Abstract

Timothy Williamson has brought valuable contributions to the understanding of the relationship between vagueness and knowledge. The philosopher argues that for a belief in a vague proposition to be considered knowledge, it is essential that it is not too close to indefinite conceptual boundaries. Williamson warns that even true beliefs can be merely coincidentally true if there is not an adequate margin of safety against error. Williamson argues that in sorites situations, problems extend beyond semantics to encompass epistemic issues. The author concludes that true beliefs, when too close to vague boundaries, are essentially true by chance, rendering them unsuitable for being considered knowledge. However, it is emphasized that vagueness is not a universal boundary and recognizes the existence of vague terms with relative and absolute boundary cases. While the former have uncertain application due to the lack of decisive methods for their use, the latter face an inherent incompleteness in the question. In summary, we will explore the essence of Williamson's argument, using simple and everyday examples to unravel the complexities of the relationship between vagueness and knowledge.