Abstract

In 1969 Robert Nozick published the first extensive philosophical analysis of the concept of coercion. His analysis has since generated a great deal of controversy. This dissertation is an attempt to resolve much of the controversy. It begins with a detailed review of recent work on coercion. Based on the lessons learned in this review, a new theory of coercion and its ethics is proposed. The theory identifies the essential features of a coerced choice and distinguishes several senses in which we might say that someone is coerced. By allowing for different senses of coercion with a common core, the theory is able to account for examples that are problematic without losing sight of valuable distinctions. For instance, one particularly controversial group of examples involves offers that appear to be coercive, even when no threat is present. The new theory allows many of these offers to be termed coercive, but not in the same strict sense that is associated with coercive threats. The treatment of the ethics of coercion that is presented in this dissertation is more comprehensive than any previous treatment of the topic. It challenges some commonly held beliefs. Most significantly, it challenges the belief that coercion is in itself a great moral evil. Many instances of coercion involve no moral violation. Immoral instances of coercion are generally immoral, not because of the coercion per se, but because of other morally objectionable features of the situation. The dissertation ends with an application of the new theory of coercion and its ethics to a public policy problem of current interest