Abstract

Using a model of practical reasons defended by Phillipa Foot, Chapter III considers the claim that Kohlberg's work indicates that all men have reasons to be moral. After examining three ways in which this claim might be defended, Chapter III concludes that if we start with the model of reasons for action defended by Mrs. Foot, Kohlberg's work cannot be used to support the view that all men have reason to be moral. ;Chapter IV considers another account of practical reasons, one defended by Thomas Nagel in The Possibility of Altruism, to see if nevertheless Kohlberg's research might still be relevant to this debate. Nagel's account focuses upon the structure of practical reasons rather than their content. Starting with the account, Chapter IV reaches the preliminary conclusion that Kohlberg's work does support the claim that all men have reason to be moral. ;This conclusion leaves another important question to be answered. It next must be decided if Kohlberg's work gives us reasons for accepting the one model of reasons rather than the other. The remainder of Chapter IV examines the possibility that psychological research can provide philosophers with independent support for various and competing models of practical reasons. This Chapter concludes that Kohlberg's work does not. ;This dissertation considers the possibility that Lawrence Kohlberg's work in the study of moral development can be used to adjudicate certain philosophical questions concerning the foundations of morality. Specifically, Kohlberg's work is used in examining the question of whether or not all men have reason to be moral. The dissertation presents a critical appraisal of Kohlberg's theory of moral development within the context of an important and traditional philosophical debate. As such, this is neither solely a philosophical critique of Kohlberg, nor solely an independent philosophical discussion. ;Chapter I presents and explicates the issues which surround the debates concerning the foundations of morality and presents the initial defense for turning to Kohlberg's work in this regard. Chapter II then presents an extended and critical introduction to Kohlberg's account of moral development