Philosophy of Biology, Miscellaneous

By definition the conference series Taboo - Transgression - Transcendence in Art & Science includes theoretical presentations and artists’ talks focusing (a) on questions about the nature of the forbidden and about the aesthetics of liminality, as expressed in art that uses or is inspired by technology and science, and (b) on the opening of spaces for creative transformation in the merging of science and art. The organization of Taboo - Transgression - Transcendence in Art & Science 2018 in Mexico (...) City, the third conference of the TTT series, embodies the trust and support that constitutes its community. After three years working in the organization of TTT in Corfu the possibility to see it happening across the Greek borders and, above all, on the other side of the Atlantic was overwhelming. I am personally grateful to María Antonia González Valerio, Marta de Menezes, Ana Ventura Miranda and Andreas Giannakoulopoulos for gracefully challenging the concept of a conference’s digital organization in real-time space and for kindly bringing in their immense experience and ability to connect beyond limits. I am also thankful to all TTT2018 participants who have generously shared their experiences, offering, through their presentations, excellence and respect for the concept of interdisciplinarity and collaboration, independently of each other’s status. Finally, my appreciation for the discrete and inestimable sustaining role of my fellow members on the Steering Committee of the TTT conference series: Roy Ascott, Andreas Floros, Gunalan Nadarajan, Melentie Pandilovski, Stelarc, Polona Tratnik and Adam Zaretsky. I am also thankful for the support of the Scientific-artistic committee. Together the Commitees insured that TTT2018 in Mexico City was an intentionally facilitated meeting point, organized to safely host the free interaction of ideas around liminal issues in the frame of Art&Sci. (shrink)

In evolutionary medicine and other related fields, the concept of evolutionary mismatch is used to explain phenomena whereby traits reduce in adaptive value and eventually become maladaptive as the environment changes. This article argues that there is a similar problem of persistent adaptivity—what has been called the problem of evolutionary novelty—and it introduces the concept of mismatch resistance in order to explain phenomena whereby traits retain their adaptive value in novel environments that are radically different from the organisms’ environment of (...) evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). The possible role of variability selection in the evolution of mismatch-resistant traits is discussed, and it is suggested that mismatch resistance provides a useful tool for making progress on certain issues related to evolutionary theory, such as the modularity debate, cases of adaptivity outside of organisms’ ancestral environment, and the viability of naturalism as an overarching philosophical framework for understanding the natural world. (shrink)

For a large period of time in biology, it was thought that only 1-2% of the entire human DNA carries protein-making signals, and the remaining 98% of DNA does not carry protein-making signals. They were called junk DNA or non-coding DNA. The Encode Project began in 2003 to explore the function of the remaining 98% of human DNA in the context of human genome research. From the ENCODE project of 2007 and 2012, we know that about 80% of the DNA (...) in the human body is not junk. The subsequent criticisms of the Encode project have been numerous. But no matter the criticism, the results of the Encode Project have always proved true. In this paper I will evaluate the result of Encode project for the case of junk Dna in the light of philosophy of biology. (shrink)

Dans un texte court, dense, poétique et technique à la fois, Martin Buber nous invite à considérer autrement nos compagnes végétales. Cette forme de considération nouvelle peut s’étendre aux autres humains, aux autres vivants. Les êtres humains constituent une espèce vivante qui entretient des relations, de toutes natures, avec quantité d’espèces vivantes, très diverses, plus ou moins visibles ou perceptibles, selon des modalités conscientes ou pas. Les humains se sont entourés d’espèces domestiquées, végétales et animales, avec lesquelles les relations sont (...) anciennes, conscientes et proches. Partis d’un arbre et de sa contemplation, nous sommes invités à une prise de conscience de son existence d’être vivant face à la nôtre, de notre puissance, éventuellement destructive, jusqu’à notre capacité à lui reconnaître sa dignité et à la possibilité d’entrer en relation réciproque avec lui. Dans la continuité de cette démarche, nous nous tournons vers les autres vivants, jusqu’à atteindre une forme d’invisibilité qui n’est ni la réciprocité de la relation ni la conscience de l’arbre mais l’existence des micro-organismes, qui ne nous sont pas accessibles directement, mais qui se révèlent être, également, dans des relations fortes avec les autres vivants. (shrink)

Niche construction is the process of organisms changing themselves or their environment—or their relationship with their environment—in ways that affect the evolutionary trajectory of their population. These evolutionary trajectory changes are traditionally understood to be triggered by changes in selection pressures. Niche construction thus necessarily involves organisms altering selection pressures. In this paper, we argue that changes in selection pressures is not the only way organisms can influence the evolutionary futures of their population. We propose that organisms can also affect (...) drift probabilities, and that such changes should be considered niche construction. Drift probabilities can be modulated by altering population size or by affecting driftability (individual variance in possible reproductive outcomes). We consider both and provide examples of how niche construction can stabilize, increase, or dampen drift probabilities. Finally, we revisit and broaden the traditional definition of niche construction. We hold that organismic activities that modify drift probabilities should count as niche construction, even if selection pressures remain unaltered. (shrink)

Whether defended or criticized, Darwinism is generally considered a scientific theory. However, Popper contests this point. According to him, Darwinism (defined as the explanation of evolution by natural selection) is less a scientific theory than a metaphysical research program: a theoretical framework that has a heuristic function for science, but that does not fulfill the necessary condition for any science, namely testability. In terms of deconstructing Darwinism, Popper’s position is therefore interesting. It raises the question of the scientificity of Darwinism. (...) More generally, it raises the question of the scientificity of the debate on the mechanisms of evolution: what type(s) of argument(s) does this debate bring into play? Can this debate be reduced to an opposition between a scientifically founded theory (Darwinism) and other theories of evolution that are purely philosophical, or even ideological? First, I analyze Popper’s position. According to him, Darwinism is rationally defensible, but difficult to test because it is not capable of making precise and sufficiently specific predictions. Darwinism is therefore more metaphysical than scientific, even if it has a heuristic function for science. Moreover, Popper proposes an improvement of Darwinism by asserting that it must give a more important place to the activity of organisms in evolution. In a second step, I discuss Popper’s position, taking into account the criticisms that this position has generated. As regards the non-testability of Darwinism, it appears that the tests proposed in the literature do not meet the defects pointed out by Popper. On the metaphysical character of Darwinism, I discuss Popper’s assertion on two levels: on the possibility of a clear demarcation between science and non-science, and on the value of the demarcation criterion proposed by Popper. Finally, on the improvement of Darwinism, I attempt to underline the originality of the Popperian proposal. (shrink)

This philosophical article critically examines Ayurveda, highlighting its classification as a pseudoscientific practice and questioning its place in modern medicine. By integrating both Indian and Western philosophical perspectives, the article contributes to the broader discourse on tradition versus empirical science. It challenges the authority of ancient knowledge in the face of modern scientific rigor, while also exploring the potential for dialogue between holistic practices and evidence-based medicine. This work adds depth to the literature on alternative medicine, skepticism, and the philosophy (...) of science, encouraging critical reflection on the role of Ayurveda today. (shrink)

“In death, life persists, transforms, and renews—what are the limits of our existence?” -/- What does it mean to be alive? From the moment we are born, our existence seems predicated on a simple dichotomy: life or death. And yet, recent developments in science, such as the creation of biobots from the cells of dead organisms, challenge this very binary. These discoveries force us to ask profound questions about the nature of existence, the essence of life, and what it truly (...) means to die. Can life persist after death? And if so, what implications does this have for our understanding of the world and ourselves? -/- . (shrink)

When an athlete is genetically engineered, s/he performs over and above the normally conceived and born athletes. That is because, a person can be (and specimens are currently being engineered) to have superior muscles and stamina for given sports specializations. It is not a big leap from designing athletes to specialized soldiers. Nature already has soldier ants, worker bees and the creator knows how many other reference points.

Clinical microbiology serves as a partner to clinicians in the diagnosis and treatment of infectious diseases. Antibiotics are prescribed empirically before the availability of antimicrobial susceptibility testing data, especially when the patient's medical status could deteriorate by suspending the treatment. To investigate the impact of antimicrobial susceptibility testing on the management of outpatients with suspected bacterial infection in Libyan patients, a cross-sectional prospective study concluded on microbial microdroplet culture by including outpatients with suspected bacterial infection, who have done antimicrobial susceptibility (...) testing. Thus, 53 Libyan patients with urinary tract infections and 14 Libyan patients with skin infections were included in this study. Before the availability of antimicrobial susceptibility testing data, 25 patients were appropriately treated while 42 patients were inappropriately treated. After the availability of antimicrobial susceptibility testing data, the number of appropriately treated patients increased to 57 patients. Thus, antimicrobial susceptibility testing improved the management of 41 patients by discontinuing an unnecessary antibiotic in four patients, starting necessary antibiotic therapy in 18 patients, and changing to more appropriate antibiotic in 19 patients. However, the antimicrobial susceptibility testing has no impact on the management of 24 patients and has led to the worsening of the management of two patients. The effect of antimicrobial susceptibility testing of antibiotic de-escalation was assessed in 35 patients; however, antibiotic de-escalation occurred in six patients. Thus, data of antimicrobial susceptibility testing has improved the management of Libyan outpatients with bacterial infection but their role in antibiotic de-escalation was slight. (shrink)

This thesis aims to advance evolutionary and epistemological knowledge of Middle and Late Pleistocene paleoanthropology, focusing on four main processes at the basis of cutting-edge research on modern human origins and evolution. These are the speciation of Homo sapiens, the transition to behavioural modernity, admixture with archaic hominin species outside Africa and human niche construction and global range expansion, here approached from the perspective of the current climate crisis. First, an extended single-origin of Homo sapiens will be defended on evidential (...) and evolutionary grounds, arguing that the paleoclimatic and paleoenvironmental context of Middle Pleistocene Africa likely favoured an allopatric speciation process from a widespread and diversified ancestral population. Then the thesis will move to the behavioural and archaeological side of the origin problem. I will analyse the evolution of the research agenda on “behavioural modernity”, developing a philosophical account of “investigative disintegration” and criticizing Rubicon-based approaches that have not kept up with new standards of explanatory adequacy. I will then turn to paleogenomic research and discuss evidence of archaic admixture with respect to the taxonomic status of Homo sapiens and Neanderthals. I will approach the apparent conflict between molecular and morphology-based taxonomies from a diachronic perspective on lineage divergence and from an integrative perspective on different species conceptions and delimitation criteria, justifying distinct specific status on such grounds. Finally, I will frame anthropogenically-driven climate change as a niche construction process played at a global scale, having deep roots in Homo sapiens evolutionary history and long-term consequences that today require a counteractive response to prior actions to deviate from a potential evolutionary trap. (shrink)

For several decades scientists and philosophers studying how the mind works have debated the issue of modularity. Their main disagreements concern the massive modularity hypothesis, according to which all (or most) of our cognitive mechanisms are modular in nature. Pietraszewski and Wertz (2022) have recently suggested that the modularity debate is based on a confusion about the levels of analysis at which the mind can be explained. This article argues that their position suffers from three major problems: (1) the argument (...) is unsound, with untrue premises; (2) it glosses over important empirical issues; and (3) the guidelines it offers are not sufficient for avoiding future confusions. As these criticisms are developed, this article will provide a way of making sense of the modularity debate—with an eye for what really is at stake both conceptually and empirically—and, by identifying a false assumption often shared by proponents and opponents of the massive modularity hypothesis alike, it will sketch out some guidelines for moving the debate forward. (shrink)

Change is the fundamental idea of evolution. Explaining the extraordinary biological change we see written in the history of genomes and fossil beds is the primary occupation of the evolutionary biologist. Yet it is a surprising fact that for the majority of evolutionary research, we have rarely studied how evolution typically unfolds in nature, in changing ecological environments, over space and time. While ecology played a major role in the eventual acceptance of the population genetic viewpoint of evolution in the (...) synthetic era (circa 1918-1956), it held a lesser role in the development of evolutionary theory until the 1980s, when we began to systematically study the evolutionary dynamics of natural populations in space and time. As a result, early evolutionary theory was initially constructed in an abstract vacuum that was unrepresentative of evolution in nature. The subtle synthesis between ecology with evolutionary biology (eco-evo synthesis) over the past 40 years has progressed our knowledge of natural selection dynamics as they are found in nature, thus revealing how natural selection varies in strength, direction, form, and, more surprisingly, level of biological organization. Natural selection can no longer be reduced to lower levels of biological organization (i.e., individuals, selfish genes) over shorter timescales but should be expanded to include adaptation at higher levels and over longer timescales. Long-term and/or emergent evolutionary phenomena, such as multilevel selection or evolvability, have thus become tenable concepts within an evolutionary biology that embraces ecology and spatiotemporal change. Evolutionary biology is currently suspended at an intermediate stage of scientific progress that calls for the organization of all the recent knowledge revealed by the eco-evo synthesis into a coherent and unified theoretical framework. This is where philosophers of biology can be of particular use, acting as a bridge between the subdisciplines of biology and inventing new theoretical strategies to organize and accommodate the recent knowledge. Philosophers have recommended transitioning away from outdated philosophies that were originally derived from physics within the philosophical zeitgeist of logical positivism (i.e., monism, reductionism, and monocausation) and toward a distinct philosophy of biology that can capture the natural complexity of multifaceted biological systems within diverse ecosystems—one that embraces the emerging philosophies of pluralism, emergence, and multicausality. Therefore, I see recent advances in ecology, evolutionary biology, and the philosophy of biology as laying the groundwork for another major biological synthesis, what I refer to as the Second Synthesis because, in many respects, it is analogous to the aims and outcomes of the first major biological synthesis (but is notably distinct from the inorganic and contrived progressive movement known as the extended evolutionary synthesis). With the general development of a distinctive philosophy of science, biology has rightfully emerged as an autonomous science. Thus, while the first synthesis legitimized biology, the Second Synthesis autonomized biology and afforded biology its own philosophy, allowing biology to finally realize its full scientific potential. (shrink)

Justin Garson has recently argued that proper functions are proximal activities of traits selected by phylogenetic or ontogenetic selection processes, and that traits are dysfunctional only if they cannot perform their proper functions for constitutional reasons. We partially agree with Garson, but reject the view that functions are proximal activities, as well as his account of dysfunctions. Instead, we propose our own theory that biological functions are selected dispositions and that a trait is dysfunctional in virtue of not having the (...) dispositions for which it was selected. This account can explain both defects (or dysfunctions in Garson’s sense) and dysfunctions due to environmental factors. Moreover, it offers a neat way to explain the graduality of dysfunction. (shrink)

Science is founded on a method based on critical thinking. A prerequisite for this is not only a sufficient command of language but also the comprehension of the basic concepts underlying our understanding of reality. This constraint implies an awareness of the fact that the truth of the World is not directly accessible to us, but can only be glimpsed through the construction of mod- els designed to anticipate its behaviour. Because the relationship between models and reality rests on the (...) interpretation of founding postulates and in- stantiations of their predictions (and is therefore deeply rooted in language and culture), there can be no demarcation between science and non-science. However, critical thinking is essential to ensure that the link between models and reality is gradually made more adequate to reality, based on what has already been established, thus guaranteeing that science progresses on this basis and excluding any form of relativism. (shrink)

This paper focuses on physiological integration in multicellular systems, a notion often associated with biological individuality, but which has not received enough attention and needs a thorough theoretical treatment. Broadly speaking, physiological integration consists in how different components come together into a cohesive unit in which they are dependent on one another for their existence and activity. This paper argues that physiological integration can be understood by considering how the components of a biological multicellular system are controlled and coordinated in (...) such a way that their activities can contribute to the maintenance of the system. The main implication of this perspective is that different ways of controlling their parts may give rise to multicellular organizations with different degrees of integration. After defining control, this paper analyses how control is realized in two examples of multicellular systems located at different ends of the spectrum of multicellularity: biofilms and animals. It focuses on differences in control ranges, and it argues that a high degree of integration implies control exerted at both medium and long ranges, and that insofar as biofilms lack long-range control (relative to their size) they can be considered as less integrated than other multicellular systems. It then discusses the implication of this account for the debate on physiological individuality and the idea that degrees of physiological integration imply degrees of individuality. (shrink)

In the last few years, a remarkable convergence of interests and results has emerged between scholars interested in the arts and aesthetics from a variety of perspectives and cognitive scientists studying the mind and brain within the predictive processing (PP) framework. This convergence has so far proven fruitful for both sides: while PP is increasingly adopted as a framework for understanding aesthetic phenomena, the arts and aesthetics, examined under the lens of PP, are starting to be seen as important windows (...) into our mental functioning. The result is a vast and fast-growing research programme that promises to deliver important insights into our aesthetic encounters as well as a wide range of psychological phenomena of general interest. Here, we present this developing research programme, describing its grounds and highlighting its prospects. We start by clarifying how the study of the arts and aesthetics encounters the PP picture of mental functioning (§1). We then go on to outline the prospects of this encounter for the fields involved: philosophy and history of art (§2), psychology of aesthetics and neuroaesthetics (§3) and psychology and neuroscience more generally (§4). The upshot is an ambitious but well-defined framework within which aesthetics and cognitive science can partner up to illuminate crucial aspects of the human mind. -/- This article is part of the theme issue ‘Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives’. -/- . (shrink)

The presentation proposes to complement an existing development on meaning generation for animals, humans and artificial agents by looking at what could have existed at pre-biotic times and what could be a post-human meaning generation. The core of the approach is based on an existing model for meaning generation: the Meaning Generator System (MGS). The MGS is part of an agent submitted to an internal constraint. The MGS generates a meaning when it receives information that has a connection with the (...) constraint. The generated meaning is used by the agent to implement an action (physical, biological or mental) aimed at satisfying the constraint. The action can be in or out the agent. The purpose of the presentation is to widen the MGS approach in order to reach a coverage for information, constraint and meaning from a pre-biotic level to a possible post-human one. We present the MGS for animals, humans and artificial agents with the corresponding constraints. We then look at what could have been a constraint at a pre-biotic far from thermodynamic equilibrium level. At the other end of the spectrum we look at a possible post-human status with an evolution of a ‘limit anxiety’ human constraint and also with AAs submitted to animal or human type constraints. Such approach links information science with physics, evolution, anthropology, semiotics and human mind. Continuations are proposed. (shrink)

Synthetic biology (SynBio) covers two main areas: application engineering, exemplified by metabolic engi- neering, and the design of life from artificial building blocks. As the general public is often reluctant to embrace synthetic approaches, preferring nature to artifice, its immediate future will depend very much on the public’s reaction to the unmet needs created by the pervasive demands of sustainability. On the other hand, this reluctance should not have a negative impact on research that will now take into account the (...) existence of the multiple transitions that cells face over time. The ages of life—birth, development, maturation, senescence and death—reflect specific key transitions and have, until now, rarely been taken into account in SynBio designs. This results in a mismatch between novelty and the very long evolutionary time that led to the existing chassis [remember that this is the common term used to describe the cellular framework as seen by synthetic biologists (de Lorenzo & Danchin, 2008)]. It also implies that, in general, transitions between growth stages will be taken into account with the appro- priate embodiment of highly specific processes. This is particularly important when adapting new models to their host, whether natural or artificial. Adaptation fol- lows two stages, short-term accommodation of new entities and long-term assimilation into the cell as a whole. This requires discrimination between classes of entities. We suggest that proteins playing the essential role of Maxwell’ demons, here named Maxwell’s dis- criminators (MxDs) to refer to their original function, will permit the assimilation and accommodation of artificial constructs. As a consequence, we can foresee that class discrimination, beyond mere recognition, will be implemented in SynBio 2.0, leading to an authentic par- adigm shift (Kuhn, 1996), based on conceptions that embody information as a genuine currency of reality. (shrink)

Research groups around the world are currently busy trying to invent new life in the laboratory, looking for extraterrestrial life, or making machines increasingly more life-like. In the case of astrobiology, any newly discovered life would likely be very old, but when discovered it would be new to us. In the case of synthetic organic life or life-like machines, humans will have invented life that did not exist before. Together, these endeavors amount to what we call the emerging plurality of (...) lives because we see a future where we are surrounded by, and interact with, life of many different origins, as well as entities that we have not traditionally seen as being alive. In the future these entities will likely possess properties that we so far have only associated with living beings, thereby transcending and perhaps blurring the borders between life and non-life. (shrink)

Humans are social beings. However, we are not alone in the realm of social reality; we share this space with diverse entities, including more than just animals. The term "social" has recently been applied to describe the collective behaviors of microorganisms and plants, as well as interactions among parts and groups of organisms. Therefore, there is a need to develop a framework that enables the study of social phenomena in a clearer and less restrictive manner. In this thesis, I lay (...) the groundwork for such a framework by describing the basic building blocks of social systems and their implications in the study of social behavior. This project necessitates breaking down disciplinary boundaries between the biological, cognitive, and social sciences to provide a more comprehensive perspective on the social phenomenon. In Part I, I review recent proposals that describe social systems based on interactions. I argue that these models can be extended to other interactive systems beyond animals, questioning the limits of the standard view of social systems. Also, by challenging an argument that supports a gap between humans and nature, I advocate for a broader understanding of social reality that includes both human and nonhuman beings. In Part II, I present a new framework for studying social systems consisting of three fundamental building blocks: interactions, relationships, and social units. I argue that interactions are vital components of social systems, highlighting their dynamic and entwined nature. Relationships, arising from distinctive patterns of interactions sensitive to the identity of the individuals, play a crucial role in these systems and encompass both objective and subjective components. Lastly, I develop an account of social units as cognitively autonomous individuals, drawing on biogenic approaches to cognition. Thus, I propose that a social system emerges when cognitively autonomous individuals (social units) engage in repeated interactions and form relationships. In Part III, I apply this framework to two entities that are subjects of contemporary debate: groups and plants. I argue that both groups and plants are potential social units. Specifically, plants interact repeatedly and demonstrate the ability to differentiate between individuals, providing evidence of their capacity to form social relationships. This framework serves as a guide for studying the social behavior of these entities and offers valuable insights into their interactive systems. Overall, this expanded framework establishes connections between social phenomena across different taxa and levels of organization, facilitating comparative investigations. It introduces new perspectives on social behavior, encourages interdisciplinary collaboration, and broadens our understanding of multi-species interactions. (shrink)

being in the dar is the dark side of the moon, that can turn itself to be a brilliant aspect of yourself.

Tres conceptos metacientíficos objeto de análisis filosófico son los de ley, modelo y teoría. El objetivo de este artículo es presentar la elucidación de estos conceptos, y de sus relaciones, hecha dentro del marco del Estructuralismo Metateórico o Sneediano (BALZER; MOULINES & SNEED, 1987), y de su aplicación a un caso del ámbito de la Biología: la Genética Clásica. El análisis realizado posibilitará fundamentar, en contra de lo que sostienen algunos filósofos de la ciencia en general y de la biología (...) en particular, las siguientes afirmaciones: a) que hay “leyes” en las ciencias biológicas, b) que muchos de los heterogéneos y distintos “modelos” de la Biología pueden ser acomodados bajo alguna “teoría”, y c) que justamente esto es lo que les confiere a las teorías biológicas su gran poder unificador. (shrink)

This paper aims to develop an account of the pursuitworthiness of models based on a view of models as epistemic tools. This paper is motivated by the historical question of why, in the 1960s, when many scientists hardly found QSAR models attractive, some pharmaceutical scientists pursued Quantitative Structure–Activity Relationship (QSAR) models despite the lack of potential for theoretical development or empirical success. This paper addresses this question by focusing on how models perform their heuristic functions as epistemic tools rather than (...) as potential theories. I argue that models perform their heuristic function by “constructing” phenomena from data in the sense that they allow the model users who interact with the medium of the models to recognise the phenomena as such. The constructed phenomena assist model users in identifying which conditional hypotheses that are focused on low-level regularities concerning entities such as chemical compounds are more “testworthy,” a concept that links the costs associated with hypothesis testing with the fertility of the hypothesis. (shrink)

Recent research about the microbiome points to a picture in which we, humans, are ‘living through’ nature, and nature itself is living in us. Our bodies are hosting—and depend on—the multiple species that constitute human microbiota. This article will discuss current research on the microbiome through the ideas of Japanese ecologist Imanishi Kinji (1902–1992). First, some of Imanishi’s key ideas regarding the world of living beings and multispecies societies are presented. Second, seven types of relationships concerning the human microbiome, human (...) beings, and the environment are explored. Third, inspired by Imanishi’s work, this paper develops the idea of dynamic, porous, and complex multispecies societies in which different living beings or species are codependent on others, including microbiota and human beings. (shrink)

This Open Access book combines philosophical and historical analysis of various forms of alternatives to mechanism and mechanistic explanation, focusing on the 19th century to the present. It addresses vitalism, organicism and responses to materialism and its relevance to current biological science. In doing so, it promotes dialogue and discussion about the historical and philosophical importance of vitalism and other non-mechanistic conceptions of life. It points towards the integration of genomic science into the broader history of biology. It details a (...) broad engagement with a variety of nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first century vitalisms and conceptions of life. In addition, it discusses important threads in the history of concepts in the United States and Europe, including charting new reception histories in eastern and south-eastern Europe. While vitalism, organicism and similar epistemologies are often the concern of specialists in the history and philosophy of biology and of historians of ideas, the range of the contributions as well as the geographical and temporal scope of the volume allows for it to appeal to the historian of science and the historian of biology generally. (shrink)

The book discusses a natural process by which an animal pathogen evolves and becomes able to infect, reproduce and transmit within the human species, in a process called zoonosis. In nine chapters of the book, the author dwells on the analysis of a specific pathogen, starting from its discovery and studies on it: the Hendra virus in the first chapter; the Ebola virus in the second; the mathematical study of epidemics at the same time as the spread of malaria in (...) the third; SARS in the fourth; bacterial zoonosis in the fifth chapter (Q fever, psittacosis and Lyme disease); the study of viral transmissibility from animal to man with the case study of herpes B in monkeys and hepadnaviruses from bats in the sixth and seventh chapters; HIV in the eighth chapter and finally some considerations on the evolution of epidemics in relation to the contribution that human activities. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that cognition is a kind of natural agency. Natural agency is the capacity that certain systems have to act in accordance with their own norms. Natural agents are systems that bias their repertoires in response to affordances in the pursuit of their goals. -/- Cognition is a special mode of this general phenomenon. Cognitive systems are agents that have the additional capacity to actively take their worlds to be certain ways, regardless of whether the world is really (...) that way. In this way, cognitive systems are desituated. Desituatedness is the root of specifically cognitive capacities for representation and abstraction. -/- There are two main reasons why this view needs defending. First, natural agency is typically viewed as incompatible with natural science because it is committed to a teleological mode of explanation. Second, cognition is typically held to be categorically distinct from natural agency. This dissertation argues against both of these views. It argues against the incompatibility of agency and natural science by demonstrating that systems biology, general systems theory, and sciences that deal with complex systems have typically underappreciated conceptual and theoretical resources for grounding agency in the causal structure of the world. These conceptual resources do not, however, reduce agency to systems theory because the normativity inherent in agency demands descriptive resources beyond those of even the most sophisticated systems theory. It argues against the categorical difference between natural agency and cognition by pointing out that separating cognition from a richer web of situated, ecologically embedded relations between the agent and the world generates the frame problem, which is an insuperable obstacle to making cognition that is sufficiently responsive to the complexity of the world. Rooting cognition in natural agency is a more robust empirical bet for theorizing cognition and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Exceptionally preserved fossils are the product of complex interplays of biological and geological processes including burial, autolysis and microbial decay, authigenic mineralization, diagenesis, metamorphism, and finally weathering and exhumation. Determining which tissues are preserved and how biases affect their preservation pathways is important for interpreting fossils in phylogenetic, ecological, and evolutionary frameworks. Although laboratory decay experiments reveal important aspects of fossilization, applying the results directly to the interpretation of exceptionally preserved fossils may overlook the impact of other key processes that (...) remove or preserve morphological information. Investigations of fossils preserving non-biomineralized tissues suggest that certain structures that are decay resistant are rarely preserved, and decay-prone structures can fossilize, albeit rarely. As we review here, decay resistance is an imperfect indicator of fossilization potential, and a suite of biological and geological processes account for the features preserved in exceptional fossils. Organisms decayed experimentally in seawater have been used as direct analogs for soft-bodied fossil taxa, with fossils representing a snapshot of a particular stage of decay. We argue that numerous geological and biological processes account for fossilization and that all of these should be considered when reconstructing extinct organisms. (shrink)

Alan M. Turing’s last published work and some posthumously published manuscripts were dedicated to the development of his theory of organic pattern formation. In “The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis” (1952), he provided an elaborated mathematical formulation of the theory of the origins of biological form that had been first proposed by Sir D’Arcy Wendworth Thompson in On Growth and Form (1917/1942). While arguably his most mathematically detailed and his systematically most ambitious effort, Turing’s morphogenetical writings also form the most thematically (...) self-contained and least philosophically explored part of his work. We dedicate our inquiry to the reasons and the implications of Turing’s choice of biological topic and viewpoint. We will probe for possible factors in Turing’s choice that go beyond availability and acquaintance with On Growth and Form. On these grounds, we will explore how and to what extent his theory of morphogenesis actually ties in with his concept of mechanistic computation. Notably, Thompson’s pioneering work in biological ‘structuralism’ was organicist in outlook and explicitly critical of the Darwinian approaches that were popular with Turing’s cyberneticist contemporaries—and partly used by Turing himself in his proto-connectionist models of learning. Resolving this apparent dichotomy, we demonstrate how Turing’s quest for mechanistic explanations of how organisation emerges in nature leaves room for a non-mechanist view of nature. (shrink)

In this essay I propose that what design principles in systems biology and systems neuroscience do is to present abstract characterizations of mechanisms, and thereby facilitate mechanistic explanation. To show this, one design principle in systems neuroscience, i.e., the multilayer perceptron, is examined. However, Braillard (2010) contends that design principles provide a sort of non-mechanistic explanation due to two related reasons: they are very general and describe non-causal dependence relationships. In response to this, I argue that, on the one hand, (...) all mechanisms are more or less general (or abstract), and on the other, many (if not all) design principles are causal systems. (shrink)

En los últimos años, algunos autores han venido sosteniendo que la validez de la representación arborescente del patrón filético generado por la evolución está siendo menoscabada por el reconocimiento del impacto evolutivo que tendrían la transferencia genética horizontal, la simbiogénesis, la especiación por hibridación y la introgresión. Esa concepción o representación cladogenética de la evolución sólo nos dejaría ver un aspecto parcial de las relaciones de filiación que conectan a los diferentes linajes de seres vivos; ocultando otro aspecto cuya representación (...) más adecuada sería un reticulado de relaciones entre taxones. Con todo, aún sin poner en tela de juicio la frecuencia y la relevancia explicativa de dichos fenómenos, en este trabajo se intentará mostrar que su admisión y reconocimiento no tiene por qué ir en detrimento de esa concepción cladogenética de la evolución cuya relativización se está pregonando. Por el contrario, la comprensión y la representación de tales fenómenos supone dicha concepción. Palabras clave: Filogénesis, Especiación por hibridación, Introgresión, Simbiogénesis, TGH. (shrink)

Algunos aspectos de La expresión de las emociones de Charles Darwin pueden resultar intrigantes, pues, en la explicación de cómo tales expresiones se originan, Darwin casi nunca apela a la selección natural. En cambio, apela principalmente a la idea de que movimientos voluntarios se asocian a emociones, volviéndose por hábito innatos e involuntarios al heredarse a la descendencia. Si bien Darwin da varias razones para defender esta explicación, en este trabajo trataré de mostrar que, si se entiende el libro sobre (...) las expresiones en relación con los objetivos explícitos e implícitos de El origen del hombre, el asunto se entiende mejor. En particular, resulta interesante la tesis que Desmond y Moore plantean respecto a la importancia de los ideales antiesclavistas de Darwin a la hora del tratamiento de las razas. Defenderé en este trabajo que el enfoque de Desmond y Moore puede extenderse al libro acerca de las expresiones. Específicamente, estableceré vínculos entre la explicación del origen de las razas y la explicación del origen del rubor. Palabras clave: Charles Darwin, La expresión de las emociones, El origen del hombre, Rubor, Antiesclavismo. (shrink)

In both scientific and popular circles it is often said that we are in the midst of a sixth mass extinction. Although the urgency of our present environmental crises is not in doubt, such claims of a present mass extinction are highly controversial scientifically. Our aims are, first, to get to the bottom of this scientific debate by shedding philosophical light on the many conceptual and methodological challenges involved in answering this scientific question, and, second, to offer new philosophical perspectives (...) on what the value of asking this question has been — and whether that value persists today. We show that the conceptual challenges in defining ‘mass extinction’, uncertainties in past and present diversity assessments, and data incommensurabilities undermine a straightforward answer to the question of whether we are in, or entering, a sixth mass extinction today. More broadly we argue that an excessive focus on the mass extinction framing can be misleading for present conservation efforts and may lead us to miss out on the many other valuable insights that Earth’s deep time can offer in guiding our future. (shrink)

Issues surrounding pregnancy loss are rarely addressed in Christian philosophy. Yet a modest estimate based on the empirical and medical literature places the rate of pregnancy loss between fertilization and term at somewhere between 40–60%. If miscarriage really is as common as the research gives us to believe, then it would seem a pressing topic for a Christian philosophy of the future to address. This paper attempts to begin this work by showing how thinking more closely about pregnancy loss understood (...) as a grievable event can have a profound impact on the way we think about particular theoretical debates in Christian philosophy and provide opportunities for the discipline to put its skills to use in the development of helpful conceptual and hermeneutical resources for those grieving such losses. However, this will require seeking out and taking seriously the testimony of those who have undergone pregnancy loss, as well as getting clearer on how best to conceptualize pregnancy and its loss in the first place. (shrink)

ENG: We all have our own ideas about what it is like to be intelligent. Indeed, even the experts disagree on this topic. This has generated diverse theories on the nature of intelligence and its genetic and environmental bases. Many scientific and philosophical questions thus remain unaddressed: is it possible to characterize intelligence in scientific terms? What do IQ tests measure? How is intelligence influenced by genetics, epigenetics, and the environment? What are the ethical and social implications of the research (...) on this topic? This book aims to provide the readers with the conceptual resources to critically analyze scientific findings and orientate themselves in this multi-faceted debate across biology, psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and anthropology. -/- ITA: Ognuno di noi ha una propria idea di cosa significhi essere intelligenti, tanto che anche gli scienziati esperti in materia hanno opinioni differenti al riguardo. Ciò ha contribuito a generare teorie contrastanti sulla natura dell’intelligenza e su quali siano le sue basi genetiche e ambientali. Non è un caso, dunque, che diverse domande scientifiche e filosofiche restino ancora aperte: è possibile caratterizzare scientificamente l’intelligenza? Cosa misurano i test del QI? In che modo genetica, epigenetica e ambiente influenzano l’intelligenza? Quali sono le implicazioni etiche e sociali della ricerca sull’argomento? Oltre ad analizzare questi problemi, il testo intende fornire gli strumenti concettuali necessari per leggere criticamente i dati scientifici e orientarsi in uno sfaccettato e affascinante dibattito a cavallo tra biologia, psicologia, neuroscienze, filosofia e antropologia. (shrink)

Modern science generally assumes that the same laws of logic apply to mechanical, chemical and biological entities alike because they are all ultimately material objects. This may seem to be so obvious that there would be no need to validate it -- experimentally or logically. In this article we would like to critically examine this assumption and show that from an experiential/observational level, as well as from a rational/logical level, it is not valid. This becomes apparent, for instance, when we (...) consider the simple observation in which we distinguish animate from inanimate objects: those objects that seem to spontaneously move themselves and those that move only when impelled by some applied force outside or beyond the object. This distinction may be valid at the macroscopic level more than at the level of theoretical atomic particles. Thus the detailed nature of spontaneous movement must also be understood. (shrink)

This paper deals with the evolutionary origin and the adaptive function of emotion. I discuss the view that emotions have evolved as functional adaptations in both humans and non-human animals in order to cope with adaptive challenges and to promote fitness. I argue that there is evolutionary continuity between humans and animals in emotions and emotional expressions, and discuss behavioural argument for this thesis, specifically, Darwin’s and Ekman’s research on similarities in how humans and animals express their basic emotions. In (...) addition to this argument, I provide neuroscientific evidence that supports the claim that basic emotions are evolutionary old and shared among humans and many other animals. Finally, I conclude that animal emotions can be considered the bases and roots of our emotions that connect us to other sentient beings. (shrink)

Microbiome research shows that human health is foundationally intertwined with the ecology of microbial communities living on and in our bodies. This challenges the categorical separation of organisms from environments that has been central to biomedicine, and questions the boundaries between them. Biomedicine is left with an empirical problem: how to understand causal pathways between host health, microbiota and environment? We propose a conceptual tool – environmentality – to think through this problem. Environmentality is the state or quality of being (...) an environment for something else in a particular context: a fully perspectival proposition. Its power lies partly in what Isabelle Stengers has called the efficacy of the word itself, contrasting the dominant sense of the word environment as something both external and fixed. Through three case studies, we argue that environmentality can help think about the causality of microbiota vis-a-vis host health in a processual, relational and situated manner, across scales and temporalities. We situate this intervention within historical trajectories of thought in biomedicine, focusing on the challenge microbiome research poses to an aperspectival body. We argue that addressing entanglements between microbial and human lives requires that the environment is brought into the clinic, thus shortening the conceptual gap between medicine and public health. (shrink)

Analytic metaphysics has become increasingly extended into the social domain. The aim of this article is critical self-reflection on the challenges of transferring the tools of analytic metaphysics from classical cases such as the very existence of abstract or composed objects to socially-contested phenomena such as gender and race. In reflecting on the status of metaphysics of race, I formulate a polemical hypothesis of misalignment according to which the tools of analytic metaphysics are not suitable for engaging with complex racial (...) phenomena and politics. In addressing this challenge of misalignment, the article sketches a perspective on critical metaphysics of race as interdisciplinary action research. (shrink)

This paper discusses the evolutionary origin and adaptive functions of emotions, in line with contemporary evolutionary psychology. Drawing upon Charles Darwin’s study of emotional expressions, it is argued that there is an evolutionary continuity among animals in emotional capacities, and that the differences between humans and animals are differences in degree and not in kind. The focus is on basic or primary emotions (joy, fear, sadness, anger), as it has been consistently shown that they are universal and shared among many (...) different species. Basis for this view is the neuroscientific research on brain mechanisms underlying the emotions, especially subcortical brain regions that are proven to be the evolutionary old loci of emotions, homologous across many species. These neuroscientific data provide convincing empirical evidence for the existence of emotional experiences in animals and the evolutionary continuity among species. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published (changed to open access).

A mythopoetic paradigm or perspective sees the world primarily as a dramatic story of competing personal intentions, rather than a system of objective impersonal laws. Asma argued that our contemporary imaginative cognition is evolutionarily conserved-it has structural and functional similarities to premodern Homo sapiens’s cognition. This article will outline the essential features of mythopoetic cognition or adaptive imagination, delineate the adaptive sociocultural advantages of mythopoetic cognition, explain the phylogenetic and ontogenetic mechanisms that give rise to human mythopoetic mind, show how (...) mythopoetic cognition challeng­es contemporary trends in cognitive science and philosophy, and recognize and outline empirical approaches for a new cognitive science of the imagination. (shrink)

Modes of teaching and learning have had to rapidly shift amid the COVID-19 pandemic. As an emergency response, students from Philippine public schools were provided learning modules based on a minimized list of essential learning competencies in Biology. Using a cross-sectional survey method, we investigated students’ perceptions of the Biology self-learning modules (BSLM) that were designed in print and digitized formats according to a constructivist learning approach. Senior high school STEM students from grades 11 (n = 117) and 12 (n (...) = 104) participated in a survey using a 3-point Likert-scale questionnaire uploaded online through Google Forms. The survey results indicate that majority of the students perceived the modules positively, suggesting that aspects of the modules that were salient to students corresponded to essential elements of constructivist pedagogies. However, during interviews, students reported several difficulties in learning with BSLM as it was constrained by, to name a few, the use of unfamiliar words, lack of access to supporting resources, slow internet connection, and time constraints. To address these problems, teachers reported that they gave deadline extensions, complemented modules with other channels of support, and used online and offline platforms for reaching out to students to answer their queries and plan out their schedule for the week. The findings across the data sources point to the complex demands of emergency distance education that teachers, as curriculum designers and enactors, need to bear in mind in order to craft productive pedagogies, constructivist or otherwise, during this unprecedented time. (shrink)

Gregor Mendel, Thomas Hunt Morgan and experiments in classical genetics In the middle of the 19th century, Gregor Mendel performed a series of crosses with pea plants to investigate how hybrids are formed. Decades later, Thomas Hunt Morgan finalized the theory of classical genetics. An important aspect of Mendel’s and Morgan’s scientific approach is that they worked in a systematic, experimental fashion. But how did these experiments proceed? What is the relation between these experiments and Mendel’s and Morgan’s explanatory theories? (...) What was their evidential value? Using present-day insights in the nature of experimentation I will show that the answer to these questions is fascinating but not obvious. Crossings in classical genetics lacked a crucial feature of traditional experiments for causal discovery: manipulation of the purported causes. Hence they were not traditional, ‘manipulative’ experiments, but ‘selective experiments’. (shrink)