Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to defend the possibility of objectivity in ethics. My claim is that modern philosophy is working with an unexamined conception of objectivity, and this accounts for our failure to understand how ethical objectivity is possible. Chapter one presents the most compelling version of a skeptical challenge to the possibility of objectivity in ethics. "Objectivity" presupposes a standpoint that is unaffected by perspectival peculiarities. Given this model, the skeptic argues that, if we were to "step outside" of any particular ethical outlook, there would be no ethical truths to discover. ;Chapter two challenges the intelligibility of the idea that objectivity requires "detachment". The detachment model of objectivity is shown to be incoherent because it is grounded in an incoherent model of reflection. Thus, our failure to understand how ethical objectivity is possible can be traced to our failure to understand how reflection really works. ;This transition is made in chapter three. When we approach the issue of relativism from the perspective of a morally concerned agent, we see why relativism cannot be true. We also see why there is no way in which one can coherently defend the nonobjectivist thesis. At the same time, by acknowledging that there is some truth in relativism, we understand better why it could not make sense to try to locate the truth about ethical values by stepping "outside" of any particular outlook. Rather, a legitimating reflection can be seen to emerge from within an ethical practice. ;Chapter four articulates a model of reflection which does not require detachment from the conceptions we are critically examining. I argue that the Hegelian model of reflection is capable of supporting claims to objectivity in the way in which we are concerned to support them. This model provides a meaningful conception of what it is for ethical beliefs to be responsive to "the way things are". The conclusion shows how a coherent understanding of the possibility of ethical objectivity can help us to rehabilitate the very idea of an "absolute conception of reality", once the idea of "detachment" has been subjected to a thorough critique