Abstract

While recent years have seen a substantial increase in research on clientelism, nearly all of it pertains to clientelism as an electoral strategy. This paper offers a general stocktaking of our understanding of the key issues in how clientelism arises, performs and (perhaps) diminishes, drawing on electoral studies while recognizing that findings in this realm do not always generalize to others. The specific questions addressed are: (1) What are the commonalities between electoral and non-electoral clientelism, and in what respects is the former distinctive? (2) What is the salience of the “commitment problem”—uncertainty over the future performance of clientelist offers—in both electoral clientelism and clientelism in general? (3) Given that clientelism entails exchanges over status inequalities, what is its relevance for studies of prosocial and dominant/submissive behaviors, and vice versa? (4) How should we view the relationship between the extent of clientelist practices in a given society and its degree of social, political and economic development or institutionalization? (5) Does clientelism require voluntary participation, or can it accommodate aspects of coercion? (6) How should clientelism be viewed normatively according to commonly applied criteria? The paper concludes with a few issues that deserve greater attention in future research.