AI rule and a fundamental objection to epistocracy

AI and Society:1-13 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Epistocracy is rule by whoever is more likely to make correct decisions. AI epistocracy is rule by an artificial intelligence that is more likely to make correct decisions than any humans, individually or collectively. I argue that although various objections have been raised against epistocracy, the most popular do not apply to epistocracy organized around AI rule. I use this result to show that epistocracy is fundamentally flawed because none of its forms provide adequate opportunity for people (as opposed to individuals) to develop a record of meaningful moral achievement. This Collective Moral Achievement Objection provides a novel reason to value democracy. It also provides guidance on how we ought to incorporate digital technologies into politics, regardless of how proficient these technologies may become at identifying correct decisions.

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Sean Donahue
Australian National University

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References found in this work

Against Democracy: New Preface.Jason Brennan - 2016 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and Accommodation.John Danaher - 2016 - Philosophy and Technology 29 (3):245-268.
National self-determination.Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (9):439-461.

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