Exit, Anonymity and the Chances of Egoistical Cooperation

Analyse & Kritik 22 (1):114-129 (2000)
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Abstract

This paper presents the results of computer simulations with a community of actors playing a large number of voluntarily iterated two-person-PD. The simulations are designed to enable uncooperative actors to exploit partners, leave them and find a new partner who knows nothing about their previous behavioral history. Hit-and-run exploitation should thrive under these conditions. However, as Schuessler (1989; 1990) has shown, the setting is highly unfavorable to uncooperative players. The present study extends this result to a wider set of strategies which can alternatively stay with defectors {and try to improve them) or leave them quickly. In addition, a class of seemingly clever strategies is introduced which try to exploit the expected dynamics of looking for a partner. Still, a high amount of egoistical cooperation can persist in the present scenario.

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