Ambiguity of "Intention"

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):348-349 (2010)
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Abstract

Knobe reports that subjects' judgments of whether an agent did something intentionally vary depending on whether the outcome in question was seen by them as good or as bad. He concludes that subjects' moral views affect their judgments about intentional action. This conclusion appears to follow only if different meanings of “intention” are overlooked

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Citations of this work

Verbal Disputes.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.

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References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Intention.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1957 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Intention.[author unknown] - 1957 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 13 (3):362-362.

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