Aristotle and the Dominion of Nature

Environmental Ethics 36 (2):203-214 (2014)
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Abstract

Although it is often held that Aristotle endorses anthropocentric dominionism, Aristotle’s writings include an account of nonhuman value. The interpretation of Aristotle’s natural teleology which assumes that the claim that plants and animals are “for the sake of humans” entails an axiologically anthropocentric view of nature. However, a combination of aspects of Aristotle ethics and natural teleology shows that nature is valuable insofar as it is constituted by natural objects, things with natures. In virtue of having a nature, an object has an end or good toward which it strives. Natural objects thus have morally relevant interests. Because having a nature is sufficient for intrinsic value, it is wrong to associate Aristotle with the dominion thesis

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