Qualitative Judgments, Quantitative Judgments, and Norm-Sensitivity

Brain and Behavioral Sciences 33 (4):335-336 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Moral considerations and our normative expectations influence not only our judgments about intentional action or causation but also our judgments about exact probabilities and quantities. Whereas those cases support the competence theory proposed by Knobe in his paper, they remain compatible with a modular conception of the interaction between moral and nonmoral cognitive faculties in each of those domains.

Other Versions

reprint Egré, Paul (2010) "Qualitative judgments, quantitative judgments, and norm-sensitivity". Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33(4):335-336

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,752

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-01

Downloads
129 (#169,661)

6 months
13 (#253,178)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Paul Egré
École Normale Supérieure

Citations of this work

The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Empirical approaches.Florian Cova - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 117–141.
On Doing Things Intentionally.Pierre Jacob, Cova Florian & Dupoux Emmanuel - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment.Dean Pettit & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (5):586-604.
Grading, a study in semantics.Edward Sapir - 1944 - Philosophy of Science 11 (2):93-116.
Moral asymmetries and the semantics of many.Paul Egré & Florian Cova - 2015 - Semantics and Pragmatics 8 (13):1-45.

View all 7 references / Add more references