A criticism of Ross's hypothetical 'I can'

Mind 69 (273):80-83 (1960)
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Abstract

This article argues that the hypothetical 'I Can' position of Sir David Ross is incompatible with his determinism.

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10.1093/mind/lxix.273.80

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Rem B. Edwards
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Citations of this work

The ramist context of Berkeley's philosophy.Stephen H. Daniel - 2001 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (3):487 – 505.

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