Abstract

Martin Heidegger’s formal indication is presented as part of the phenomenological methodology. When Heidegger is raising questions about the implications of the theoretical attitude, he is contrasting the theoretical with the historical as such. The formality of the formal indication must thus be distinguished from the generality of the generalization and that of the formalization. From Heidegger’s explication of the different senses of a phenomenon, it is shown that the sense of reference (Bezugssinn) and the sense of fruition (Vollzugssinn) must be kept open so that the phenomenon is not disfigured in advance by theoretical presuppositions on the one hand, and so that the phenomenon can concretize itself on the other hand. Only qua formalization can the factual experience of life, despite life’s tendency to objectivization and alienation, be adequately brought into the view of phenomenology. The author shows that the structure of the fruition of life (Vollzugsstruktur des Lebens) cannot be made accessible theoretically, but only within fruition (im Vollzug). The formal indication thus mediates between the generality of the structures and the concreteness of the indicated phenomenon, for these structures are only accessible and describable in the fruition of one’s own individualized existence.