Future, truth, and probability

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):251-263 (2025)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to some scholars, universalist semantics of the future are incompatible with classical ascriptions of probability. This alleged fact is used as an argument for the linearist semantics of the future. In this paper, we show that, on the contrary, universalist semantics of the future are in harmony with the theory of probability, while the advocates of linearist semantics have to pay high theoretical costs to maintain the coherence with the classical theory of probability.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,154

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2025-01-17

Downloads
3 (#1,846,357)

6 months
3 (#1,464,642)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Ciro De Florio
Università Cattolica di Milano

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations