Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach: In Need of a Moral Epistemology?

Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 38 (3):186-201 (2009)
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Abstract

Although Nussbaum’s “Capabilities Approach” clearly expresses a commitment to objectivity, this article argues that this commitment is rather ambiguous due to the conception of public reason it endorses. In particular, the CA cannot account for an objective justification of public reason, given certain characteristics of public reason. As a result, the CA jeopardizes the substantive aim it has set itself: to provide an objective justification for public choices regarding human capabilities and their specifications

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Iris Van Domselaar
University of Amsterdam

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