Radical embodied cognitive science and “Real Cognition”

Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):115-136 (2019)
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Abstract

A persistent criticism of radical embodied cognitive science is that it will be impossible to explain “real cognition” without invoking mental representations. This paper provides an account of explicit, real-time thinking of the kind we engage in when we imagine counter-factual situations, remember the past, and plan for the future. We first present a very general non-representational account of explicit thinking, based on pragmatist philosophy of science. We then present a more detailed instantiation of this general account drawing on nonlinear dynamics and ecological psychology.

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Author Profiles

Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira
Technische Universität Berlin
Anthony Chemero
University of Cincinnati
Vicente Raja
University of Western Ontario