microbial features provide signatures that characterize host disease states such as cancer or cardio-metabolic diseases. Yet, the current predictive models stemming from machine learning still behave as black boxes and seldom generalize well. Their interpretation is challenging for physicians and biologists, which makes them difficult to trust and use routinely in the physician-patient decision-making process. Novel methods that provide interpretability and biological insight (...) are needed. Here, we introduce "predomics", an original machine learning approach inspired by microbial ecosystem interactions that is tailored for metagenomics data. It discovers accurate predictive signatures and provides unprecedented interpretability. The decision provided by the predictive model is based on a simple, yet powerful score computed by adding, subtracting, or dividing cumulative abundance of microbiome measurements. -/- Results: Tested on >100 datasets, we demonstrate that predomics models are simple and highly interpretable. Even with such simplicity, they are at least as accurate as state-of-the-art methods. The family of best models, discovered during the learning process, offers the ability to distil biological information and to decipher the predictability signatures of the studied condition. In a proof-of-concept experiment, we successfully predicted body corpulence and metabolic improvement after bariatric surgery using pre-surgery microbiome data. -/- Conclusions: Predomics is a new algorithm that helps in providing reliable and trustworthy diagnostic decisions in the microbiome field. Predomics is in accord with societal and legal requirements that plead for an explainable artificial intelligence approach in the medical field. (shrink)

L’histoire parallèle de l’évolution de l’intelligence humaine et de l’intelligence artificielle constitue un voyage fascinant, mettant en lumière les voies distinctes mais interconnectées de l’évolution biologique et de l’innovation technologique. Cette histoire peut être considérée comme une série de développements interconnectés, chaque avancée de l’intelligence humaine ouvrant la voie au prochain bond en avant de l’intelligence artificielle. L’intelligence humaine et l’intelligence artificielle sont depuis longtemps liées, évoluant selon des trajectoires parallèles tout au long de l’histoire. Alors que les humains cherchent (...) à comprendre et à reproduire l’intelligence, l’IA est devenue un domaine dédié à la création de systèmes capables d’accomplir des tâches qui nécessitent traditionnellement l’intellect humain. Ce livre examine les racines évolutives de l'intelligence, explore l'émergence de l'intelligence artificielle, examine l'histoire parallèle de l'intelligence humaine et de l'intelligence artificielle, retraçant leur développement, leurs interactions et l'impact profond qu'elles ont eu les unes sur les autres, et envisage les paysages futurs où l'intelligence humaine et artificielle converge. Explorons cette histoire, en comparant les étapes clés et les développements dans les deux domaines. (shrink)

This chapter explores the influence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on digital democracy, focusing on four main areas: citizenship, participation, representation, and the public sphere. It traces the evolution from electronic to virtual and network democracy, underscoring how each stage has broadened democratic engagement through technology. Focusing on digital citizenship, the chapter examines how AI can improve online engagement while posing privacy risks and fostering identity stereotyping. Regarding political participation, it highlights AI's dual role in mobilising civic actions and spreading misinformation. (...) Regarding representation, AI's involvement in electoral processes can enhance voter registration, e-voting, and the efficiency of result tabulation but raises concerns regarding privacy and public trust. Also, AI's predictive capabilities shift the dynamics of political competition, posing ethical questions about manipulation and the legitimacy of democracy. Finally, the chapter examines how integrating AI and digital technologies can facilitate democratic political advocacy and personalised communication. However, this also comes with higher risks of misinformation and targeted propaganda. (shrink)

The rapid pace of technological advancements offers an essential field of research for a deeper understanding of man’s relationship with artifacts of her design. These artifacts designed by humans can have various mental and physical effects on their users. The human interaction with the artifact is not passive; on the contrary, it exhibits a potential that reveals the inner dispositions of human beings and makes them open to new creations. In this article, we will examine the impact of technology on (...) human life through the dispositional compatibilism perspective of the contemporary philosopher Kadri Vihvelin, arguing for a system of metaphysics in which ontology of properties depend on dispositions. In this context, the emerging phenomenon of dispositional compatibilism opens the door to developing new philosophical ideas for evaluating the concepts of compatibilism and freedom in the context of technology. Thus, it is emphasized that although technological devices shape human life, new and unforeseen powers may emerge due to human-artifact interaction. This article will examine the idea of dispositional compatibilism by specifically considering human interaction with text-based AI applications. The ability of AI to collaborate with human thought patterns is a meaningful example of the observation of dispositional compatibilism. In conclusion, the article aims to address the effects of technology on human freedom by approaching the human-artifact relationship from a dispositional perspective. It also aims to defend the claim that technological artifacts can positively contribute to human freedom from the perspective of dispositional compatibilism. (shrink)

Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI) systems (also known as AI “chatbots”) are among the most promising examples of the use of technology in mental health care. With already millions of users worldwide, CAI is likely to change the landscape of psychological help. Most researchers agree that existing CAIs are not “digital therapists” and using them is not a substitute for psychotherapy delivered by a human. But if they are not therapists, what are they, and what role can they play in mental (...) health care? To answer these questions, we appeal to two well-established and widely discussed concepts: cognitive and affective artifacts. Cognitive artifacts are artificial devices contributing functionally to the performance of a cognitive task. Affective artifacts are objects which have the capacity to alter subjects’ affective state. We argue that therapeutic CAIs are a kind of cognitive-affective artifacts which contribute to positive therapeutic change by (i) simulating a (quasi-)therapeutic interaction, (ii) supporting the performance of cognitive tasks, and (iii) altering the affective condition of their users. This sheds new light on why virtually all existing mental health CAIs implement principles and techniques of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy — a therapeutic orientation according to which affective change and, ultimately, positive therapeutic change is mediated by cognitive change. Simultaneously, it allows us to conceptualize better the potential and limitations of applying these technologies in therapy. (shrink)

What can contemporary machine learning (ML) models do? Given the proliferation of ML models in society, answering this question matters to a variety of stakeholders, both public and private. The evaluation of models' capabilities is rapidly emerging as a key subfield of modern ML, buoyed by regulatory attention and government grants. Despite this, the notion of an ML model possessing a capability has not been interrogated: what are we saying when we say that a model is able to do something? (...) And what sorts of evidence bear upon this question? -/- In this paper, we aim to answer these questions, using the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) as a running example. Drawing on the large philosophical literature on abilities, we develop an account of ML models' capabilities which can be usefully applied to the nascent science of model evaluation. Our core proposal is a conditional analysis of model abilities (CAMA): crudely, a machine learning model has a capability to X just when it would reliably succeed at doing X if it 'tried'. The main contribution of the paper is making this proposal precise in the context of ML, resulting in an operationalisation of CAMA applicable to LLMs. We then put CAMA to work, showing that it can help make sense of various features of ML model evaluation practice, as well as suggest procedures for performing fair inter-model comparisons. (shrink)

International regulation of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) is increasingly conceived as an exercise in risk management. This requires a shared approach for assessing the risks of AWS. This paper presents a structured approach to risk assessment and regulation for AWS, adapting a qualitative framework inspired by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It examines the interactions among key risk factors—determinants, drivers, and types—to evaluate the risk magnitude of AWS and establish risk tolerance thresholds through a risk matrix informed by (...) background knowledge of event likelihood and severity. Further, it proposes a methodology to assess community risk appetite, emphasizing that such assessments and resulting tolerance levels should be determined through deliberation in a multistakeholder forum. The paper highlights the complexities of applying risk-based regulations to AWS internationally, particularly the challenge of defining a global community for risk assessment and regulatory legitimization. (shrink)

This paper (in German) discusses the question of what is going on when large language models (LLMs) produce meaningful text in reaction to human prompts. Can LLMs be understood as authors or producers of speech acts? I argue that this question has to be answered in the negative, for two reasons. First, due to their lack of semantic understanding, LLMs do not understand what they are saying and hence literally do not know what they are (linguistically) doing. Since the agent’s (...) knowing what they are doing is a necessary condition of action, LLMs cannot be said to produce speech acts. Secondly, agency conceptually implies accepting accountability for one’s doings, which in turn implies some kind of practical commitment to live up to that accountability. Since LLMs lack any kind of practical commitment, they cannot be said to produce speech acts. I then assess two proposals of how better to understand the contribution of LLMs to human discourse. According to Anna Strasser and Eric Schwitzgebel, they should be understood as junior partners in asymmetric joint action. I claim that this suggestion founders on the same objections as rehearsed above. According to Alice Helliwell, they should be understood as a radically new kind of component of our (human) extended mind. Although I do have reservations about this suggestion as well, it seems the most promising at this point. (shrink)

Bài viết này giới thiệu năm yếu tố tiền đề đó với mục đích gia tăng nhận thức về quan hệ giữa người và máy trong bối cảnh công nghệ ngày càng thay đổi cuộc sống thường nhật. Năm tiền đề bao gồm: Tiền đề về cấu trúc xã hội, văn hóa, chính trị, và lịch sử; về tính tự chủ và sự tự do của con người; về nền tảng triết học và nhân văn của nhân loại; về hiện (...) tượng tiếp biến văn hóa sinh ra từ tương tác giữa người và máy; về tam giác tương tác giữa con người với máy tính, giữa con người với con người, và giữa con người với thiên nhiên. Trên cơ sở giải thích rõ về năm tiền đề này, bài viết đã đưa ra ba gợi ý cho Việt Nam về việc phát triển, ứng dụng, và quản lý trí tuệ nhân tạo. (shrink)

“Strong AI” is the view that it is possible for an artificial agent to be mentally indistinguishable from human agents. Because the behavioral dispositions of artificial agents are determined by underlying dispositional systems, Strong AI seems to entail human behavioral dispositions are also determined by dispositional systems. It is, however, highly intuitive that non-dispositional, phenomenal properties, such as being in pain, at least partially determine certain human behavioral dispositions, like the disposition to take a pain killer. Consequently, Strong AI seems (...) to conflict with an intuitive view of phenomenal properties’ role in determining human behavioral dispositions. My goal here is not directly to evaluate this tension, but rather to clarify how dispositionalism in the metaphysics of properties bears on it. While a tempting thought is that dispositionalism fits well with Strong AI’s thoroughly dispositional account of human behavior, I argue that this thought does not hold for dispositionalism in general. In particular, I argue that combining a version of the “powerful qualities view” with certain dispositionalist conceptions of the will leads to a version of the intuitive view of phenomenal properties that is radically incompatible with Strong AI. I argue further that this view also raises a challenge for the weaker claim that an artificial agent could be behaviorally indistinguishable from a human agent. (shrink)

Machina sapiens - l;algoritmo che ci ha rubato il segreto della conoscenza. -/- Le macchine possono pensare? Questa domanda inquietante, posta da Alan Turing nel 1950, ha forse trovato una risposta: oggi si può conversare con un computer senza poterlo distinguere da un essere umano. I nuovi agenti intelligenti come ChatGPT si sono rivelati capaci di svolgere compiti che vanno molto oltre le intenzioni iniziali dei loro creatori, e ancora non sappiamo perché: se sono stati addestrati per alcune abilità, altre (...) sono emerse spontaneamente mentre leggevano migliaia di libri e milioni di pagine web. È questo il segreto della conoscenza, ed è adesso nelle mani delle nostre creature? Cos'altro può emergere, mentre continuiamo su questa strada? (shrink)

The biomedical literature makes extensive use of the concept of a genetic program. So far, however, the nature of genetic programs has received no satisfactory elucidation from the standpoint of computer science. This unsettling omission has led to doubts about the very existence of genetic programs, on the grounds that gene regulatory networks lack a predetermined schedule of execution, which may seem to contradict the very idea of a program. I show, however, that we can make perfect sense of genetic (...) programs, if only we abandon the preconception that all computers have a von Neumann architecture. Instead, genetic programs instantiate the computational architecture of Post–Newell Production Systems. That is, genetic programs are unordered sets of conditional instructions, instructions that fire independently when their conditions are matched. For illustration I present a paradigm Production System that regulates the functioning of the well-known lac operon of E. coli. On close reflection it turns out that not only genes, but also proteins encode instructions. I propose, therefore, to rename genetic programs to biomolecular programs. Biomolecular and/or genetic programs, and the cellular computers than run them, are to be understood not as von Neumann computers, but as Post–Newell production systems. (shrink)

What does it mean to be human? Philosophers and theologians have been wrestling with this question for centuries. Recent advances in cognition, neuroscience, artificial intelligence and robotics have yielded insights that bring us even closer to an answer. There are now computer programs that can accurately recognize faces, engage in conversation, and even compose music. There are also robots that can walk up a flight of stairs, work cooperatively with each other and express emotion. If machines can do everything we (...) can, does that mean we are machines? -/- This book examines whether an artificial person can be constructed and if so, what that might tell us about our future and ourselves. Different human capacities such as perception, creativity, consciousness, social behavior, and free will are described in separate chapters. Technological advances in these areas are summarized and compared to our own abilities. The book adopts a multi-disciplinary approach, with a naturalistic perspective drawn from biology and psychology matched against a technological perspective based on computer science and robotics. (shrink)

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be (...) explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require onsciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims). (shrink)

Psychoanalysis, particularly as articulated by figures like Freud and Lacan, highlights the inherent division within the human subject—a schism between the conscious and unconscious mind. It could be said that this suggests that such an internal division becomes amplified in the context of generative art, where technology and algorithms are used to generate artistic expressions that are meant to emerge from the depths of the unconscious. Here, we encounter the tension between the conscious artist and the generative process itself, which (...) may yield unexpected, even uncontrollable results. -/- This paper, therefore, seeks to address this division within the modern subject and its relationship to technology, wherein the division within the living body is revealed through the presence of prosthetic elements, which mirrors the division brought about by the incorporation of language as a signifier. I argue that the amplification of this internal schism does not necessarily lead to a more fractured subject. Instead, generative art, bolstered by advancements in AI and machine learning, offers a unique opportunity for individuals to externalize and explore their minds in novel ways. -/- By examining contemporary works such as Hal Foster’s Prosthetic Gods, which stands as a pivotal exploration of the convergence between modernist art and psychoanalytic theory and Isabel Millar’s Psychoanalysis of Artificial Intelligence, this paper elucidates the profound implications of Freud’s vision of modern -/- subjectivity as Prothesengott (Prosthetic God) and address the questions concerning this technological imbrication of the human mind and body through the Lacanian framework. Although for Freud, Man does not become a real God, rather, the potential to transcend one’s limitations ascribes us to God-like qualities by seeking to generate new forms of life that go beyond merely reproducing nature — a transcention of the natural. Millar emphasizes that Freud observes that this is evidenced by the fact that these additional organs remain distinct from the organism and can never assimilate into it. One continually falls short of realizing the fantasy he envisions, opting instead to use his supplementary artificial organs to endlessly revolve around the objects of the drive. -/- This evolving relationship that the drive has with its technological objects, resounds in Lacan’s conception of “lathouse” which allows extimate objects to convert interiority (unconscious) into exteriority (conscious) and exteriority into interiority. The thesis of this paper seeks to employ this underutilized concept to understand the nature of human subjectivity and its bodily and structural relationship to generative art. Therefore, this paper emphasizes what really happens when we enter into this relationship with the lathouse, whereby this artificial object has effects in the "real of jouissance", where these Lathouses create a network, namely the Alethosphere. My goal is to argue that generative art as a technological development, can be seen as an extension to the development of the drive. Conclusively, I make the claim for generative art's potential to externalize the human creative drive by emphasizing the interplay between randomness and structure, and how it offers a means to surpass our inherent limitations by presenting an avenue for self-expression that transcends traditional modes of art. (shrink)

Despite its centrality in the philosophy of cognitive science, there has been little prior philosophical work engaging with the notion of representation in contemporary NLP practice. This paper attempts to fill that lacuna: drawing on ideas from cognitive science, I introduce a framework for evaluating the representational claims made about components of neural NLP models, proposing three criteria with which to evaluate whether a component of a model represents a property and operationalising these criteria using probing classifiers, a popular analysis (...) technique in NLP (and deep learning more broadly). The project of operationalising a philosophically-informed notion of representation should be of interest to both philosophers of science and NLP practitioners. It affords philosophers a novel testing-ground for claims about the nature of representation, and helps NLPers organise the large literature on probing experiments, suggesting novel avenues for empirical research. (shrink)

While philosophers hold that it is patently absurd to blame robots or hold them morally responsible [1], a series of recent empirical studies suggest that people do ascribe blame to AI systems and robots in certain contexts [2]. This is disconcerting: Blame might be shifted from the owners, users or designers of AI systems to the systems themselves, leading to the diminished accountability of the responsible human agents [3]. In this paper, we explore one of the potential underlying reasons for (...) robot blame, namely the folk's willingness to ascribe inculpating mental states or "mens rea" to robots. In a vignette-based experiment (N=513), we presented participants with a situation in which an agent knowingly runs the risk of bringing about substantial harm. We manipulated agent type (human v. group agent v. AI-driven robot) and outcome (neutral v. bad), and measured both moral judgment (wrongness of the action and blameworthiness of the agent) and mental states attributed to the agent (recklessness and the desire to inflict harm). We found that (i) judgments of wrongness and blame were relatively similar across agent types, possibly because (ii) attributions of mental states were, as suspected, similar across agent types. This raised the question - also explored in the experiment - whether people attribute knowledge and desire to robots in a merely metaphorical way (e.g., the robot "knew" rather than really knew). However, (iii), according to our data people were unwilling to downgrade to mens rea in a merely metaphorical sense when given the chance. Finally, (iv), we report a surprising and novel finding, which we call the inverse outcome effect on robot blame: People were less willing to blame artificial agents for bad outcomes than for neutral outcomes. This suggests that they are implicitly aware of the dangers of overattributing blame to robots when harm comes to pass, such as inappropriately letting the responsible human agent off the moral hook. (shrink)

The editorial introduces issue 21.1 of Technoetic Arts via a critical reflection on the artificial intelligence hype (AI hype) that emerged in 2022. Tracing the history of the critique of Large Language Models, the editorial underscores that there are substantial ethical challenges related to bias in the training data, copyright issues, as well as ecological challenges which the technology industry has consistently downplayed over the years. -/- The editorial highlights the distinction between the current AI technology’s reliance on extensive pre-existing (...) human-generated data for pattern recognition and the performative process inherent in art practice. Patterns of creative output can be replicated without a thorough understanding of underlying concepts. In contrast, the performative process of art practice, as explored through the conceptual frameworks of creativity by Noam Chomsky, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Roger T. Ames and discussed in previous publications by this editorial's author, creates concepts and continually ‘strives to extend itself towards the unknown.’ -/- Following this introductory section, the editorial provides an overview of the ten articles featured in this issue of Technoetic Arts. The first four texts engage with emerging technologies from various perspectives in art and design. The subsequent six articles, part of a special section titled 'Perspectives from Chandigarh,' reflect a quest for meaningful existence within colonial, patriarchal, and biopolitical structures that frame everyday practices of exclusion and oppression. (shrink)

Research groups around the world are currently busy trying to invent new life in the laboratory, looking for extraterrestrial life, or making machines increasingly more life-like. In the case of astrobiology, any newly discovered life would likely be very old, but when discovered it would be new to us. In the case of synthetic organic life or life-like machines, humans will have invented life that did not exist before. Together, these endeavors amount to what we call the emerging plurality of (...) lives because we see a future where we are surrounded by, and interact with, life of many different origins, as well as entities that we have not traditionally seen as being alive. In the future these entities will likely possess properties that we so far have only associated with living beings, thereby transcending and perhaps blurring the borders between life and non-life. (shrink)

This short article is a “conversation” in which an android, Mort, replies to Richard Marc Rubin’s android named Sol in “The Robot Sol Explains Laughter to His Android Brethren” (The Philosophy of Humor Yearbook, 2022). There Sol offers an explanation for how androids can laugh--largely a reaction to frustration and unmet expectations: “my account says that laughter is one of four ways of dealing with frustration, difficulties, and insults. It is a way of getting by. If you need to label (...) my conception of humor, you might call it an adjustment theory, or perhaps an accommodation theory” (Rubin 256). Mort is intrigued but has his doubts. Mort contends that synesthesia likely has something to do with how humans develop humor. Perhaps, he considers, human designers crossed the androids' sensory wires, allowing them to be able to smash up concepts that do not otherwise seem to fit together, reconstruct incongruities in a manner that is not nonsensical, express the aha-eureka moment of a serendipitous discovery, and even feel blue when they fail at a given task that we were expected to complete. (shrink)

The recent wave of generative AI (GAI) systems like Stable Diffusion that can produce images from human prompts raises controversial issues about creatorship, originality, creativity and copyright. This paper focuses on creatorship: who creates and should be credited with the outputs made with the help of GAI? Existing views on creatorship are mixed: some insist that GAI systems are mere tools, and human prompters are creators proper; others are more open to acknowledging more significant roles for GAI, but most conceive (...) of creatorship in an all-or-nothing fashion. We develop a novel view, called CCC (collective-centered creation), that improves on these existing positions. On CCC, GAI outputs are created by collectives in the first instance. Claims to creatorship come in degrees and depend on the nature and significance of individual contributions made by the various agents and entities involved, including users, GAI systems, developers, producers of training data and others. Importantly, CCC maintains that GAI systems can sometimes be part of a co-creating collective. We detail how CCC can advance existing debates and resolve controversies around creatorship involving GAI. (shrink)

This book surveys and examines the most famous philosophical arguments against building a machine with human-level intelligence. From claims and counter-claims about the ability to implement consciousness, rationality, and meaning, to arguments about cognitive architecture, the book presents a vivid history of the clash between the philosophy and AI. Tellingly, the AI Wars are mostly quiet now. Explaining this crucial fact opens new paths to understanding the current resurgence AI (especially, deep learning AI and robotics), what happens when philosophy meets (...) science, and the role of philosophy in the culture in which it is embedded. -/- Organising the arguments into four core topics - 'Is AI possible', 'Architectures of the Mind', 'Mental Semantics and Mental Symbols' and 'Rationality and Creativity' - this book shows the debate that played out between the philosophers on both sides of the question, and, as well, the debate between philosophers and AI scientists and engineers building AI systems. Up-to-date and forward-looking, the book is packed with fresh insights and supporting material, including: -/- - Accessible introductions to each war, explaining the background behind the main arguments against AI - Each chapter details what happened in the AI wars, the legacy of the attacks, and what new controversies are on the horizon. - Extensive bibliography of key readings. (shrink)

Context sensitivity is one of the distinctive marks of human intelligence. Understanding the flexible way in which humans think and act in a potentially infinite number of circumstances, even though they’re only finite and limited beings, is a central challenge for the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, particularly in the case of those using representational theories. In this work, the frame problem, that is, the challenge of explaining how human cognition efficiently acknowledges what is relevant from what is not (...) in each context, has been adopted as a guide. By using it, we’ve been able to describe a fundamental tension between context sensitivity and the mental representations used in cognition theories. The first chapter discusses the nature of the frame problem,as well as the reasons for its persistence. In the second and third chapters, the problem is used as a measure tool in order to inquiry a few representational approaches and check how well suited they are to deal with context dependencies. The problems found are then correlated with the frame problem. Throughout the discussion, we try to show that 1) none of the evaluated approaches is capable of dealing with context sensitivity in a proper manner, but 2) that’s not a reason to think that the frame problem constitutes an argument against representational approaches in general, and 3) that it constitutes a fundamental conceptual tool in contemporary research -/- A sensibilidade ao contexto é uma das marcas distintivas da inteligência humana. Compreender o modo flexível como o ser humano pensa e age em função de um número potencialmente infinito de circunstâncias, ainda que munido de recursos finitos e limitados, é um desafio central para a filosofia da mente e para a ciência cognitiva, em particular aos que fazem uso de teorias representacionalistas. Nesse trabalho, adotou-se como fio condutor o modo como isso se manifesta no "frame problem": a dificuldade em explicar como a cognição humana reconhece, de maneira eficiente, o que é ou não relevante em cada contexto. A partir dele, buscou-se caracterizar uma tensão fundamental entre a sensibilidade ao contexto e o uso de representações mentais em teorias da cognição. O primeiro capítulo discute a natureza do frame problem, bem como as razões de sua resiliência. No segundo e terceiro capítulos, faz-se uso do problema como métrica para investigar o quão adequado é o tratamento das dependências contextuais no âmbito de várias abordagens representacionais. No decorrer da discussão, realiza-se um esforço argumentativo para mostrar que 1) nenhuma das estratégias abordadas é capaz tratar adequadamente da sensibilidade ao contexto, mas que 2) apesar disso, o frame problem não constitui argumento fatal para teorias representacionalistas em geral, e que 3) ele constitui uma ferramenta conceitual fundamental para pesquisas contemporâneas. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) techniques are used to model human activities and predict behavior. Such systems have shown race, gender and other kinds of bias, which are typically understood as technical problems. Here we try to show that: 1) to get rid of such biases, we need a system that can understand the structure of human activities and;2) to create such a system, we need to solve foundational problems of AI, such as the common-sense problem. Additionally, when informational platforms uses these (...) models to mediate interactions with their users, which is a commonplace nowadays, there is an illusion of progress, for what is an increasingly higher influence over our own behavior is took for an increasingly higher predictive accuracy. Given this, we argue that the bias problem is deeply connected to non-technical issues that must be discussed in public spaces. -/- Técnicas de inteligência artificial (IA) são utilizadas para modelar as atividades humanas e gerar predições comportamentais. Estes sistemas têm apresentado vieses diversos, inclusive de raça e gênero, tipicamente tomados como problemas de engenharia. Realiza-se aqui um esforço argumentativo para mostrar que: 1) escapar dos vieses demanda um sistema que compreenda a estrutura das atividades humanas e; 2) criar um sistema que apresente tal compreensão, demanda a solução de problemas fundacionais da IA, em particular, o problema de como modelar o senso comum. No caso de plataformas informacionais que usam desses modelos para mediar interações com seus usuários, algo cada vez mais comum, o não reconhecimento disso dá margem a uma ilusão de progresso, em que uma crescente influência sobre nosso comportamento é tomada como uma crescente acurácia preditiva. Nesse cenário, argumenta-se que o problema dos vieses está associado a questões não técnicas que devem ser discutidas em espaços públicos. (shrink)

Extended Reality (XR) and Large Language Model (LLM) technologies have the potential to significantly influence higher education practices and pedagogy in the coming years. As these emerging technologies reshape the educational landscape, it is crucial for educators and higher education professionals to understand their implications and make informed policy decisions for both individual courses and universities as a whole. -/- This paper has two parts. In the first half, we give an overview of XR technologies and their potential future role (...) in higher education. Then, we discuss the benefits and challenges of adopting and integrating XR technologies into higher education settings. Finally, we offer recommendations for educators, administrators, and policymakers on how to approach the adoption of this set of technologies and set institutional policy to take advantage of its benefits while minimizing its potential negative consequences. -/- In the paper’s second half, we discuss LLMs - specifically Generative Pre-trained Transformers (GPTs). Again, we provide an overview of this rapidly developing technology and examine its unprecedented and potentially disruptive impact on higher education pedagogy. We delve into the benefits and limitations of GPTs, highlighting the pedagogical and ethical challenges they may pose. Finally, we present actionable recommendations for instructors and administrators at both the course level and the university-wide level to guide policy decisions concerning these transformative technologies. (shrink)

The debate around the notions of a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge has proven crucial for the development of many fields in philosophy, such as metaphysics, epistemology, metametaphysics etc. We advocate that the recent debate on the two notions is also fruitful for man-made distributed computing systems and for the epistemic analysis thereof. Following a recently proposed modal and fallibilistic account of a priori knowledge, we elaborate the corresponding concept of a priori belief: We propose a rich taxonomy of (...) types of a priori beliefs and their role for the different agents that participate in the system engineering process, which match the existing view exceedingly well and are particularly promising for explaining and dealing with unexpected behaviors in fault-tolerant distributed systems. Developing such a philosophical foundation will provide a sound basis for eventually implementing our ideas in a suitable epistemic reasoning and analysis framework and, hence, constitutes a mandatory first step for developing methods and tools to cope with the various challenges that emerge in such systems. (shrink)

In God Emperor of Dune, Leto II explains to Moneo why people destroyed thinking machines in the Butlerian Jihad: "Humans had set those machines to usurp our sense of beauty, our necessary selfdom out of which we make living judgments." The Orange Catholic Bible (OCB), the key religious text in the Dune universe, forbids the creation of machines that imitate human thinking: "Thou shalt not make a machine in the likeness of a man's mind." The OCB focuses on human mental (...) abilities – especially computation, reason, and logic – that have a status that machines should not emulate. In Frank Herbert's universe, divine imitation and creation are presented in conflicting ways: on the one hand, they are strictly prohibited, on the other, they are aspirations for key characters. Mentats replace machines by use of hard, cold, logical thinking and reasoning with machine‐like efficiency. (shrink)

Growing demand for broadly accessible mental health care, together with the rapid development of new technologies, trigger discussions about the feasibility of psychotherapeutic interventions based on interactions with Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI). Many authors argue that while currently available CAI can be a useful supplement for human-delivered psychotherapy, it is not yet capable of delivering fully fledged psychotherapy on its own. The goal of this paper is to investigate what are the most important obstacles on our way to developing CAI (...) systems capable of delivering psychotherapy in the future. To this end, we formulate and discuss three challenges central to this quest. Firstly, we might not be able to develop effective AI-based psychotherapy unless we deepen our understanding of what makes human-delivered psychotherapy effective. Secondly, assuming that it requires building a therapeutic relationship, it is not clear whether psychotherapy can be delivered by non-human agents. Thirdly, conducting psychotherapy might be a problem too complicated for narrow AI, i.e., AI proficient in dealing with only relatively simple and well-delineated tasks. If this is the case, we should not expect CAI to be capable of delivering fully-fledged psychotherapy until the so-called “general” or “human-like” AI is developed. While we believe that all these challenges can ultimately be overcome, we think that being mindful of them is crucial to ensure well-balanced and steady progress on our path to AI-based psychotherapy. (shrink)

لم نعد بحاجة إلى فانوس سحري نمسح عليه بأصابعنا لكي يخرج منه المارد القادر على خدمتنا وتلبية بعض أهم مطالبنا الحياتية، ولم نعد بحاجة إلى تعويذات نلج بها في عالم السحر والخيال؛ لقد خرج المارد بالفعل من قمقمه الحاسوبي؛ من جوف مختبرات البرمجة والذكاء الاصطناعي، بتعويذات (أكواد) رياضية رمزية سرعان ما تمكن من التهامها وهضمها، ليبيت قادرًا على إنتاج تعويذات أخرى مماثلة، وربما أفضل منها! خرج «المُحول التوليدي المدرب مُسبقًا»، المعروف اختصارًا باسم «جي بي تي»، ملوحًا بإمكانات بحثية وخدمية وإنتاجية (...) هائلة، ومهددًا بتصفية قطاعات بأسرها من المهن والوظائف، وبتجريف مهارات البحث العلمي لدى طلاب المدارس والجامعات! (shrink)

تُخبرنا النظرية الحاسوبية للعقل (أو مذهب الحوسبة)، أن عقولنا تُشبه الحواسيب في عملها؛ أي أنها تتلقى مدخلات من العالم الخارجي، ثم تُنتج بالخوارزميات مخرجات في شكل حالات ذهنية أو أفعال. وبعبارة أخرى، تذهب النظرية إلى أن الدماغ لا يعدو أن يكون معالج معلومات؛ حيث يكون العقل بمثابة «برمجيات» (سوفت وير) تعمل على «جهاز» هو الدماغ (هارد وير). وما دام العقل مجرد برمجيات تخضع للحوسبة الفيزيائية بواسطة الأدمغة، أليس من الممكن إذن منطقيًا نقلها إلى أي حاسوب مثلما نقوم بنقل أية برمجيات (...) أخرى؟. (shrink)

It is indubitable that machines with artificial intelligence (AI) will be an essential component in humans’ quest to become a spacefaring civilization. Most would agree that long-distance space travel and the colonization of Mars will not be possible without adequately developed AI. Machines with AI have a normative function, but some argue that it can also be evaluated from the perspective of ethical norms. This essay is based on the assumption that machine ethics is an essential philosophical perspective in realizing (...) the aim of humanity becoming a spacefaring civilization. In this essay, I explore two questions in the field of machine ethics, that I believe to be relevant to the role AI will play in long-distance space travel. The first is, should moral theory be extended to include machines with AI, and second, can machines be fully ethical agents? In this essay, I define AI and then discuss the difference between implicit, explicit and full ethical agents in relation to machines with AI. I then present the argument that the inclusion of moral theory is essential in the development of machines with AI. Without an adequate inclusion of moral theory in the design of AI it may pose an existential threat to humanity, especially in the development of super-intelligent machines. I also highlight that conceptual clarity is essential in the field of machine ethics and the choice of the conceptual foundation that informs AI research and development has ethical implications, especially in the case of super-intelligent machines. This essay is an exploratory and speculative philosophical analysis of certain aspects of machine ethics relevant to long-distance space travel and does not attempt to provide definitive answers to the questions posed in the essay, but instead aims to bring attention to what I deem important considerations. (shrink)

Limits need to be set on AI’s ability to simulate human feelings. Ensuring that chatbots don’t use emotive language, including emojis, would be a good start. Emojis are particularly manipulative. Humans instinctively respond to shapes that look like faces — even cartoonish or schematic ones — and emojis can induce these reactions.

I conducted an experiment by using four different artificial intelligence models developed by OpenAI to estimate the persuasiveness and rational justification of various philosophical stances. The AI models used were text-davinci-003, text-ada-001, text-curie-001, and text-babbage-001, which differed in complexity and the size of their training data sets. For the philosophical stances, the list of 30 questions created by Bourget & Chalmers (2014) was used. The results indicate that it seems that each model has its own plausible ‘cognitive’ style. The outcomes (...) of the ‘strongest’ model correlate with the average philosophers' stance. (shrink)